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 The current anti-globalization movements can be seen as counter movements against neo-
liberalism staged by social groups who have not benefited much from global economic 
integration. The WTO has been criticized for restricting domestic regulatory autonomy that 
could accommodate the interests of some of the disadvantaged social groups by having very 
narrow and strict exceptions to trade disciplines. Particularly, the WTO judiciary has repeatedly 
refused to exempt domestic regulatory measures having policy objectives beyond the closed-end 
list prescribed in the exception clause of GATT Article XX in its jurisprudence by declining 
various approaches to circumvent that list. However, I argue and try to demonstrate that the 
interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX by the Appellate Body in recent years can be used to 
reconstruct the chapeau to exempt highly flexible domestic measures with objectives listed in 
Article XX and even domestic measures with objectives not listed in Article XX. This is only a 
tentative development so far, not yet substantiated by explicit Appellate Body endorsement and 
successful application in WTO dispute settlement. But it should be followed in order to help the 
WTO endure and finally survive the attacks from the counter movements around the world. 
Nevertheless, the new interpretation and the interpretations of the closely related texts, 
particularly the lettered subparagraphs of Article XX, need tweaks to be more internally 
consistent with one another. A number of WTO Agreements also contain clauses serving 
basically the same purpose of Article XX, which is to exempt domestic measures otherwise in 
violation of trade disciplines. The new interpretation of Article XX needs to be transplanted into 
these Agreements as well to achieve internal consistency of the WTO jurisprudence. Therefore, 
after reconstructing the chapeau of Article XX, I will make my suggestions supported by careful 
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This study focuses on how the World Trade Organization (WTO) should police its 
Members’ domestic regulations. The balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade 
disciplines under WTO rules is very fundamental to the world trading system. Among the few 
most important substantive rules, which are tariff caps, quantitative restriction elimination, Most 
Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), and National Treatment (NT), the NT obligation has turned 
out to be most demanding, having incidental but quite restrictive impacts on any imaginable 
domestic matter, even if it is basically of a non-trade nature. Therefore, the NT obligation is most 
intrusive and its interaction with domestic regulations has been one of the focal points of the 
relationship between international obligations and national sovereignty under the WTO.  
However, in the on-going trade war, the significance of this issue seems to have become 
less apparent. The trade war President Donald Trump started against many US trading partners, 
particularly China, has created the biggest crisis for the WTO. An even more imminent threat to 
the WTO arises from the Trump administration’s practice of blocking appointment of the 
Appellate Body (AB) members. The AB will soon become unable to operate at all when the 
tenure of two more members comes to an end in 2019. These are the gravest issues a world 
trading system could possibly face. One can argue, however, the current more serious crisis has 
its roots in the failure to properly balance the NT obligation and domestic regulatory autonomy. 
Ruggie once argued that the world trading system after World War II was built on the concept of 
“embedded liberalism,” which allowed nations to take various regulatory measures to 
accommodate special domestic needs.1 Market liberalization across national borders, if not 
embedded in non-economic social institutions, would help widen economic and social 
inequalities within a country. Capitalists and their agents would benefit more from globalization 
and trade liberalization while other social groups, particularly people selling their labor, would 
benefit less or even lose in the process. As is already evident today, the disadvantaged social 
groups would mount counter-movements against the movement of trade liberalization to protect 
themselves. As right-wing populists have gained momentum in both Europe and the United 
States, it is obvious that the WTO should respond one way or another, allowing national 
                                               
1  John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order’, 36 (2) International Organization 378-415 (1982), pp.382-383. 
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governments to protect those disadvantaged social groups who have not benefited from trade 
liberalization. The failure to do so would seriously undermine the WTO’s legitimacy and draw 
strong political opposition.  
When trade multilateralism reached its culmination in 1995, the new WTO not only cured 
the “birth defects” of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by establishing a 
formal institution, but also expanded from trade in goods into new domains of trade in services 
and intellectual property, strengthened substantive trade disciplines, and upgraded the dispute 
settlement mechanism. The achievements are truly tremendous. However, in the following 
twenty plus years, the political function of the WTO has not worked productively to address 
important issues faced by the world trading system, which is very unfortunate. Equally 
unfortunately, the WTO judiciary has been a little too cautious and rigid, and has not made 
enough efforts to understand and respond to the dynamics of international trade either. Problems 
including the one this study focuses on have been avoided and thus accumulated.  
When issues keep accumulating, not only will crises inevitably come, but also the WTO 
organs entrusted to address them would lose authority and respect. It is reasonable to say that the 
WTO judiciary is at least partially responsible for the on-going trade war and the very misfortune 
its AB is suffering. Jackson had warned that the WTO judiciary should not apply the WTO law 
too legalistically.2  It is desirable for the WTO judiciary to promote stability and predictability 
through consistent application of the rules. Jackson especially saw and welcomed the rule-
oriented approach taken by the WTO to deal with international trade issues.3 But “[a]ny legal 
system must accommodate the inherent ambiguities of rules and the constant changes of practical 
needs of human society.”4 Especially when the WTO political function is paralyzed, the hope of 
addressing tough issues lies only with the judiciary. The balance between domestic regulatory 
autonomy and trade disciplines has been treated as a legal issue. It can definitely be dealt with 
through the judicial approach. 
Nevertheless, if we count on the judiciary approach, we need to understand the relevant 
legal technicalities and develop jurisprudential routes with innovative interpretation to address 
                                               
2  John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence. The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998, p.61. 
3  John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence. The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998, p.60. 
4  John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence. The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998, p.61. 
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the issue of our concern. In WTO jurisprudence, domestic regulatory autonomy is greatly 
restricted first by the rule-exception structure in the GATT. Trade disciplines are the rules while 
domestic regulations are exceptions that have to be defended when they have impacts on trade. 
Restrictions on domestic regulatory autonomy are also embodied in the cumbersome conditions 
the exceptions have to meet. Finally, the most serious restriction may be that domestic 
regulations must have legitimate policy objectives that are on a short list prescribed in the 
exception clause. To circumvent these restrictions on domestic regulations, the extant literature 
has focused on reinterpreting GATT Article III – the NT clause – to accommodate more 
domestic regulatory autonomy. Some of those proposals are particularly able to circumvent the 
closed-end list in the exception clause and enable domestic regulatory measures to be justified 
with limitless policy objectives. Unfortunately, the WTO judiciary has repeatedly refused to 
reinterpret Article III.  
Scholars seem to think that it is impossible to find a way to circumvent the closed-end list 
if we try to expand domestic regulatory autonomy under the exception clause.5 This is why they 
repeatedly propose to reinterpret GATT Article III even when the WTO judiciary has repeatedly 
declined their proposals. After all, that list is prescribed in the exception clause. But is it true that 
there is less room for reinterpretation under the exception clause to expand domestic regulatory 
autonomy? This study is going to probe where it has been thought impossible. Particularly, this 
study suggests that the WTO judiciary has left openings in the case law concerning the chapeau 
of the exception clause to help domestic regulatory measures to circumvent some of the 
restrictions imposed on Members’ autonomy. With some clarifications and reinterpretation, the 
chapeau of the exception clause can provide accommodation to domestic regulatory measures 
that have policy objectives not based on the closed-end list maintained by the subparagraphs of 
the exception clause that imposes the most serious restriction on domestic regulatory autonomy.   
 
Roadmap of this study 
In the common law tradition, it is not uncommon for courts to take initiatives regarding 
some important issues. Nevertheless, a judicial solution cannot be viewed as successful if it only 
                                               
5 For example, one scholar commented, “Article XX provides a closed list of legitimate objectives to justify 
government intervention…the WTO judicial body is not in a position to expand the list so as to better handle the 
newly emerging challenges”. See Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the 
GATT/WTO Regime’, 14 (3) Journal of International Economic Law 639-675 (2011),  pp.671-672. 
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offers a blunt tool for important changes. A good judicial solution should be able to preserve the 
stability and predictability of the law as much as possible. In Chapter 1, after presenting the 
research question in more detail and showing the significance of the research, this study will first 
review the major alternatives proposed in the literature to solve the issue of our concern. An 
assessment of these alternatives will be made to see whether they are able to be incorporated into 
the jurisprudence without much difficulty. 
When Hudec first started academic discussion of the issue of policing domestic 
regulatory autonomy under the WTO, he proposed to introduce an “aim and effects” test into the 
determination of “like products” under GATT Articles III:2 and III:4. Thus, policy objectives 
would be considered and used to justify domestic regulatory measures impacting on trade 
without having to be subjected to the jurisprudential hurdles in the exception clause.6 But the AB 
clearly rejected the “aim and effects” test.7 People later proposed a resurrection of the “aim and 
effects” test regarding the interpretation and application of “treatment no less favourable” under 
GATT Article III:4.8 However, the AB again rejected the “aim and effects” test in a footnote of 
an important case.9 This issue was also discussed as part of  the “linkage” issue or the 
“fragmentation” issue. It was argued that the right to regulate is a right also recognized and based 
on general international law and the rights and obligations of the WTO Members under the WTO 
law should be determined not only by the WTO law but also by general international law as 
applicable law and interpretative material.10 Domestic regulation for non-trade values is therefore 
less constrained by the restrictive WTO rules. The WTO judiciary does take consideration of 
general international law, but it has been reluctant to apply substantive rules of external 
international law that are in conflict with trade disciplines.  
                                               
6 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.628. 
7 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), pp.630-632. 
8 Weihuan Zhou, ‘US – Clove Cigarettes and US – Tuna II (Mexico): Implications for the Role of Regulatory 
Purpose under Article III:4 of the GATT, 15 (4) JIEL 1075-1122 (2012), p.1078; William J. Davey & Keith E. 
Makus, ‘Thailand-Cigarettes (Philippines): A More Serious Role for the ‘Less Favourable Treatment’ Standard of 
Article III:4’, 12 (2) World Trade Review 163-193 (2013), pp.179-181; Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Robert 
Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects’, 37 (4) Journal of World Trade 783-799 
(2003), p.789; Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’, 14 (3) 
Journal of International Economic Law 639-675 (2011), pp.659-664.  
9 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US 
– Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, fn.372 
10 A comprehensive treatment of this topic, see Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, How 
WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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This study then proposes the central thesis that the most promising approach to expand 
domestic regulatory autonomy is to make use of the opening provided by the AB in EC – Seal 
Products to reinterpret the chapeau of the exception clauses in the GATT and GATS 
Agreements. Particularly, the reinterpretation should allow domestic regulatory measures 
violating substantive obligations to be justified by their policy rationales not listed in the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause. This approach not only satisfies the need to circumvent 
the closed-end list of legitimate policy objectives as prescribed in the GATT Article XX and 
GATS Article XIV subparagraphs, but also is more favored by the AB in recent years when 
compared with alternatives proposed in the literature. Moreover, my proposition is obviously 
applicable to both the trade-in-goods context and the trade-in-services context while some of the 
alternative propositions reviewed can only work with the GATT Agreement. Although in 
practice, the domestic regulatory autonomy issue is much more prominent in the GATT context, 
in the GATS context, it is equally important in theory and will possibly become more practically 
important in the future when trade in services becomes more regulated by the WTO. My 
proposition, however, is based only on a tentative development of the GATT Article XX chapeau 
so far. It is not yet substantiated by explicit AB endorsement and successful application in WTO 
dispute settlement. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I will first review the major cases concerning the 
development of the chapeau of the exception clause, trying to assess the acceptability of my 
proposition in the WTO case law.  
Chapter 2 reviews the jurisprudential history from the pre-WTO era of the world trading 
system to present. There is only one positive case supporting my proposition, which is EC – Seal 
Products. But it would be difficult to take EC – Seal Products seriously if it is only an isolated 
case overwhelmed by a body of negative precedents, particularly when the AB’s new 
interpretation in EC – Seal Products was somewhat vague and its application did not finally 
justify the EU’s measure. However, if there are a series of cases opening to, supporting or 
incrementally leading to the reinterpretation of GATT Article XX Chapeau in EC – Seal 
Products, not only the foundations for establishing EC – Seal Products as an important case 
would be more solid, but also proposed further jurisprudential developments in the vein of EC – 
Seal Products would be more feasible. A careful review finds there are some cases (not only 
GATT cases, but also cases concerning the GATS, TBT and SPS Agreements) containing 
openings that support the positive case. However, this chapter also finds a very negative case 
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prior to the positive case, which is Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. The influence of the negative case 
is still present today, and the positive case is vague on the specifics of the new development. 
Therefore, although my proposition has not been explicitly turned down by the WTO judiciary 
like the “aim and effects” test, and although there are some cases supporting EC – Seal Products, 
the development under the chapeau of the exception clause is only more promising instead of 
having been undoubtedly established.  
Nevertheless, the rich history can provide us with jurisprudential details for further 
analysis and synthesis regarding the particular standards or tests the new development would 
have and its implications for the expansion of Members’ domestic regulatory space, which will 
be discussed in later chapters. 
The key development of the chapeau of the exception clause will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. Briefly, assessing the legitimacy of trade measures violating substantive trade 
disciplines will focus on assessing the rationales behind the measures under the chapeau of the 
exception clause. If a disputed measure can be justified with its rationale not listed in the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause, on what conditions can it be justified? What elements 
should a test have to be able to perform this task? The EC – Seal Products revealed some key 
components for testing measures in the perspective of the rationales not on the short list. But the 
AB did not try to outline a complete test. Fortunately, earlier cases, particularly the TBT cases, 
have also provided clues to construct a more comprehensive test. Therefore this chapter will try 
to draw on EC – Seal Products and other cases to propose a reconstruction of the chapeau 
jurisprudence that can handle the examination of cases that need (or need not) to be justified by 
rationales not on the closed-end list. 
Chapter 4 will discuss the expanded scope of acceptable policy objectives if the WTO 
judiciary embraces the tentative development in EC – Seal Products. The scope can undoubtedly 
be expanded if my proposition is taken, but is there still a boundary? What criteria are needed to 
draw such a boundary? The reconstruction proposal of the chapeau of the exception clause in 
Chapter 3 will definitely discuss the test that will determine whether a policy rationale is 
acceptable or not under the chapeau, but the discussion is only a part of the overall 
reconstruction of the chapeau and not the focus. Chapter 4 will continue the discussion that will 
only be briefly touched upon in the previous chapter and try to shed more light. In the more 
detailed discussion in chapter 4, this study will first resort to discussion of standard of review 
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under the WTO, which is the most relevant jurisprudential theory about policing WTO 
Members’ domestic regulations. Then this chapter will suggest that the possible scope of 
acceptable rationales may be probed in two ways. The first one is to establish a general standard 
for acceptable policy objectives while the second one is to interpret the exception clause more 
expansively. This chapter will also discuss whether some high-profile contentious policy 
objectives and some low-profile but trendy policy rationales are acceptable or not.   
Nevertheless, the chapeau does not stand alone. The interpretations of the closely related 
texts may need tweaks to be more internally consistent with the reconstructed chapeau. Chapter 
5 will first try to examine the subparagraphs of the exception clause and the non-discrimination 
clauses, particularly the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX and GATT Article III:4. Basically, 
this study will argue that the subparagraph jurisprudence should keep rejecting examining any 
discrimination caused by the disputed measures. As long as discrimination is not examined under 
the subparagraphs of the exception clause, the disputed measures can easily survive the 
subparagraphs and hence have a chance to be finally justified under the chapeau by their 
rationales not listed in the subparagraphs. However, GATT Article (g) contains an explicit non-
discrimination requirement, which requires specific attention. A general review of the necessity 
test will also be conducted. It is possible to introduce the necessity test into the chapeau to assess 
whether discrimination can be explained by either the purported policy objectives, or most 
importantly, by other rationales. The subparagraphs are the right place for a look of a full-
fledged necessity test. There is one element of the necessity test, which is analysis of “reasonable 
availability” of alternatives, may overlap with the analysis of “administrative difficulties” under 
the chapeau. Therefore, a comparison or contrast of the two is needed to harmonize the 
relationship between the chapeau and the subparagraphs. Then, if the chapeau of the exception 
clause is relied upon to exonerate measures that can only be justified by rationales not listed in 
the subparagraphs, what should we do with Article III in the GATT context? Basically, the 
Article III jurisprudence, particularly the rejection of the “aim and effects” test, should remain 
intact, which will be further discussed.  
Two other WTO Agreements, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement, also contain 
clauses serving basically the same purpose of GATT Articles III and XX combined, which is to 
maintain a balance between trade liberalization and domestic regulatory autonomy. The new 
interpretation of the exception clause needs to be transplanted into these Agreements as well to 
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achieve internal consistency of the WTO jurisprudence. Chapter 5 will particularly focus on the 
implications of the reconstructed chapeau for the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement. It 
may not be necessary to dramatically reconstruct the relevant clauses in these two Agreements, 
but the relevant texts and jurisprudence, particularly the texts and jurisprudence of TBT Article 
2.1 and SPS Article 5.5, need to be reoriented for the reception of the reconstructed chapeau of 
the exception clause. In terms of jurisprudential technicality, we may see the same re-balancing 
issue may pose itself differently in the TBT context and the SPS context with an understanding 
that this issue will be somewhat redefined in terms of jurisprudential details. After Chapter 5, 
this study will conclude by summarizing its key findings. 




CHAPTER 1: THE ISSUE, ITS SIGNIFICANCE, AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Before engaging in detailed discussions of how the WTO judiciary should re-adjust the 
balance between trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy,  it is necessary to present 
the research question in more detail. It is particularly important to understand the legal 
technicalities concerning the issue of our concern in order to appreciate discussions in the 
interpretive approach in later chapters. The significance of this issue will be discussed next. The 
issue of our concern seems not so important in the face of the on-going trade war and the 
imminent threat to the AB. However, this issue, along with other issues, are actually at the root 
of the current crises faced with the WTO. This study then reviews the major alternatives 
proposed in the literature to solve the issue of our concern. An assessment of these alternatives 
will be made to see whether they are able to be incorporated into the jurisprudence without much 
difficulty. Unfortunately, they are not. Therefore, at the end of this chapter, this study proposes 
to re-interpret the chapeau of the exception clause to re-adjust the balance between trade 
disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy by following EC – Seal Products.  
 
1.1 The issue  
  
The issue of how the WTO should police domestic regulatory measures was acutely 
presented by Robert E. Hudec about 20 years ago.11 In his view, the issue arises from the fact 
that domestic regulations may sometimes negatively impact on trade. He argues that some 
domestic regulations may explicitly discriminate, that is to intentionally impose more 
burdensome treatment on imports, or other domestic regulations may not discriminate based on 
origin but nevertheless treat imports with de facto discrimination. Therefore, it is inevitable for 
the WTO to police domestic regulations to guard against protectionism and promote trade 
                                               
11 The importance of Hudec’s work on the balance between trade as promoted by the WTO and non-trade values as 
protected by domestic regulations, particularly the importance of his seminar article “GATT/WTO Constraints on 
National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘Aim and Effects’ Test”, was elaborated by Issue 4 (special issue) of Volume 
37 of the Journal of World Trade. Three articles in the special issue are particularly relevant. See Donald H. Regan, 
‘Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose Under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec’, 37 (4) Journal of World Trade 737-760 (2003), p. 737; Frieder Roessler, ‘Beyond 
the Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of Products 
Under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, 2003, 37 (4) Journal of 
World Trade 771-781 (2003), p. 771; Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: 
The Resurrection of Aim and Effects’, 37 (4) Journal of World Trade 783-799 (2003), pp. 783, 784.  
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liberalization. While explicit discrimination that is more likely to be protectionist and illegitimate 
deserves to be governed by more severe rules, de facto discrimination may have legitimate 
reasons and hence should not be governed by the same severe rules. However, Hudec finds that, 
because the relevant legal texts do not provide a basis for distinguishing these two types of 
discrimination, the WTO law, primarily GATT Article III as a substantive clause containing the 
national treatment obligation and Article XX as a general exception clause, has treated both 
explicit discrimination and origin-neutral discrimination very strictly without any difference, 
which in his opinion would undermine the delicate balance between trade disciplines and 
domestic regulatory autonomy and draw strong political opposition.12    
From the jurisprudential perspective, Hudec suggested that the roots of the issue were 
two GATT clauses, Article III and Article XX. Article III contains the national treatment 
obligation. Articles III:1, III:2, and III:4 are the key sub-clauses, which read: 
Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation 
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, 
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative 
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts 
or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production. 
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal 
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise 
apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a 
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. 
[Ad note to Articles III:2] A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence 
of paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the 
second sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on the one 
hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or 
                                               
12 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), pp. 619-623, 633. 
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substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.  
… 
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the 
product.  
…  
Article III:1 is the introduction. It informs the entire Article III and sets forth the purpose or 
principle, which is that domestic fiscal and other regulatory measures “should not be applied to 
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production”. Article III:2 is 
one of the two operative clauses in Article III that are of interest for this study. Article III:2 is 
concerned with domestic fiscal measures. Its first sentence requires WTO Members not to charge 
foreign products taxes and fees higher than those applied to “like” domestic products. Its second 
sentence with its ad note is concerned with “directly competitive or substitutable products” 
instead of “like products”. However, since competitive or substitutable products may be very 
different in terms of tax classification, Article III:2, second sentence does not have the same 
specific requirement as the first sentence. Instead, it refers back to the general non-protective 
principle in Article III:1. Article III:4 is concerned with more variety of domestic regulations and 
requires foreign products should not be less favorably treated than domestic “like products”. 
Different from Article III:2, Article III:4 is not concerned with competitive or substitutable 
products, nor does it refer back to the principle set forth in Article III:1.  
When there is a prima facie violation of national treatment obligation, it is standard 
exercise to invoke GATT Article XX for an affirmative defense. The key clauses in Article XX 
read: 
Article XX: General Exceptions 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
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countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
(a)  necessary to protect public morals;  
(b)  necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
…  
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to 
customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 
of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, 
and the prevention of deceptive practices;  
…  
(g)  relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.  
…  
To justify a measure found in violation of Article III and some other trade disciplines, the 
measure has to pass the examination under one of the ten subparagraphs of Article XX. So far, 
subparagraphs (a), (b), (d), and (g) have been invoked in WTO dispute settlement. If the measure 
meets the standard set forth in one of the subparagraphs, it has to go through the examination of 
the chapeau – the introductory clause – of Article XX before it is finally justified.  
Other WTO Agreements including the GATS Agreement, the TBT Agreement, and the 
SPS Agreements contain clauses analogous to GATT Article III and/or Article XX. They help to 
provide balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade disciplines, particularly the 
national treatment obligation, in areas concerning trade in services, standards, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary matters. The lines drawn between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade 
disciplines in the different legal instruments may vary due to variations of their specific non-
discrimination requirements and justifications provided. Overall, GATT Article III and Article 
XX are the most important clauses in the WTO law regarding policing domestic regulations 
because of their widest coverage. 
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One of the biggest constraints the WTO imposes on domestic regulatory autonomy is that 
domestic regulatory measures, when negatively impacting on imports, must have an acceptable 
policy objective as specified in a closed-end list particularly provided by GATT Article XX 
subparagraphs (and its equivalents in the GATS Agreement) in order to survive a challenge 
under the WTO law.13 WTO Members can only exercise their regulatory autonomy when they 
implement a limited number of policy objectives in their measures if they impact on trade. There 
appears to be no way in which WTO Members can possibly pursue policy objectives that are not 
explicitly recognized by the list as long as their measures negatively impact imports. However, 
national governments have to perform their duties to provide public goods or protect the interests 
of their constituents without the limit of a short list. There is no doubt that an irreconcilable 
tension between WTO trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy therefore exists.     
In the following years, things have evolved a little differently from what Hudec had in 
mind regarding this issue. Most importantly, domestic regulatory measures that have purported 
policy objectives not on the list provided in GATT Article XX have not really been challenged 
under the WTO. Maybe, WTO Members, with the list in mind, have tried to avoid having 
domestic regulations with purported policy objectives clearly not on the list. What really reveals 
the problem of the short list is domestic regulatory measures having internal inconsistencies. 
These measures are usually flexible about the levels of attainment of their purported policy 
objectives and choices of implementing means. Some of them have carve-outs that do not 
contribute to the achievement of their purported policy goals at all or even go against them. 
Flexibilities and carve-outs create internal inconsistencies and hence discrimination. Products or 
services associated with low levels of attainment of the regulatory policy objectives or less 
infringing implementing means, or covered by the carve-outs apparently enjoy better competitive 
opportunities. Nevertheless, more and more of the discriminatory measures challenged under the 
WTO have been this type of measure. They take consideration of other values or interests 
affected and grant certain exemptions, which is reasonable and even imperative in today’s 
complicated and highly integrated society. However, even if these measures do have purported 
policy objectives falling on the list provided by the exception clause, because they are “flawed” 
with internal inconsistencies, there are doubts raised as to whether these measures’ purported 
                                               
13 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p. 622. 
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policy objectives are genuine.14 While WTO Members may have compelling reasons for having 
measures with internal inconsistencies,15 it seems that measures have to be designed and 
implemented with full commitment to their purported objectives in order to survive challenges 
under the WTO law.16 The current jurisprudence seems to be very unfriendly to flexible 
regulatory measures or measures with exemptions while these measures are becoming more 
popular. Then tension between trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy is thus 
intensified. 
In US – Gasoline, for example, when the United States imposed gasoline quality 
requirements on both domestic and foreign refiners for the objective of conserving clean air, it 
had different baseline requirements for domestic and foreign refiners. While domestic refiners 
were required to reduce pollutants against individual baselines, foreign refiners were asked to 
reduce pollutants against a more demanding statutory baseline. An internal inconsistency and 
hence discrimination was thus created. Article XX (g), the conservation exception, was invoked 
to justify its violation of the NT obligation as provided in GATT Article III. However, the 
conservation exception could not justify the internal inconsistency of the US measure. 
Obviously, if the US measure is to conserve clean air, there is no reason to treat domestic and 
foreign refiners differently. Therefore, the measure eventually failed the chapeau of GATT 
Article XX. The United States tried to explain the discrimination with enforcement 
considerations, but these considerations were obviously not related to any of the policy 
objectives on the list. It seems that, in principle, it is nearly impossible for measures with internal 
inconsistencies to survive the WTO law when justifications of discrimination are limited to those 
provided on the short list. Even if their purported policy objectives are on the list, they are 
                                               
14 Gracia Marin Duran, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a Conflict 
between GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) Journal of International Economic 
Law 467-495 (2016), p. 493; Philip I. Levy & Donald H. Regan, ‘EC – Seal Products: Seals and Sensibilities (TBT 
Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports)’, 14 (2) World Trade Review 337-379 (2015), p. 363. 
15 Donald H. Regan, ‘Measures with Multiple Purposes: Puzzles from EC – Seal Products’, 108 American Journal 
of International Law Unbound 315-322 (2014), p. 315; Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, ‘Regulatory 
Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution’, 1 (2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 303-322 (1998), p. 303.  
16 Scholars once observed that “the WTO permits Members to implement regulatory and legislative acts freely to 
promote whatever public policy they deem appropriate for their national interests, as long as these measures do not 
discriminate between imported and domestically produced goods of the same kind, or between trading partners”. 
Discrimination meant in this statement is discrimination in the perspective of the “regulatory and legislative acts” or 
the perspectives of the immediate policy objectives of these “regulatory and legislative acts”. See Henrik Horn, 
Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’, NBER Working 
Paper No.12745, 2006, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12745.  
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categorically unable to explain the internal inconsistencies. While some other policy rationales 
may be able to explain the internal inconsistencies, they are most usually not on the list or may 
even undermine the purported policy objectives that are on the list. Measures of this kind are 
almost doomed.  
Take Brazil – Retreaded Tyres for another example. Brazil prohibited importation of 
retreaded and used tires for a health objective. However,  it carved out two exemptions, allowing 
importation of retreaded tires from certain origins and importation of used tires for domestic 
manufacturers to produce retreaded tires. The exemptions created internal inconsistencies and 
hence discrimination although they did not necessarily give rise to the MFN or NT issues in the 
technical sense. The policy objective of the Brazilian measure was invoked under Article XX (b) 
to justify its violation of certain GATT obligations. Although the health objective was on the list, 
it is obvious that it could not justify the internal inconsistencies of the Brazilian measure. Brazil 
argued that the exemptions were carved out in order to comply with an international tribunal 
ruling and a domestic court ruling. However, following court orders was not a rationale related to 
any policy objective recognized by the list. They even undermined the health policy objective of 
the Brazilian measure. Again, it is apparent that measures with internal inconsistencies are 
particularly prone to being struck down because of the limited coverage of the list. 
There are also a couple of more developments worth mentioning. First, most domestic 
regulatory measures challenged in the WTO tribunals have been origin-neutral. Discrimination 
explicitly based on origin has rarely been found. It is possible that WTO Members have learned 
how to turn explicitly discriminatory measures into origin-neutral ones. Since more and more 
disputed measures are recognized to have a legitimate policy objective as listed in the exception 
clause, what is really at issue is their internal inconsistencies. In such a case, traditional explicit 
discrimination based on origin can hardly be found. EC – Hormones us a clear example. In that 
case, the European Union prohibited imported meat products treated with hormones for growth 
purposes,17 claiming that growth hormones pose health risks.18 The US beef was most impacted 
for the usage of growth hormones is common in the United States. Domestic European beef was 
not affected because growth hormones were discouraged in Europe although the usage of some 
                                               
17 WTO Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, 
adopted 18 August 1997, paras Ⅱ.1-Ⅱ.5. 
18 WTO Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, 
adopted 18 August 1997, para III.4. 
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other hormones, which may pose the same level of health risks, were still allowed. We can see a 
discrimination was created, not nakedly based on origins but on a tailored health policy. 
Particularly, even if discrimination caused by the internal inconsistency of a disputed measure 
may actually be based on origin, as in US – Gasoline and a few other cases, it may still be able to 
disguise itself by cloaking the entire measure with a legitimate policy objective. But explicit 
discrimination does not simply disappear, it may disguise itself as de facto discrimination.19 
Disguised de facto discrimination is different from de facto discrimination. De facto 
discrimination, according to Hudec, accidentally discriminates against imports or accidentally 
has negative impact on trade, therefore “guilty of nothing more than transgressing certain 
abstract notions of ‘likeness’.”20 Disguised de facto discrimination may design and implement 
policies with particular distinctions to perfectly match origins. It is as bad as explicit 
discrimination, or even worse. In that case, disguised de facto discrimination may warrant 
imposing strict rules on it. Second, to achieve certain regulatory objectives, the measures taken 
by WTO Members need not only be domestic measures, border measures can also be used to 
achieve the same objectives.21 Take US – Shrimp for an example. The US measure was an import 
ban of shrimp if foreign shrimp fishing vessels did not install “turtle exclusion devises (TEDs)” 
to conserve sea turtles.22 Discrimination was clearly created among the trading partners of the 
United States—those who adopted essentially the same turtle conservation program as the United 
States were allowed to export shrimp to the United States while those who did not were 
                                               
19 James Flett commented on the distinction made by Hudec between explicit discrimination and de facto 
discrimination, saying “[i]t cannot be that the exercise of local regulatory autonomy, even when facially origin 
neutral, is always beyond the purview of federal trade adjudicators, because it may happen that regulations are 
adopted without any true regulatory purpose, but rather with the sole object and effect of restricting trade.” James 
Flett, ‘WTO Space for National Regulation: Requiem for a Diagonal Vector Test’, 16 (1) Journal of International 
Economic Law 37-90 (2013), p. 43. 
20 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p. 626. 
21 Although a ban on the importation of foreign products were held to be a domestic measure enforced “at the time 
or point of importation” by the Panel in EC – Asbestos. See WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC - Asbestos), WT/DS135/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 
8.99. However, the ban on importation was implemented together with the ban on manufacture, processing, sale, 
placing on the domestic market and transfer. Therefore, it may be argued that the ban on importation is the logical 
corollary of the general domestic regulations of asbestos products. However, in US – Shrimp, the United States 
imposed a ban on the importation of shrimp without further domestic regulations of shrimps. The US ban was only 
examined as a quantitative border measure. See US – Shrimp, Panel report, para. 8.1. If in EC – Asbestos, there were 
only the ban on importation, it was possible that it would have been examined as a border measure. Also see Joel P. 
Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10 (3) Journal of International Economic Law 631-651 (2007), p. 
634. 
22 WTO Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimps), 
WT/DS58/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 2.4-2.16.  
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prohibited from exporting shrimp to the United States. More importantly here, a de facto 
discrimination was also created between domestic shrimp and foreign shrimp that was not allowd 
to be imported. The balance between trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy has 
actually turned into a balance between trade disciplines on the one hand and domestic measures 
and border measures on the other hand. Therefore, recent scholarship on this topic has avoided 
using the concept of “domestic” regulations. Yet, in most cases, the measures pursuing 
regulatory objectives that have been challenged under the WTO are still domestic regulatory 
measures.  
While the straightjacket the WTO put on domestic regulatory autonomy has remained, 
the developments related to this issue have made it more complicated. The possibility that bad 
faith discrimination may disguise itself as non-explicit discrimination makes the WTO judiciary 
reluctant to relax restrictions on measures violating GATT Article III. Border measures that 
implement national regulatory policies can blur the line between quantitative trade restrictions 
and discrimination. Hence the WTO may have to deal with the balancing issue under the 
exception clause because the exception clause can balance both domestic measures and border 
measures. These developments appearing evasive of the strict rules are probably prompted by the 
restrictions the WTO put on domestic regulatory autonomy. Conversely, the developments make 
the WTO judiciary more careful and reluctant to relax its policing efforts, which in turn makes 
the WTO look even more intrusive.  
 
1.2 Why is the issue important? 
 
How the WTO restricts its Members’ domestic autonomy is definitely important in terms 
of legal technicalities, but it matters little in terms of the political opposition created. Ordinary 
people do not understand the difference between measures with internal inconsistencies and 
domestic regulations in Hudec’s mind, nor do they care. What matters is that people see that 
domestic regulatory measures have repeatedly been struck down by the WTO. When the 
measures struck down by the WTO protect the interests of certain social groups in WTO 
Member countries, these groups may get very upset about the WTO and hence globalization and 
free trade that the WTO stands for.  
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The WTO, succeeding the GATT after its 40 plus years’ evolution, represents the highest 
achievement of free trade institutionalism and globalization. Its success was based on the 
popularity of the Washington Consensus after the downfall of the Soviet Union and the 
communist governments in its satellites, the debt crisis in South American counties that tried the 
import substitution development model, and the rise of the United States as the only super power 
and its championing of neo-liberalism. However, that ideological consensus achieved in 
Washington did not last very long. The most fundamental idea of free trade seems not accepted 
any more by the general public and their representatives in some of the major countries as some 
social groups do not benefit from free trade and the institutions that promote it.   
“[The] ascendancy of market rationality…must be related to the political and cultural 
ascendance of the middle classes”23. On the other hand, the increased resentment of free trade 
and intensified anti-globalization sentiments must be associated with the rise of social groups 
who have not benefited in the liberalization of world market, particularly those groups in 
developed democracies where their political power is somewhat more guaranteed. Nobel laureate 
Joseph Stiglitz previously focused his studies of the discontent of disadvantaged social groups at 
globalization in developing countries, but in his new book about globalization, he acknowledged 
that his theories about anti-globalization were equally applicable to the reality in developed 
countries.24 Actually, it is the discontent in the developed countries that has produced important 
political changes at the domestic level and the international level. As the middle classes in the 
developed countries are shrinking, the political and cultural powers of other social groups begin 
to grow, and they may seek to restrain market ideologies that have not served them well and 
promote the agendas they care about most. “The battle of Seattle” and protests accompanying 
other WTO Ministerial conferences demonstrated the powers and resolve of social groups whose 
interests and hence ideologies are at odds with free trade. But the emergence and ascendance of 
radical right populist parties in some European countries are more troubling signs that the 
relative power of the social groups that are against globalization and cross-border integration has 
become dominant in the politics of developed democracies.25 The victory of Trump in the 2016 
                                               
23 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order’, 36 (2) International Organization 378-415 (1982), p.386. 
24 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti Globalization in the Era of Trump. WW 
Norton & Company. Inc, 2018 First Chapter.  
25 Andrej Zaslove, ‘Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an Anti-
Globalization Movement’, 6 (2) Comparative European Politics 169-189 (2008), pp. 188, 189;  
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general election in the United States more or less resonated with the right-turning trend in 
Europe.26 
Basically, the rise of right-wing political power and the anti-globalization movements can 
be explained by the failure of governments to redistribute the aggregated benefits generated from 
trade. Workers in certain industries would certainly suffer job losses due to international trade, 
which is natural economic re-adjustment to international competition. It is unavoidable that 
domestic distribution of the benefits from international trade is uneven among all industries. As a 
result, job losses in some industries may not be the result of unfair competition and these losses 
are possibly compensated by job creation in other industries if we consider a nation as a single 
economic entity.27 However, while some industries in developed countries such as the high-tech 
and financial industries may well benefit from international trade, people who are in the failing 
industries are not compensated. As the discontent of the disadvantaged social groups that do not 
benefit through trade and globalization has accumulated, trade and globalization have become 
targets of criticism from these groups. Therefore, the theory of comparative advantage is not 
wrong, the problem is that capitalism and the free market do not make all social groups better 
off. As the international institutions based on neo-liberalism promote trade and globalization, 
they are necessarily the targets of criticism at the international level. Particularly when 
nationalism is popular, international institutions like the WTO are perfect outlets of discontent. 
When WTO law further restrains domestic re-adjustments that are often in the forms of domestic 
regulations and other national regulations protecting various domestic interests, it looks like that 
the WTO is holding a smoking gun when discontented people are looking for a scapegoat to vent 
their anger.  
It is a deeply-held belief by some people that an economy is supposed to be embedded in 
social relations and serve non-economic purposes.28 The movement of capitalism, particularly 
the rise of self-regulating markets, domestically or internationally, forces people to take their 
chances in the market where they are absolutely disadvantaged vis-a-vis capital. Naturally, those 
groups who do not benefit from market liberalization would try to protect themselves through 
                                               
26 Enzo Traverso, ‘Trump’s Savage Capitalism: The Nightmare is Real’, 34 (1) World Policy Journal 13-17 (2017), p. 
17. 
27 See, for example, Romain Wacziarg & Jessica Seddon Wallack, ‘Trade Liberalization and Intersectoral Labor 
Movements, 64 Journal of International Economics 411-439 (2005). 
28 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (second paperback 
edition), Boston: Beacon Press, 2001, pp. 48-49. 
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counter-movements against market power, including demanding protection by the government. 
When their disadvantage is institutionalized and their demand for protection is refused, their 
dissatisfaction grows even greater.29 Fortunately, as Ruggie argued, the world trading system in 
the post-War era could be defined as embedded liberalism, which allowed highly discretional 
accommodations of various non-economic domestic needs.30 Therefore, the development of the 
world trading system did not really prompt an anti-trade or anti-globalization movement at the 
beginning.  
In the early years of the GATT, tariffs were still high. Non-trade barriers were still 
waiting for their time to become regulated; therefore legal instruments concerning them were 
pretty much under-developed and less intrusive. The GATT dispute settlement mechanism was 
negotiation-oriented at the beginning although it gradually became more legalistic.31 Overall, the 
world trading system was not very restrictive on domestic measures that provided social 
protections to certain social groups and non-economic interests . Moreover, developed countries 
experienced long economic booms in the aftermath of the Second World War and they were 
more internationally competitive vis-à-vis developing countries. They had the luxury to offer 
protections to underprivileged social groups and pay great attention to non-economic values 
while sacrificing economic efficiency or competitiveness.  
With tariffs reduced to 4.7% on average and non-tariff barriers beginning to be 
constrained in the 1970s,32 members of the international economic system began to feel greater 
international competitive pressures. In such a situation, the French School’s argument that more 
intense international competition in globalization could constrain the domestic policy choices 
that provides social protections sounded true.33 For the United States, due to the recovery of the 
European countries and the rise of the East Asian Tigers, American companies began to lose 
competitive advantages. To make things worse, the oil crises in the early 1970s crippled certain 
                                               
29 Polanyi’s double movements framework is useful in explaining how laissez-faire policies institutionalize the 
disadvantage of certain social groups, particularly the working class and how the disadvantaged social groups would 
resist and counter-balance the market power. See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time (second paperback edition), Boston: Beacon Press, 2001, pp. 171, 213. 
30 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order’, 36 (2) International Organization 378-415 (1982), pp.382-383. 
31 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International economic relations: 
Cases, Materials and Text (4th ed.). St Paul, Minn: West Group , 2002, pp. 256-257. 
32 The WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm. 
33 David Neilson, ‘Remaking the Connection: Marxism and the French Regulation School’, 44 (2) Review of 
Radical Political Economics 160-177 (2012), pp. 165-166. 
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major American industries that were not as energy efficient as their foreign competitors, say 
Japanese companies. At home, the New Deal legacy was therefore discarded in the 1970s to cut 
costs.34 And the United States adopted more conservative economic policies under the Regan 
Administration.35 On the international front, the United States began to push for reforms of the 
world trading system to restrict its trading partners’ non-tariff trade restrictive measures so as to 
gain more foreign market access for its economy. That is a bit paradoxical. At the domestic level, 
national policies are becoming conservative, but at the international level, countries are pushing 
for more liberal institutions. However, the logic is simple. The liberalization at the international 
level is a demand primarily targeting trading partners although any country taking part in the 
world trading system has to offer something in exchange. Within a certain extent, the conflicts 
between national policies and international institutions can be contained.  
Eventually, in the heyday of neo-liberalism after the downfall of the Soviet Union and the 
communist governments of its satellites, the Uruguay Round of GATT trade talks upgraded the 
GATT to the WTO which corrected the “birth defects” of the GATT. With the WTO in place, 
market forces and capital within national borders and around the world got reinforced. Domestic 
market liberalization had one stronger excuse, which is that Members have binding obligations 
under the WTO to be more liberal. With the international movement of liberalization had such a 
sweeping victory, the conflicts between national policies and international institutions reached a 
new height and may not be contained any more.  
When the world trading system was upgraded from the GATT to the WTO in 1995, it 
was said with approval that the “birth defect” of the world trading system was cured36 and that 
the era of the rule of law was ushered in.37 However, some people were more critical, seeing that 
the “side agreements” refining the original GATT texts and particularly the judicialization of 
dispute settlement took too much flexibility away from the trading system and resulted in greatly 
                                               
34 Sanford M. Jacoby ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 173. 
35 John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill, The Regan Experiment: An Examination of Economic and Social Policies 
under the Regan Administration. Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute, 1982, pp. 1-2  
36 John H. Jackson, Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, March 23, 1994. For a list of major negative 
consequences that were “cured” by the WTO, see John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text (4th ed.). St Paul, Minn: West Group , 
2002, pp214-216. 
37 Joseph, H. H. Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External 
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement’, 35 (2) Journal of World Trade 191-207 (2001), pp. 198-200; Judith 
Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and International Politics’, 54 (3) International Organizations 385-399 
(2000), p. 389. 
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restricting national regulatory autonomy.38 Being more powerful and shielding itself with more 
technocracy, the world trading system became more able to ignore pressures from stakeholders 
outside the trade community. Despite the fact that the WTO Agreement more explicitly 
advocates for the promotion of diversified interests and values, people saw that the WTO had 
deviated from the original “embedded liberalism.”39  
The power of anti-globalization began to build up afterwards. The “battle in Seattle” 
demonstrated the power against neo-liberalism. The WTO immediately lost its momentum after 
it reached its culmination. It was proposed in the new round of trade talks in the WTO to include 
non-trade issues such as environment issues and labor issues. However, no more progress in 
liberalization has been made. The WTO has been stopped from moving forward for more than 20 
years. However, the anti-globalization movements did not have effective ways to push further 
back. Government measures trying to intervene with foreign human rights or labor rights are met 
with strong opposition. Government measures trying to protect domestic interests are seen as 
violations of the rules of the international free trade and investment institutions. Private 
enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSRs) faces many problems like ineffective 
auditing, 40  lack of government incentives, 41  and sustainability issues after the initial 
momentum’s exhaustion.42 
Then, how would anti-globalization forces built up so powerfully find an outlet and push 
back? The ordinary people, mostly the working class, may be easily misled and manipulated by 
radicals when they are left helpless and confused. Populist nationalism, with its rhetoric against 
free trade, becomes very attractive to disadvantaged social groups.43 This was what happened 
right before the First World War and the Second World War. Their powers were taken advantage 
of, not for their interests, but for their greater suffering. However, capitalists did not really 
                                               
38 Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’, 14 (3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 639-675 (2011), pp.647-650. 
39 Jeffery L. Dunoff, ‘The Death of the Trade Regime’, 10 (4) European Journal of International Law 733-762 
(1999), p. 738; Robert Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy – And Back Again: The Fate of The Multilateral 
Trading Regime’, 96 (1) American Journal of International Law 94-117 (2002), p. 106. 
40 Richard M. Locke, Fei Qin, & Alberto Brause, ‘Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike’, 
61 (1) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 3-31 (2007), p. 21. 
41 Layna Mosley, ‘Workers’ Rights in Global Value Chains: Possibilities for Protection and for Peril’, 22 (2) New 
Political Economy 153-168 (2017), pp. 157-159. 
42 Christina Niforou, ‘International Framework Agreements and Industrial Relations Governance: Global Rhetoric 
versus Local Realities’, 50 (2) British Journal of Industrial Relations 352-373 (2012), p. 361. 
43 Simon Lester & Inu Manak, ‘The Rise of Populist Nationalism and the Renegotiation of NAFTA’, 21 (1) Journal 
of International Economic Law 1151-1169 (2018), pp.153-156. 
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compromise and cooperate when the forces against liberal market tried to push back, which is 
not conducive to the creation of a constructive outlet for the conflicts. Therefore, we had two 
world wars and working class revolutions around the world. 
Today, international neo-liberalism has built insurmountable technical barriers for the 
anti-globalization movements to find a way to push back more peacefully. One of the biggest 
problems is that only national governments are legal entities under most international institutions 
such as the WTO. And international diplomacy has a strong tradition of secrecy to exclude 
domestic influence. Although unsatisfactory, various social powers do have access to domestic 
political life and institution building. However, they are excluded from international politics and 
institution building. They may try to impact upon international institutions through domestic 
political activities, but the difficulties are doubled. They have to face the very confusing 
mechanisms, procedures, and rules that all pose great barriers for them to exert their powers 
peacefully. If capitalists insist foolishly on the formal rigidity and confusing technicalities, which 
are created unfairly to the disadvantage of the underprivileged social groups in the first place, 
what would happen could be that the anti-globalization movements have to smash everything, 
and just for the world to go through another circle of violence and destruction again.  
So, hopefully, the current institutions should be more open to the demands of the 
underprivileged social groups, allowing their voice to be heard and powers to be peacefully 
exercised not only domestically but also internationally. Thus, international institutions can help 
to reach a balance of benefits for both capitalists and those underprivileged. Then there can be 
more domestic regulatory autonomy for domestic authorities to deal with social issues. The 
powers of market liberalization and the anti-globalization movement can reach an equilibrium 
without a devastating clash of the two. 
 
1.3 Possible routes to expand domestic regulatory space under the WTO: A literature 
review 
 
As the counter movements against neo-liberalism began to gain momentum in the late 
1990s, as an institution, the WTO, also susceptible to the law of survival, began to feel the 
pressures. When the power of the anti-globalization movements grows strong enough, the WTO 
has to respond one way or another. With regard to the issue raised by Hudec, the commentators 
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have argued that the WTO should expand domestic regulatory autonomy by allowing Members 
to take domestic regulatory measures to address social issues much more freely. More 
specifically, domestic regulatory measures that are becoming more flexible and often in violation 
of substantive WTO obligations should be justified with acceptable policy rationales that are not 
on the short list as provided in the exception clauses of the relevant WTO Agreements. However, 
although changes through political actions under the WTO are possible in theory, it would be 
extremely difficult because of the consensus decision-making mechanisms. Fortunately, judicial 
interpretation may work to a certain extent. In fact, the WTO judiciary has gradually tuned the 
WTO case law in certain aspects to better accommodate the needs of Members to meet the 
challenges posed by the anti-globalization movements. These interpretative developments have 
inspired commentators to propose ways to expand domestic regulatory autonomy of WTO 
Members. Of course, as will be shown below, the interpretative developments have been very 
slow and insufficient in some key aspects. Nevertheless, it is where the developments have been 
slow that have prompted commentators to make creative suggestions and proposals.  
Next, I will review the extant literature on how the WTO should leave more room for 
domestic regulations, particularly how the WTO should circumvent the constraints imposed on 
Members by the limited list in the exception clause. Major proposals that will be reviewed 
include: (1) the proposal to introduce an “aim and effects” test into the determination of “like 
products” under GATT Articles III:2 and III:4; (2) the proposal to resurrect the “aim and effects” 
test regarding the interpretation and application of “treatment no less favourable” under GATT 
Article III:4; and (3) the proposal to introduce general international law into WTO dispute 
settlement to counter balance trade disciplines. Jurisprudential developments have been made 
under GATT Article XX to expand domestic regulatory autonomy although those developments 
are only incremental compared with the three major proposals. Those developments and relevant 
academic discussions will be reviewed as well.   
 
1.3.1 Early version of the “aim and effects” test proposal  
To respond to the anti-liberalism movements at the domestic level, national governments 
may need to adopt and implement policies prioritizing non-trade values and protecting domestic 
interests. Most likely, these measures are in the form of domestic regulations and fiscal 
measures. Therefore, these measures would likely violate the national treatment obligations 
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under the WTO. Hudec made the proposal that, if the WTO would choose to respond to political 
opposition generated by its restrictions on domestic regulatory autonomy, it should choose to 
exonerate regulatory measures from national treatment obligation violation if they meet certain 
conditions.44 
To be more specific, Hudec’s proposal was to introduce an “aim and effects” test into the 
determination of “like products” under GATT Articles III:2 and III:4. The prevailing WTO 
jurisprudence on “like products” has embraced an economic test focusing on the competitive 
relationship between products without consideration of policy objectives of the disputed 
measures.45 The economic approach to the “like products” test has been clearly specified. For 
example, In EC – Asbestos, the AB stated that in both GATT Articles III:2 and III:4, “likeness” 
should be interpreted by considering four general characteristics of products as outlined in the 
Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments:  
(i) the physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are 
capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers 
perceived and treat the products as alternative means of performing particular 
functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international 
classification of the products for tariff purposes. 46 
Although this market competitiveness approach has been largely followed by panels and 
the AB since 1970,47 GATT panels in two cases adopted a “regulatory likeness” approach.48 The 
panel in the US – Malt Beverages case first came up with the “aim and effects” test.49 Hudec 
                                               
44 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
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45 Henrik Anderson, ‘Protection of Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic 
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49 Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and 
Effects’, 37 (4) Journal of World Trade 783-799 (2003), p.788; Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory 
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analyzed this case and found that, although the panel discussed the traditional test, it made its 
conclusion regarding the issue of “like products” after it examined the purpose and the effect of 
the US measure.50 The panel also stated that “in determining whether two products subject to 
different treatment are like products, it is necessary to consider whether such product 
differentiation is being made ‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’.”51 
Therefore, US – Malt Beverages can be counted as a precedent supporting the “aim and effects” 
test. Scholars agree that the panel in the unadopted US – Taxes on Automobiles elaborated the 
“aim and effects” test.52 In US – Taxes on Automobiles, without relying on the traditional test, 
the panel relied on GATT Article III:1 to establish that, to determine whether imported and 
domestic products are “like”, a consideration of the aims and effects of the disputed measures 
should be included besides the traditional factors of consideration.53 The Panel then elaborated 
how the “aim and effects” approach should work in the “like products” test:  
A measure could be said to have the aim of affording protection if an analysis of the 
circumstances in which it was adopted, in particular an analysis of the instruments 
available to the contracting party to achieve the declared domestic policy goal, 
demonstrated that a change in competitive opportunities in favour of domestic 
products was a desired outcome and not merely an incidental consequence of the 
pursuit of a legitimate policy goal. A measure could be said to have the effect of 
affording protection to domestic production if it accorded greater competitive 
opportunities to domestic products than to imported products. The effect of a measure 
in terms of trade flows was not relevant for the purposes of Article III, since a change 
in the volume or proportion of imports could be due to many factors other than 
government measures.(emphasis original)54  
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This passage makes it clear that the “aim and effects” test, if adopted, could render the traditional 
approach to determining “like products” less important and instead relies heavily on an 
examination of the policy objectives of disputed measures and their trade effects.55   
Hudec and other commentators praised the “aim and effects” test for leaving more room 
for domestic regulations.56 The most important substantive benefit of conducting an analysis of 
the regulatory purpose under Article III is that, if the analysis of regulatory purpose is deferred to 
GATT Article XX, only measures with regulatory objectives on a very limited list can be spared 
from being found illegal.57 It was also suggested that it was difficult for the disputed measures to 
meet the more burdensome conditions set forth under GATT Article XX.58 There is also a shift 
of the burden of proof. If an assessment of the policy objectives of the disputed measures is 
conducted under Article III, the burden of proof is on the complainants who have to present a 
prima facie case that there is no legitimate policy objective behind the disputed measures, while 
the burden of proof is on the respondents who have to convince the WTO judiciary that the 
measures have legitimate policy concerns if the policy analysis is conducted in an affirmative 
defense under the exception clause.59 An important normative reason has also been offered, 
which is that when economic competitiveness approach to interpretation of the key elements in 
Article III is adopted, it undermines the institutional legitimacy of WTO.60 That is, the WTO 
would appear to be less legitimate if it makes those justifiable measures to be found violating 
Article III, even if it would later pardon them under Article XX. The violation and exception 
framework as embodied in the relationship between Article III and Article XX reflects a pro-
market bias.61 However, John H. Jackson indicated that the institutional and moral arguments 
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may not be valid, only representing views of certain groups from certain countries.62 Adopting 
the “aim and effects” test also helps to harmonize the national treatment clause under the GATT 
with the similar clauses in the TBT and the SPS, in which there is no general exception clause 
and policy analysis of the disputed measures may have to be carried out under the national 
treatment clauses.63  
 
Figure 1.1: Measures falling under GATT Article III:2 and Article III:4 
 
 
Moreover, if the “like product” test does not include a policy analysis, a disparity between 
Article III:2 and Article III:4 would be created. The second sentence of Article III:2, with its ad 
note, requires a policy analysis when examining disputed fiscal measures regarding directly 
competitive and substitutable products. While the first sentence of Article III:2 and Article III:4, 
which examine fiscal measures and domestic regulations concerning “like products,” would not 
require a policy analysis, measures falling under Article III:4 would be examined without a 
policy analysis while some measures falling under Article III:2 would be examined with a policy 
analysis. That is, when the “like products” analysis does not include the “aim and effects” test 
under both Articles III:2 and III:4, all measures falling under Article III:4 cannot invoke policy 
justification while only some measures falling under Article III:2 are deprived of policy 
                                                                                                                                                       
Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 34. 
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justification. As shown in Figure 1, although the overall coverage of goods under Article III:2 is 
greater than that under Article III:4, the coverage of “like products” is smaller under Article III:2 
than that under Article III:4.64 The absence of the inquiry into the purpose of the disputed 
measures concerning “like products” would possibly result in more findings of Article III:4 
violation than findings of Article III:2 violation since the coverage of “like products” is greater 
under Article III:4 than that under Article III:2, other things being equal.65 This creates an 
obvious disparity between Articles III:2 and Article III:4. 
However, the AB stressed that Article III:1 “informs the first sentence and the second 
sentence of Article III:2 in different ways.”66 People arguing for the “aim and effects” test 
acknowledge that the complicated structure in Article III, particularly Article III:2 second 
sentence, makes it difficult to draw on Article III:1 to introduce the “aim and effects” test under 
Article III:2 first sentence and Article III:4.67 Article III:1, which is the general introduction to 
Article III requiring domestic measures “should not be applied to imported or domestic products 
so as to afford protection to domestic production,” informs the rest of Article III.68 However, 
while Article III:4, along with Article III:2 first sentence, do not refer back to Article III:1 in 
their texts, Article III:2 second sentence specifically refers back to the principle set forth in 
Article III:1, which creates some difficulty to map the relationships between Article III:1 on the 
one hand and Article III:2 and Article III:4 on the other hand. If Article III:4 and Article III:2, 
first sentence, without explicit reference to Article III:1, is interpreted as to require an inquiry 
whether a disputed regulatory measure is applied “so as to afford protection,” it would render the 
reference to Article III:1 by Article III:2, second sentence redundant. Therefore, it makes Article 
III more internally coherent if we understand that Article III:4 and Article III:2, first sentence, 
are able to carry out the principle set forth in Article III:1 by examining disputed measures with 
objective standards without further inquiring into the policy objectives of the disputed measures.  
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There is no consensus on the structural implications of GATT Article III, but there is no 
doubt about the relationship between Article III and Article XX. If the “aim and effects” test is 
adopted, a major structural problem would be definitely created, which is that the general 
exception clause of the GATT would be rendered “virtually redundant.”69  
Eventually, the WTO AB clearly re-affirmed, in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the 
traditional approach set out in the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 
regarding the interpretation of “like products.”70 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II was a case 
concerned only with the interpretation of “like products” under GATT Article III:2, first 
sentence. Before long, in EC – Bananas III, the AB made it clear that it was inappropriate to 
inquire into the purpose of the disputed measure under GATT Article III:4.71 In the same case, 
the AB also rejected applying the “aim and effects” test to non-discrimination analysis under 
Article II or Article XVII of the GATS, stating that “[w]e see no specific authority either in 
Article II or in Article XVII of the GATS for the proposition that the ‘aims and effects’ of a 
measure are in any way relevant in determining whether that measure is inconsistent with those 
provisions.”72 Even if some scholars would claim the “aim and effects” test was adopted in the 
GATT era, it was effectively rejected when the WTO age came. 
It is always possible to find statements by the panels and the AB that support a probe into 
the regulatory purposes and the discriminatory effects of the disputed measures in some cases.73 
Particularly, EC – Asbestos, a case after Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, has been used as a 
major example for the lingering of the “aim and effects” test.74 however, it may require a little 
more concrete evidence to claim the resurrection of the “aim and effects” test in determining 
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“like products”. Although Hudec claimed that the implicit application of “aim and effects” test is 
inevitable,75 people including Hudec have acknowledged that a requiem had been held.76   
 
1.3.2 Resurrection of the “aim and effects” test 
In US – Clove Cigarettes, which was followed by US – Tuna II (Mexico) and US – 
COOL, the Panels and the AB interpreted the TBT national treatment clause contained in Article 
2.1 for the first time. Since the TBT Agreement does not have a general exception clause as there 
is in the GATT Agreement, the AB was forced to create a counter balance to the national 
treatment obligation within TBT Article 2.1, interpreting “treatment no less favorable” as to 
require an inquiry whether the different treatment between domestic products and imports, to the 
detriment of imports, stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction.77  This interpretation 
generated great repercussions. Weihuang Zhou argued that the “treatment no less favourable” 
standard under Article III:4 should follow the approach taken by the AB in the TBT cases by 
incorporating a policy analysis.78 Professors Davey and Makus made a similar argument as 
well.79 
Professor Davey combed the history of the interpretation of Article III:4, concluding that 
the AB had kept refusing to consider the policy objectives of the regulatory measures in 
dispute.80 In the very first case where the AB interpreted “treatment no less favourable” under 
GATT Article III:4, the AB made it very clear that it was not necessary to consider whether a 
measure was applied “so as to afford protection.”81 This interpretation had created confusion and 
attracted criticism,82  but only after the US – Clove Cigarettes, more explicit and louder 
opposition to the AB’s position surfaced as commentators saw the obvious interpretative 
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disparity of “treatment no less favourable” in the GATT Article III:4 context and the TBT 
Article 2.1 context. 
Some other scholars, inspired by the TBT cases, also called for the resurrection of the 
“aim and effects” not only regarding the element of “treatment no less favourable” but also 
regarding Article III in general.83 For example, it was argued that the “aim and effects” test 
should be resurrected in the analysis under Article III:2 and the analysis of “treatment no less 
favourable” under Article III:4.84 According to another scholar’s resurrection analysis, in EC – 
Asbestos, the AB said the existence of Article XX should not warrant a broadened or restricted 
interpretation of Article III:4, which was used to imply that regulatory objectives can still be 
considered in Article III:4 in general.85  
The resurrection argument is not totally new from Hudec’s position. As said earlier, there 
are always cases that can be used to support to a certain extent the reintroduction of the “aim and 
effects” test into the “like products” assessment, but these cases are ambiguous themselves and 
not explicit enough to overrule precedents that refused to adopt an “aim and effects” approach to 
the “like products” test. Moreover, Flett particularly argued that since the typical approach taken 
by the WTO judiciary to conduct the “like products” assessment is a diagonal comparison 
between substitutable or directly competitive products in different countries instead of a 
comparison of real “like products,” it is difficult to properly incorporate a policy analysis. 
Therefore, it is better to conduct a policy analysis only within the element of “treatment no less 
favourable.”86  
How a policy analysis in determining “treatment no less favorable” would go has not had 
a chance of being stated by a panel or the AB, but it may replicate an “aim and effects” test as 
elaborated in the unadopted US – Taxes on Automobiles panel report. There is already an 
“effects” requirement in determining “treatment no less favourable,” as clearly demonstrated by 
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a typical interpretation of “treatment no less favourable.” Once the policy analysis regarding 
“treatment no less favourable” under TBT Article 2.1 is introduced into GATT Article III:4, we 
may have an “aim and effects” test quite similar to the one in determining “like products” in US 
– Taxes on Automobiles.   
The pros and cons associated with introducing a policy analysis in the element of 
“treatment no less favourbale” are very similar to those discussed above regarding the earlier 
version of the “aim and effects” test. Again, to circumvent the closed-end list in GATT Article 
XX is definitely a major consideration. Nevertheless, to introduce the “aim and effects” test into 
the “treatment no less favourable” analysis does have a strong support from the TBT cases, 
which is not applicable in the “like products” context. Disparity between identical or similar 
texts in sister legal instruments should be definitely avoided when possible.87 TBT Article 2.1 
and GATT Article III:4 have very similar formulations and the same core terms,88 the AB in US 
– Clove Cigarettes took great efforts to establish its position that GATT Article III:4 informs the 
understanding of TBT Article 2.1 and that ‘like products’ in both TBT Article 2.1 and GATT 
Article III:4 should be interpreted in the same manner.89 The same logic should equally apply to 
the interpretation of “treatment no less favourable.”90 But on the other hand, introducing the “aim 
and effects” test into “treatment no less favourable” cannot completely address the disparity 
between TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article III. In that case, domestic regulations in the form of 
fiscal measures covered by GATT Article III:2 still do not have a chance to survive Article III if 
they are found discriminatory in the economic sense while only measures covered by Article 
III:4 have a chance to escape the danger of being found guilty under Article III if they have 
legitimate policy objectives.   
Nevertheless, there is no WTO case on Article III:4 clearly suggesting that a policy 
analysis should be incorporated into “treatment no less favourable” under Article III:4. A typical 
interpretation of “treatment no less favourable” goes like this: 
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“an analysis under Article III:4 must begin with careful scrutiny of the measure, 
including consideration of the design, structure, and expected operation of the 
measure at issue. Such scrutiny may well involve—but does not require—an 
assessment of the contested measure in the light of evidence regarding the actual 
effects of that measure in the market. In any event, there must be in every case a 
genuine relationship between the measure at issue and its adverse impact on 
competitive opportunities for imported versus like domestic products to support a 
finding that imported products are treated less favourably.”91 
The most interesting thing is that when the US – Clove Cigarettes panel tried to argue that 
importing a policy purpose analysis into the “treatment no less favourable” standard was 
supported by the equivalent analysis under Article III:4 by the AB in Dominican Republic—
Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the AB acknowledged that it said in Dominican Republic—Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes that the “treatment no less favorable” analysis may need to consider 
“factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the products,” but in a footnote it 
clarified that it did not mean that policy purposes should be considered.92 Although the footnote 
was not liked by people who want the WTO judiciary to take a more friendly stance towards 
domestic regulations under Article III, it sends out a clear message.  
One commentator suggests that the AB had created the flexibility in GATT Article III:4 
jurisprudence for “purpose inquiries under the ‘treatment no less favourable’ test” in Dominican 
Republic—Import and Sale of Cigarettes and a later case, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines).93 
However, both cases are not very useful. First, although Dominican Republic—Import and Sale 
of Cigarettes left a real opening to policy analysis in “treatment no less favourable”,94 he cannot 
ignore what the AB said about it in the footnote in US – Clove Cigarettes. Second, Professors 
Davey and Makus, after a careful analysis of Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), commented 
disappointedly that the AB had not really tried to incorporate a policy analysis in “treatment no 
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less favourable” under Article III:4.95 In the recent EC – Seal Products, a case very important for 
the issues addressed in this thesis, another chance seemed to present itself for a reconsideration 
of the disparity between TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article III:4 in terms of the interpretation of 
“treatment no less favourable,” but the AB turned it down and no change was made.96 
Interestingly, also in In EC – Seal Products, the respondent tried to introduce an “aim and 
effects” test into GATT Article I:1 regarding the obligation of MFN in the granting of “any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” with respect to “all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 
and 4 of Article III”. The respondent’s major argument was that “the legal standard for the non-
discrimination obligations under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement” should be transplanted not 
only to GATT Article III:4 but also Article I:1.97 Again, the AB emphasized that the MFN 
obligations udner GATT Article I:1 were only concerned with competitive opportunities, 
refusing to incorporate a policy consideration.98 
 
1.3.3 From clinical isolation to the unity of the International Law   
A more general approach has been proposed to address the problems created by the 
constraints of the WTO law on Members’ autonomy to make and implement its policies to 
address social problems. This approach was best illustrated by Pauwelyn in his well-known 
treatise and some articles.99 Pauwelyn’s major proposition is that the WTO law does not exist in 
“clinical isolation” but is a part of general public international law. Therefore, all international 
law rules that are relevant to the issues presented should be used as interpretative material and 
more importantly as applicable law in WTO dispute settlement.100 As Pauwelyn sees it, if the 
WTO is allowed to be isolated from general international law, powerful domestic groups, 
primarily multinationals, would be able to circumvent domestic regulatory constraints in the 
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form of concerted international initiatives or biased domestic regulations.101 When the WTO is 
embedded back into the general international law, even if a prima facie case of violation of the 
WTO law, say GATT Article III, is established, the finding would be overturned based on 
external international law, even before resorting to GATT Article XX. That is, when the disputed 
measures are supported by international laws other than the WTO law, a joint application of both 
may lead to results different from findings made only under WTO law. According to this 
approach, domestic regulations responding to the anti-liberalism movements at the domestic 
level would not be circumvented and WTO Members’ autonomy to act would not be limited by 
the list in the exception clause and the legal standards contained in it.  
Pauwelyn’s proposition also responded to the debates concerning the “fragmentation” 
issue in public international law and drew on the relevant discussions that started immediately 
after the Second World War.102 This issue became more prominent after the conflicts between 
trade liberalization and environmental protection, health issues, labor standards, and human 
rights became more than hypothetical under the GATT in the 1980s and later under the WTO. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN International Law Commission both paid 
great attention to it around the millennium.103  
In agreement with Pauwelyn, Bartels stressed that the WTO Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) did not bar the application of general 
international law while Article 2 of the DSU and its Appendix 2 only served to define the scope 
of the WTO jurisdiction, which covers issues arising out of the covered WTO Agreements 
only.104 Articles 3.2 and 19.2 require that dispute settlement cannot add or diminish the rights 
and obligations of WTO Members. If applying substantive rules in external international laws 
together with the WTO law, it is likely that Members’ negotiated rights and obligations are 
influenced. However, Pauwelyn argued that it is impossible for the WTO judiciary to exclude 
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external international law when it adjudicates and WTO Members must have anticipated 
application of external international law when they negotiated their rights and obligations.105 The 
AB did make it clear that the WTO judiciary should interpret the WTO according to customary 
international law concerning treaty interpretation and stated that the WTO law should “not be 
read in clinical isolation from public international law” in the first case it heard.106 Therefore, it 
seems that the WTO does open its door to external international law. 
However, Pauwelyn himself made a clear distinction between introducing external 
international law into the WTO as interpretative material and as applicable law.107 Although 
external international law can also influence the rights and obligations of WTO Members when 
they are used as interpretive material, its influence is much limited by the WTO text it is 
supposed to help interpret. In WTO dispute settlement practice, most external international law is 
introduced into the WTO dispute settlement as interpretative material to clarify the meaning of 
certain clauses of the WTO Agreements. The best example is the interpretation of “exhaustible 
natural resources” in GATT Article XX (g), which will be discussed in detail later.  
Nevertheless, people arguing for the unitary approach do find support in WTO law for 
introducing external international law as applicable law to WTO disputes. The most obvious 
example of external international law applicable to WTO disputes is that explicitly instructed by 
the WTO to apply. The most well-known are the customary international law concerning treaty 
interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention.108 There are more. For example, the TRIPS 
Agreement also instructed that, for particular issues, the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Rome 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organization, and the Convention on the Integrated Circuit Intellectual Property are 
authoritative.109 Pauwelyn also identified a second group of external international law applicable 
to WTO disputes even without explicit instruction by WTO law, which are general principles of 
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international law concerning burden of proof and standard of proof, evidence, good faith, due 
process, attribution, jurisdiction, countermeasures and treaty interpretation.110 It is true that the 
WTO judiciary often relies on general international law to fill the gaps in the WTO law.111 These 
general principles are very fundamental to maintaining the basic operation of the international 
law and WTO law, but they are mostly concerned with procedural or miscellaneous matters that 
are only remotely related to the substantive rights and obligations of WTO Members.  
International law as a source of law under the WTO as identified by Mavroidis mostly 
falls into these above two groups.112 The digest compiled by Cook covers more statements by the 
WTO adjudicators regarding more diverse issues, but I see in Cook’s work that the WTO 
generally opens its door to only these two groups of external international law as well.113 To the 
disappointment of some commentators, these two groups of international law usually do not 
include substantive rules in other specific branches of international law such as environment law, 
labor standards, and human rights114 while the interaction of these rules with the WTO law is 
more immediately important regarding domestic regulatory autonomy.115 For these two groups of 
international law, they are unlikely to be in conflict with the WTO law, or the legal rights and 
obligations of these groups and the WTO are “accumulative.”116 Or people simply “fall back” to 
general international law when there are gaps in the WTO law.117 Therefore, they are unable to 
trump the restrictive rules in the WTO, particularly GATT Articles III and XX. 
The group of international law that contains substantive rules in other international law 
branches is most important for the purpose of retaining or expanding domestic regulatory 
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autonomy. When they are in conflict with the WTO law, their application may justify Members’ 
regulatory measure in violation of WTO rules if they are given priority in dispute settlement. 
However, commentators’ views are very diverse. Yearwood revealed two opposite positions and 
a middle ground between the two.118 Trachtman represents the position that the WTO judiciary 
should not apply substantive external international law unless incorporated in the WTO 
corpus.119 Pauwelyn represents the opposite position that the WTO judiciary should apply all 
international law rules that are relevant to the issues presented and provide legal answers 
accordingly.120 Bartels seems to stand in the middle, arguing although the first position is too 
restrictive, specific WTO rules should be given priority over external international law.121   
In WTO dispute settlement practice, the WTO judiciary is still reluctant to apply 
substantive external international law. But it is worth noting that scholars taking the unitary 
approach, particularly regarding the applicability of external international law in the WTO 
dispute settlement, have proposed thoughtful ways to solve the conflicts between the WTO rules 
and external international law. The unitary approach can make use of a number of concepts and 
principles in general public international law to determine the specific relationships between the 
WTO law and general public international law. Of course, they tend to prioritize external 
international law over the WTO law.  
One of the important concepts is the hierarchy of the “sources” of international law. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ provides an authoritative illustration of the sources of 
international law, which include: a, international conventions; b, international custom; c, the 
general principles of law; d, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists. Pauwelyn also supplemented the list with other forms of international law.122 There is 
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a rough hierarchy recognized among these sources. For example, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists are said to be “subsidiary” compared with the 
other sources listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.123 When external international law 
sources are superior to the WTO law in the hierarchy, prima facie violation of the WTO law can 
be justified by external international law. But in reality, a rough hierarchy is not enough to 
provide guidance in many situations. Although it has been argued that trade law serves as means 
to the end of achieving more important objectives,124 international law experts cannot come up 
with a clear hierarchy that has a general application.125 Pauwelyn also acknowledged that the 
concept of hierarchy of international law sources was of very limited use in general.126  
Jus cogens is a related concept that can be used to introduce external international law 
into WTO dispute settlement and render the WTO law in conflict with it void. Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention defines Jus cogens as (1) norms; (2) accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole; (3) from which no derogation is permitted. Both 
Articles 53 and 54 provide that international treaties in conflict with jus cogens would be void.127 
Therefore, WTO law may not justify Members’ derogation from jus cogens. But the concept of 
jus cogens has its own problems as well. Although the concept of jus cogens has been widely 
accepted, what it includes is far from settled. The most fundamental problem is that there is not a 
standard for people to determine whether an international norm is jus cogens or not.128 
International tribunals also tried not to clarify the nature or general qualifications of jus cogens. 
It has to be admitted that progress has been made by identifying some individual norms that are 
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thought to be qualified as jus cogens in case law.129 Nevertheless, many issues remain even 
regarding those identified norms, particularly their detailed contents.130  
Other concepts and rules of conflict are also proposed to determine the priority of the 
WTO and external international law.131 Again, it has to be admitted that some of the proposals 
are hard to rebut. Scholars taking the unitary approach demonstrate that applying external 
international law to the WTO law is inevitable in some cases if we accept the validity of some 
fundamental concepts and rules of conflict in international law. However, as said earlier, 
although using external international law as interpretative material and applying non-substantive 
international law is accepted by the WTO judiciary, treating it as applicable law in general is still 
resisted.   
  
1.3.4 Unsatisfactory progress under the exception clause 
Compared with the static development under GATT Article III, the interpretation of 
GATT Article XX has gone through gradual transitions in favor of greater domestic regulatory 
autonomy over the years. But interestingly, commentators are still more interested in proposing 
new approaches to the balance between trade discipline and domestic regulatory autonomy under 
GATT Article III because it has the potential to circumvent the short list of legitimate policy 
objectives in Article XX that domestic measures should have. While the Article XX 
jurisprudence has made some progress, commentators have not proposed anything like the “aim 
and effects” test that can greatly change the balance between trade disciplines and domestic 
regulatory autonomy. They still have not treated Article XX as the key to a possible 
breakthrough. Professor Davey once argued that “a rational measure could be crafted to achieve 
the Government’s policy goal and still satisfy the terms of Article XX.”132 In his view, the 
exception clause could be flexible enough to achieve what people want to achieve under Article 
III regarding readjusting the balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade 
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disciplines. Unfortunately, Professor Davey’s comment is still waiting for more serious academic 
explorations and the exception jurisprudence has not made enough progress yet.   
Nevertheless, Article XX has generated a large body of literature. This stream of 
literature and the relevant jurisprudence are interesting, but they do not have concentrated 
focuses and clear approaches. Therefore, it is difficult to summarize. I will organize the review 
here into four parts. First, I will review jurisprudential developments that seem to tap in the 
unitary approach to the relationship between the WTO law and external international law. I will 
also review the relevant comments. Second, I will review three overarching issues under Article 
XX, which are the structure of Article XX, the definition of a “measure,” and the legitimacy of 
process and production methods (PPMs). Third, I will review the jurisprudential development of 
the “necessity” test under some of the subparagraphs and the relevant comments. Fourth, I will 
review the jurisprudential developments under the chapeau and the relevant comments. GATS 
Article XIV is another major exception clause in the WTO. But, since GATS Article XIV has 
been viewed by the AB as analogous GATT Article XX,133 a separate review of the development 
of GATS Article XIV jurisprudence and the relevant debates is not necessary. 
 
1.3.4.1 External international law in the context of GATT Article XX 
Some changes under GATT Article XX may be viewed as the success of the unitary 
approach discussed earlier. For example, In US – Shrimp, the AB was faced with the issue 
whether certain species of turtles were “exhaustible natural resources” within GATT Article XX 
(g). The AB first introduced the evolutionary interpretation method, then interpreted “exhaustible 
natural resources” by relying on external environmental agreements such as the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity to expand its 
scope from minerals to endangered living species.134 This example is often cited by scholars who 
support introducing external international law into the WTO dispute settlement.135 However, the 
external environmental treaties are only used as interpretative material. 
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In this case, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) became the only important 
interpretative material. Although they were not applicable laws, they could change the 
interpretation of an important element in subparagraph (g) of GATT Article XX. However, the 
AB in this case did not faithfully follow the customary rules of international law it had 
repeatedly claimed to be following in WTO law interpretation.136 According to the Vienna 
Convention Articles 31 and 32, the AB should give great weight to primary interpretative 
materials such as the ordinary meaning of the phrase to be interpreted, the textual context, and 
the interpretation in the case law. it should also give weight to legislative history. However, it 
seemed the AB ignored all these materials, particularly the very clear case law and legislative 
history that supports interpreting “exhaustible natural resources” as minerals, and only relied on 
MEAs to draw its conclusion. 
The WTO judiciary has also tapped in general international law in its GATT Article XX 
chapeau jurisprudence. It characterized GATT Article XX chapeau as the expression of an 
important principle of general international law, which would make scholars supporting 
introducing external international law into WTO dispute settlement happy. For example, the AB 
in US – Shrimp said the chapeau is “one expression of the principle of good faith,” which is “a 
general principle of law and a general principle of international law”.137 This statement has been 
often cited by later cases. 
However, the WTO judiciary stresses that treating the chapeau as an expression of the 
principle of good faith in international law is not for the purpose of expanding domestic 
regulatory autonomy, but to prevent the abuse of the exceptions as provided in the 
subparagraphs.138 It is observed that the WTO judiciary in US – Gasoline and some later cases 
worried about discriminatory measures getting away without being caught, particularly after the 
AB had decided not to examine discrimination under the subparagraphs.139 The principle of good 
faith, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, has been employed to erect a difficult hurdle for the 
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disputed measure to overcome under the chapeau before it is finally justified under the exception 
clause.  
 
1.3.4.2 Some overarching issues under Article XX  
There have been some jurisprudential developments concerning a number of overarching 
issues under GATT Article XX. Among them, developments concerning the structure of Article 
XX analysis, the definition of a “measure,” and the treatment of PPMs are more interesting. 
Some of these issues have evolved in the jurisprudence in the direction of expanding domestic 
regulatory autonomy.  
 
The structure of Article XX analysis 
The two-tier structure of the analysis under Article XX was first established by the AB in 
US – Gasoline,140 and soon affirmed in US – Shrimp.141 According to the two-tier structure, a 
disputed measure must first be provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs, then it 
would be examined next under the chapeau. This structure seems to go along with the balance 
between exceptions as provided in the subparagraphs and prevention of abuse as provided in the 
chapeau.142  
However, this structure was regarded as superficial or even counter-productive.143 The 
reason offered is similar to that for criticizing the treatment of chapeau as a good faith principle 
and as a counterbalance for the abuse of exceptions,144 which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three. Particularly, the fixed order of the two-tier analysis is not necessary. The 
conditions a disputed measure has to meet under the subparagraphs and the chapeau are 
cumulative, the order does not matter in terms of the final result.145 If a disputed measure would 
obviously fail the chapeau, it is not efficient to examine it first under one of the subparagraphs.   
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Although it is true the two-tier structure is superficial, it was one of the steps taken to 
appease the opposition of groups like the environmentalists to the world trading system. The 
environmentalists would feel a little better if the disputed environmental measure was justified 
under subparagraph (b) of GATT Article XX, even though it then would fail the chapeau. As 
mentioned earlier and will be discussed later, with the jurisprudential developments under the 
subparagraphs and the wider definition of a “measure,” it would be certainly easier for a disputed 
measure to pass the examination under one of the subparagraphs. Coupled with the two-tier 
structure of analysis, this definitely helps to make Article XX appear a little friendlier to 
domestic regulations.   
 
The definition of a “measure” 
In the GATT case US – Section 337, the Panel said that when Article XX (d) was invoked 
to justify a disputed measure violating GATT disciplines, “what has to be justified as 
"necessary" under Article XX (d) is each of the inconsistencies with another GATT Article 
found to exist".146 When examining whether a disputed measure can be exempted under the 
subparagraphs of Article XX, it makes sense to focus the analysis on part of the disputed 
measure that is actually in violation of substantive GATT clauses. In other words, what needs to 
be justified under Article XX is only the part of a disputed measure that causes violation, not the 
entire measure when the other parts of it are in compliance with the WTO law.  
However, in the very first case heard by the WTO AB, the AB overruled the precedent 
set in the GATT case, stating that when considering the disputed US gasoline baseline standards 
under Article XX(g), it was wrong to consider “whether the refusal to provide individualized 
baselines to foreign refiners was primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources” and 
the right question to ask was “whether the ‘measure’, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were 
‘primarily aimed at’ conservation of clean air.”147 In US – Gasoline, Brazil and Venezuela did 
not challenge the entire baseline establishment rules. The entire rules were easily found to be 
primarily aimed at environmental protection, however, it was much more difficult to establish 
such a connection between the part of the rules that imposed a uniform baseline for foreign 
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refiners or the internal inconsistency of the US baseline rules and the legitimate purpose to 
protection the environment. Therefore, it can be imagined that the AB made it easier for 
domestic regulatory measures that violate other GATT clauses to be exempted under Article XX 
and hence provided Members with more domestic regulatory space.  
The AB had followed the approach to the interpretation of “measure” in Article XX (g) 
since US – Gasoline without discussing the scope of “measure” in later cases until Thailand – 
Cigarettes (Philippines).148 In Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the AB reinstated the US – 
Section 337 precedent, stating that “when less favourable treatment is found based on differences 
in the regulation of imports and of like domestic products, the analysis of an Article XX (d) 
defense should focus on whether those regulatory differences are ‘necessary’ to secure 
compliance with ‘laws and regulations’ that are not GATT-inconsistent”.149 Clearly, the AB 
focused its attention on the internal inconsistencies of a disputed measure instead of the entire 
measure in Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines). However, later in EC – Seal Products, the AB 
interpreted Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) as to ask panels to consider the whole measure. It 
said the inconsistencies with GATT non-discrimination obligations were caused by “the 
combined operation” of both “the ‘ban’ that restrict market access” and “the IC exception” and 
the other exceptions.150 Therefore, even when the exemptions lowered the contribution of the 
entire seal scheme could make to the fulfilment of its purported policy objective, the entire 
scheme was still found to be necessary for the achievement of its purported policy objective.151    
 
PPMs 
The PPMs issue in the WTO context arises when a Member conditions market access or 
regulatory measures on the production and process methods of products.152 Hudec discussed this 
issue in the GATT Article III context not long after the WTO was established, stating that 
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determining like products according to PPMs is “simply viewed as a priori illegitimate”.153 But 
with knowledge of the GATT era cases in which the PPMs issue arose in the GATT Article III 
context, he did not discuss this issue in the exception clause context. This issue in the exception 
clause context came up in US – Shrimp after the establishment of the WTO in the exception 
clause context and disappeared in the GATT Article III context. In that case, the US banned 
shrimp harvested with methods dangerous to turtles. However, this ban was not to protect 
domestic interests. Nevertheless, the effects of the PPMs for harvesting shrimp had an 
international characteristic. The AB noted that the turtles are not confined to US territorial waters 
but migrate around the world.154 Other PPMs confined to the territories of producers may only 
directly impact on the exporting countries. Measures conditioned on PPMs clearly have an 
extraterritorial implication. The AB took issue with the unilateral nature of the US measure, 
holding that the United States unjustifiably treated the countries where the conditions were 
different the same.155 The US ban therefore failed GATT Article XX. As to whether the 
extraterritorial nature of the US measure is problematic or not, however, the AB did not express 
itself. Subparagraph (e) does permit measures restricting imports made by prison labor in a 
foreign country, but Article XX is silent on the legitimacy of measures targeting more general 
PPMs.156 It is fair to say that the issue of PPMs remains open.157  
Commentators categorized measures with an extraterritorial focus into different groups. 
With the relationship between the policy objective and the products involved becomes more 
distant, the legitimacy of PPMs measures under the WTO becomes more doubtful.158 However, 
we do not have an agreed spectrum. Maybe, we can agree that embargos constitute the most 
extreme case where the policy objective is not related to the PPMs of the products at all, 
                                               
153 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.624. 
154 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 133. 
155 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 164 
156 Lorand Bartels, ‘Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, 36 (2) Journal of World 
Trade 353-403 (2002), p.358. 
157 William J. Davey, Non-discrimination in the World Trade Organization: The Rules and the Exceptions, The 
Hague: The Hague Academy of International Law, 2012, p. 248. 
158 Lorand Bartels, ‘Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, 36 (2) Journal of World 
Trade 353-403 (2002), pp.355-358; Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law, Leiden, the 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, pp.298-299.  
48 
 
therefore, they raise the most serious concerns.159 For people who are more afraid that the world 
trading system would be undermined by PPMs measures, measures with extraterritorial effects 
are things to worried about in general. For example, Baghwati was shocked by the “concessions” 
the AB made in US – Shrimp regarding its deliberation under subparagraphs (b) and (g) and 
commented that the AB made law in controversial matters such as the legitimacy of measures 
conditioned on PPMs under “the political pressures brought by the rich-country environmental 
NGOs.”160 
In EC – Seal Products, the PPMs issue arose again since the EU seal scheme affects 
foreign seal products because of the processes and procedures producing them. The AB held that 
“the EU Seal Regime is designed to address seal hunting activities occurring ‘within and outside 
the Community’ and the seal welfare concerns of ‘citizens and consumers’ in EU member 
States”.161 Hence, the AB decided the European Union based its regulatory jurisdiction on 
protecting interests within the territories of its members and refused to rule on the issue of PPMs 
again.162 Therefore, no matter what scholars argue, WTO Members’ autonomy to make and 
implement policy objectives that have more extraterritorial effects is still restricted up until 
recently because of the uncertain status of PPMs measures under the WTO law. 
   
1.3.4.3 Necessity: the key test in GATT Article XX subparagraphs  
For a disputed measure to fall in the scope of important Article XX subparagraphs 
including (a), (b), and (d), the greatest hurdle is that the disputed measure has to be “necessary” 
to achieve its regulatory purpose. The key to the “necessity” test since the GATT era has been to 
determine whether there was a less trade restrictive alternative to the disputed measure that is 
also able to contribute to the realization of the regulatory purpose.163 In US – Section 337, it was 
first stated by the panel that a disputed measure is not necessary when there existed an alternative 
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that was not GATT inconsistent and that could reasonably be expected to be employed.164 In 
most cases, the AB has been quite deferential to Members in terms of their characterization of 
their regulatory purposes, but less so in terms what means they chose to achieve their purposes. 
Therefore, the AB has been quite enthusiastic in searching for “less restrictive alternatives” that 
would render the means used by Members disqualified as exceptions under Article XX.165 The 
WTO “necessity” jurisprudence was criticized for a while for being too intrusive to the 
regulatory prerogatives of Members and too insensitive to the practical difficulties associated 
with the hypothetical alternative means identified by the WTO judiciary.166 But the “necessity” 
jurisprudence has gradually evolved in favor of the regulating Members. 
At the most general level, the hypothetical application of the “necessity” test should 
include a juxtaposed “weighing and balancing” of both the dispute measure and the proposed 
alternative regarding the extents they can contribute to the regulatory purpose and their 
respective impacts on trade.167 In actual application, there was rarely a side-by-side and step-by-
step contrast of the disputed measures and the proposed alternatives. They were mostly analyzed 
separately. However, as the AB stated: “[t]he weighing and balancing is a holistic operation that 
involves putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating them in relation to each 
other after having examined them individually, in order to reach an overall judgment.”168 
Therefore, although there is no perfectly matched contrast, a holistic operation is still in place. 
The reason why the “weighing and balancing” is far from a standard operation is that the facts in 
different cases present different issues or the same issues in different framing and sometimes 
additional issues regarding the “weighing and balancing.” The variations of the analysis of 
“necessity” have increased the difficulty for people to appreciate the changes that have already 
taken place.  
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When we look at the “necessity” analysis, the existence of the problems the disputed 
measure is supposed to address is logically the first issue, although it was usually treated as an 
issue separate from the issue of “necessity.”169 In EC – Asbestos, the AB clarified that a Member 
“may rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but 
qualified and respected opinion” to justify the existence of a health risk that its measure was to 
address, even though the scientific sources were different from the mainstream opinion.170 If the 
problems the disputed measures are supposed to address do not exist, the disputed measures are 
certainly not necessary under the relevant subparagraphs of Article XX. Therefore, by relaxing 
the burden of proof for the existence of the problems, the AB gave Members greater regulatory 
autonomy. 
After confirming the problems the disputed measures are supposed to address do exist, 
the next issue is what is the appropriate level of protection/enforcement. In EC – Asbestos, the 
AB said clearly that “it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”171 And it did endorse the 
zero-risk approach to setting the level of protection by the European Union. However, in Korean 
– Beef, the AB refused to recognize the validity of the preventive approach adopted by Korea in 
enforcing laws reducing origin misrepresentation of the beef although it reiterated that Members 
had the right to decide the level of enforcement of their laws and regulations.172 It appears that 
the AB has not been consistent when assessing the appropriate level of protection or enforcement 
Members set, but there may be a pattern. When a more important value is involved, like 
protection of human life from lung cancer in EC – Asbestos, the AB allows Members the greatest 
discretion, but when the value is not that important, like reduce misrepresentation to consumers 
in Korea – Beef, Members are allowed less discretion.173  
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The extent to which the disputed measure can contribute to the realization of the 
regulatory policy objective is also an important issue in the “weighing and balancing”. In Korean 
– Beef, the AB already clarified that the connection between the disputed measure and the 
regulatory objective it was supposed to achieve needed not to be “indispensable.”174 In Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres, the AB further clarified that the connection only needed to be “material,”175 
which was considered another step towards less strict requirements for a disputed measure to be 
determined as necessary.176  
The extent to which the disputed measure impacts on trade is hypothetically one of the 
most important issues in the “weighing and balancing” test. However, in some cases, take EC – 
Asbestos for example, it is not touched. In EC – Asbestos, the ban on Canadian Asbestos 
products had a serious negative impact on trade. If it was discussed in detail, it would create 
some difficulty in the “weighing and balancing” for the AB to support European Union’s ban. 
On the contrary, when the AB struck down Korea’s dual retail system regulation, it discussed the 
negative impacts of the Korean measure on beef imports, which certainly further justified its 
decision that Korea’s measure failed the requirements under Article XX (d).177 This shows that 
the AB has used tricks to create interpretative flexibility to allow Members greater regulatory 
space in some circumstances. 
When the examination focuses on the proposed alternative, the AB should also examine 
the extent the alternative can contribute to the realization of the regulatory goal at the appropriate 
level set by Members and the extent of its impact on trade. Usually, the impact of an alternative 
on trade will not be discussed because the proposed alternative is always less trade restrictive. 
Otherwise, the aggrieved party will not propose it as an alternative. The focus is usually on 
whether “a ‘reasonably available’ alternative… would preserve for the responding Member its 
right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective…” 178  The 
contribution of the alternative to the regulatory goal has been discussed in some cases together 
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with the issue whether the level of protection/enforcement set by the regulating Member is 
appropriate. For example, in Korea – Beef, the AB held that the traditional enforcement 
procedures were sufficient to achieve the regulatory goals after it replaced elimination with 
procedures ex ante as the appropriate level of enforcement.179 
The additional analysis concerning the examination of alternatives is about its availability 
in the context of the regulating Member’s political, economic and cultural context. Although 
resource constraints may not successfully serve as excuses for an alternative not to be reasonably 
available, there are some other subtle developments that render finding an alternative more 
difficult.180   
Overall, I would argue that the conditions in GATT Article XX subparagraphs have been 
relaxed in some aspects. However, the ultimate limit they impose on domestic regulatory 
measures cannot possibly be lifted. Disputed measures still have to be provisionally justified by 
policy objectives listed in the subparagraphs. Moreover, as more domestic regulatory measures 
are challenged for their internal inconsistencies, the subparagraphs, along with the necessity test, 
have become less important. What eventually determines the scope of domestic regulatory 
autonomy in most cases where domestic regulations have internal inconsistencies are concerned 
is the chapeau.  
 
1.3.4.4 The chapeau of Article XX  
The AB, in US – Shrimp, stressed that the analysis pursuant to the chapeau examines both 
the content (“detailed operating provisions”) and the application of the disputed measure,181 but 
it was only the application that was focused upon by the AB in the examination under the 
chapeau in that case.182 This eased the worry that the AB would, after US – Gasoline, put a 
“necessity” test into the chapeau regarding environmental measures that are supposed to be 
examined first under subparagraph (g).183 If the substance of environmental measures will not be 
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examined under the chapeau, there is little to be worried about even if there is a “necessity” test 
under the chapeau. However, this distinction could not be well maintained. It was argued that, 
depending on the level of details of the examination of the disputed measure needed under the 
chapeau, the AB may look at both the content and the application of the disputed measure under 
the chapeau.184 When the AB examines the content of the disputed measure under the chapeau 
again, it increases the likelihood of the disputed measure failing the chapeau no matter what the 
test is or whether the test is different from that in the subparagraph. 
The development in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres further complicated the examination of 
disputed measures under the chapeau. Under the chapeau, it is supposed that there are three 
conditions disputed measures have to satisfy in order to pass the examination under the chapeau. 
However, the condition that requires the disputed measures not to constitute a “disguised 
restriction on international trade” has remained dormant in WTO jurisprudence. 185  The 
remaining two conditions that require the disputed measure not to constitute “a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” 
are the real hurdles the disputed measures have to pass under the chapeau.186 In Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres, the AB held that discrimination had to be justified with the assessment of 
rationales in the light of the purported policy objectives of the dispute measures.187 This is a 
rather strict requirement.  
In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the fatal flaw of the regulation imposed by Brazil was that it 
contained exceptions and these exemptions could not be explained by the purported policy 
objective or even went against it. Follow this logic, then all regulatory measures containing 
exceptions would suffer the same fate as the disputed measure in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
because the rationales behind exceptions can hardly relate positively to the purported regulatory 
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objectives. No doubt that Brazil – Retreaded Tyres has been repeatedly criticized by 
commentators.188  
Therefore, the “curse” of Brazil – Retreaded Tyres needs to be broken if the chapeau 
wants to be truly useful to expand domestic regulatory autonomy. The cumbersome requirement 
in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres was somewhat relaxed in EC – Seal Products, however, some 
commentators did not take notice.189 Some others did take note. For example, Duran spoke most 
explicitly that the AB implied in EC – Seal Products that rationales not on the list as prescribed 
in the GATT Article XX subparagraphs could justify an inconsistent measure flawed with 
exemptions,190 but he still hoped the AB had made this more explicit.191 Still some others took 
the middle ground. For example, Bartels noted the new development but he held that the AB 
“harks back to the original test in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres.”192 It is true that the AB did not 
really depart from Brazil – Retreaded Tyres when it tried to spell out its interpretation of the 
GATT Article XX chapeau, but in its analysis, it undoubtedly updated the test assessing 
discrimination under the chapeau, which has been summarized as follows:  
(i) whether rationales offered other than the immediate policy objectives of measures 
at issue are reconcilable with the immediate policy objectives; [if not,] (ii) whether 
the exceptions can realize the policies behind themselves while avoiding 
unnecessarily undermining the immediate policy objectives of the measures at issue; 
and (iii) whether the exceptions are applied even-handedly in the perspective of the 
rationales behind the exceptions other than the immediate policy objectives of 
measures at issue.193  
                                               
188 For the most recent criticism, see Gracia Marin Duran, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – 
Seal Products: Avoiding a Conflict between GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) 
Journal of International Economic Law 467-495 (2016), p. 470. 
189 Emily B. Lydgate, ‘Is it Rational and Consistent? The Wto’s Surprising Role in Shaping Domestic Public Policy’, 
20 (3) Journal of International Economic Law 561-582 (2017), p.573; Lorand Bartels, ‘The chapeau of the General 
Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A Reconstruction’, 109 (1) American Journal of International 
Law 95-125 (2015), p. 117; Julia Y. Qin, ‘Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives under WTO Law: 
Reflections on EC – Seal Products’, 108 American Journal of International Law Unbound 308-314 (2014). 
190 Gracia Marin Duran, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a 
Conflict between GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 467-495 (2016), pp. 477-479. 
191 Gracia Marin Duran, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a 
Conflict between GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 467-495 (2016), p. 470. 
192 Lorand Bartels, ‘The chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction’, 109 (1) American Journal of International Law 95-125 (2015), p. 117. 
193 The three-step test has been first summarized in Henry Hailong Jia. The Legitimacy of Exceptions Containing 
55 
 
The detailed analysis of EC – Seal Products will be deferred to Chapter 2. I would simply argue 
that, according to this updated test, measures that have flaws similar to that in the Brazilian 
measure in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres will have a chance to pass the examination under the 
chapeau.  
   
1.4 A necessary and promising solution 
 
The GATT Agreement was drafted more than 70 years ago. Hudec thought it was 
inadequate to address the issue of balancing trade disciplines and domestic regulatory 
autonomy.194 It is true that the world trading system has concluded more and more agreements 
during its development along the way, particularly the side agreements amending and expanding 
the GATT Agreement. However, the policing of domestic regulations is still governed primarily 
by GATT Articles III and XX. Bound by the legal texts, the WTO judiciary has been more 
concerned with abuse of domestic regulatory autonomy than with its over-restraint. Proposals 
trying to free domestic regulatory autonomy from strict trade disciplines such as the two versions 
of the “aim and effects” test and the “linkage” and “unity of international law” arguments have 
been turned down by the AB to different extents.  
However, the WTO has been faced with grave challenges since its inception. The anti-
globalization movements of the disadvantaged social groups who do not benefit from 
globalization and trade liberalization have made the world trading system as their major target. 
The WTO has been heavily criticized for its negligence of environmental protection, labor 
standards, human rights, culture preservation, development etc. As the populist nationalism has 
gained traction in both Europe and the United States, which are among the most powerful 
Members of the WTO, the legitimacy crisis of the WTO has very well turned into a political 
crisis. Coupled with the rise of China as a major exporter that has definitely tipped the balance of 
trade benefits negotiated in the Uruguay Round, the political commitment of the United States, 
the No. 1 sponsor of the world trading system, to the WTO has further declined. In such a 
situation, the WTO has to respond, one way or another, to the challenges. As the political 
                                                                                                                                                       
Exceptions in WTO Law: Some Thoughts on EC – Seal Products. 2015. Chinese Journal of International Law, 14 
(2), 411-417, p.415. 
194 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.633. 
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function of the WTO has paralyzed, it is time for the judiciary to step up to address difficult 
issues such as the balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade disciplines.  
To redraw the line between permissible and impermissible domestic regulations, the 
WTO judiciary may now embrace the proposals it has repeatedly declined. But it would disturb 
quite a number of important rules, whose interpretations have been firmly established in the 
jurisprudence. This is very harmful for the stability and predictability of the WTO law. Besides, 
it would also greatly undermine the authority of the WTO judiciary. Moreover, as more and 
more challenged measures violating the national treatment obligation are those having legitimate 
policy objectives but flawed with internal inconsistencies, it is prudent for the WTO judiciary not 
to follow the suggestions of Hudec and scholars who are like-minded to treat those measures 
more leniently under GATT Article III. Furthermore, border measures that implement national 
regulatory policies have blurred the line between quantitative trade restrictions and 
discrimination, readjusting the balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade 
disciplines within GATT Article III can do nothing for border measures with domestic regulatory 
policy goals. 
Readjusting the balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade disciplines 
under the chapeau of the exception clause not only prevents disturbing existing relevant 
jurisprudence but also helps to further improve its internal consistency. For example, in US – 
Shrimp, the AB stated that the purported policy objective of the disputed measure had to be 
examined under the subparagraphs not under the chapeau in order to provide provisional 
justification for the disputed measure.195 If the purported policy objective is the key to justify a 
disputed measure again under the chapeau, as required by the AB in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, 
either the chapeau or the subparagraph would be rendered redundant. The AB in EC – Seal 
Products seemed to detach the analysis of the chapeau from that of the subparagraphs, which not 
only enabled the discrimination under the chapeau to be able to be justified with policy rationales 
not limited by the list in the subparagraphs any more, but also drew a clearer functional 
distinction between the substantive clauses and the chapeau of the exception clause.  
Therefore, I would argue that it is the AB’s decision in EC – Seal Products that may turn 
the GATT Article XX chapeau into the best vehicle to expand domestic regulatory autonomy 
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under the WTO, particularly in the GATT context. Compared with the other alternatives 
reviewed earlier, clarifying and developing the chapeau jurisprudence in the vein of EC – Seal 
Products not only saves the WTO judiciary from overruling itself and takes into consideration 
the developments of discriminative measures, but also works more harmoniously with the legal 
texts and existing jurisprudence, which will be discussed in detail in later chapters.  
In the recent couple of years, the trade war and the blocking of AB member appointment 
are more immediate threats the WTO has been facing. Even intensified efforts of regional or 
bilateral trade arrangement by major trade powers and heavy use of trade remedies have seemed 
to be more serious concerns. But as Hudec correctly pointed out that the task of policing 
domestic regulations was essential for the WTO and any other federal system,196 readjusting the 
balance between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade disciplines is even more important in 
the long run. After EC – Seal Products, the AB has had very few opportunities to further clarify 
itself regarding its interpretation of the GATT Article XX chapeau in EC – Seal Products. When 
a couple of opportunities were presented to the AB, it refused to take advantage of them. It is 
possible that the AB could not concentrate on the issue of our concern during a turbulent time. 
But this inaction after EC – Seal Products has created confusion for both panels and scholars. 
Panels may still have to treat Brazil – Retreaded Tyres as authority and scholars may still fail to 
appreciate the fundamental change EC – Seal Products could bring to the issue of policing 
domestic regulations. I would hope the AB, after surviving the current crisis, would become 
more responsive to the dynamics of international trade relations and turn the GATT Article XX 
chapeau into a full-fledged instrument to more appropriately adjust the balance between 
domestic regulatory autonomy and trade disciplines. I will, in the following chapters, provide 
analysis that will help if the WTO judiciary decides to further clarify and develop its 
interpretation of the GATT Article XX chapeau in EC – Seal Products. 
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CHAPTER 2: JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Looking back at the WTO jurisprudential history, the development under the GATT XX 
chapeau has been slow and ambiguous, attracting less attention when compared with the more 
dramatic or contentious developments under GATT Article III and the GATT Article XX 
subparagraphs. It looks as if the GATT Article XX chapeau had not been considered the major 
candidate for expanding Members’ domestic regulatory autonomy before EC – Seal Products. 
EC – Seal Products seemed to start changing this. Unfortunately, the new development in EC – 
Seal Products has been ignored by some commentators197 while some others are not very sure 
about the change.198 Actually, the AB in EC – Seal Products began applying the chapeau in a 
way to defer further to the regulatory authority of WTO Members, not only bringing the chapeau 
abreast with developments under TBT Article 2.1 but also giving the chapeau great potential to 
turn into the most powerful tool to expand domestic regulatory autonomy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to review the details of how the AB applied the chapeau to the facts in EC – Seal 
Products carefully. A careful review will make it clear that domestic regulatory measures, which 
are otherwise in violation of substantive trade disciplines, could be justified by their policy 
rationales that are neither those listed in the GATT Article XX subparagraphs nor their purported 
policy objectives. The biggest concern Hudec had when he raised the issue of domestic 
regulatory autonomy seems able to be solved if EC – Seal Products is further clarified and 
followed.  
But it would be difficult to take EC – Seal Products seriously if it is only an isolated case 
overwhelmed by a body of negative precedents, particularly when the AB’s new reading of the 
chapeau in EC – Seal Products was somewhat vague and its application did not finally justify the 
EU’s measure. However, if there are a series of cases opening to, supporting or incrementally 
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leading to the reinterpretation of the GATT Article XX chapeau in EC – Seal Products, not only 
the foundations for establishing EC – Seal Products as an important case would be more solid, 
but also proposed further jurisprudential developments in the vein of EC – Seal Products would 
be more feasible. Cases after EC – Seal Products can also help us to see how the WTO judiciary 
has accepted the new interpretation and have a better idea of the trajectory of the GATT Article 
XX chapeau jurisprudence. Furthermore, the case law would shed light on what tests and 
standards, which will be discussed in the next chapter, should be developed when expanding 
WTO Members’ regulatory space under the GATT Article XX chapeau. Therefore, it is 
necessary to review the history of the WTO jurisprudence regarding the GATT Article XX 
chapeau, including EC – Seal Products and other relevant cases, before engaging in detailed 
discussions of the interpretive details in light of the development in EC – Seal Products.     
In a nutshell, before EC – Seal Products, policy rationales not on the list as prescribed 
under the GATT Article XX subparagraphs had not been explicitly recognized in WTO case law 
as justifications for disputed measures under the chapeau. Thus, although most disputed 
measures relying on GATT Article XX for an affirmative defense do have purported policy 
objectives falling under the subparagraphs, it is nearly impossible for disputed measures with 
internal inconsistencies to survive the examination under the chapeau because the internal 
inconsistencies are mostly caused by policy rationales other than their purported policy 
objectives. Responding parties in certain cases had argued that disputed measures should be 
justified by policy rationales beyond the list that is prescribed in the subparagraphs of GATT 
Article XX, but the WTO judiciary had not accepted these arguments until EC – Seal Products. 
In EC – Seal Products, it seemed the AB finally accepted that disputed measures could be 
justified by policy rationales different from their purported policy objectives while these 
rationales are usually not recognized under the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX. But the 
caveat is that the AB was ambiguous about its new reading of the chapeau. Fortunately, it 
examined some of the arguments based upon rationales other than the purported policy objective 
and not recognized under the GATT Article XX subparagraphs under the chapeau in EC – Seal 
Products, implying these rationales could be accepted as justifications in principle. 
Unfortunately, all these rationales failed the examination on the merits. After EC – Seal 
Products, the AB did not further clarify itself in EC – Seal Products regarding the GATT Article 
XX chapeau. Therefore, it looks as if EC – Seal Products has not been buttressed so far. But the 
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rejections of rationales other than the purported policy objectives as justifications in many cases 
were based upon various reasons. As to whether there is possibility that the chapeau may allow 
disputed measures to be justified with these rationales, the WTO judiciary has rarely said no. On 
the contrary, it has left openings in some cases, which, along with EC – Seal Products, can pave 
the way for future developments of the chapeau.  
 
2.1 Pre-WTO cases 
 
US – Canadian Tuna was a GATT case in the early 1980s and the first case in which 
GATT Article XX was interpreted and applied. In this case, the United States banned 
importation of tuna and tuna products from Canada pursuant to its Fishery Conservation of 
Management Act of 1976. The purposes of the Fishery Conservation of Management Act of 
1976 were “to ensure that certain stocks of fish were properly conserved and managed, to 
support and encourage the implementation and enforcement of international fishery agreements 
for the conservation and management of highly migratory species, and to encourage the 
negotiation and implementation of such additional agreements as necessary.”199 However, the 
direct cause for the US ban was the seizure of American fishing boats by Canada, which 
prompted the United States to retaliate against Canada.200  
The United States resorted to GATT Article XX (g) to justify its violation of Article XI, 
but the panel finally found the US ban could not be justified because it was not “made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption,” as required under 
Article XX (g).201 However, contrary to the two-tier analytical structure of Article XX, the panel 
first analyzed the US ban under the chapeau before its analysis under subparagraph (g), and 
found “similar actions had been taken against imports from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and 
Peru and then for similar reasons.”202 Therefore, the US ban did not constitute any “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable” discrimination under the chapeau. The panel also found the US ban “had been 
                                               
199 GATT Panel Report, United States — Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (US – 
Canadian Tuna), L/5198 – 29S/91, adopted 22 February 1982, para. 4.5. 
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Canadian Tuna), L/5198 – 29S/91, adopted 22 February 1982, para. 2.2. 
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Canadian Tuna), L/5198 – 29S/91, adopted 22 February 1982, para. 4.8. 
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taken as a trade measures and publicly announced as such,” and was therefore not a “disguised 
restriction on international trade.”203 Therefore, the US ban passed the examination under the 
chapeau.  
This case, for the first time, interpreted and applied the three conditions set in the GATT 
Article XX chapeau. The condition requiring the disputed measure not to constitute a “disguised 
restriction on international trade” seemed only to focus on whether the measure is made public or 
not, while the conditions requiring the disputed measure not to constitute “a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” were not 
discussed because there was no discrimination found in the first place. This case is not 
illuminating as to the issue whether a measure can be justified with its policy objectives not 
listed in the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX.  
US – Spring Assemblies is another case adjudicated in the early 1980s, which also 
interpreted the GATT Article XX chapeau. But there was nothing new to report. The panel in 
this case simply reiterated US – Canadian Tuna regarding the interpretation of the GATT Article 
XX chapeau.204  
US – Section 337 was a later GATT case that discussed GATT Article XX in some detail. 
In that case, the respondent tried to justify its violation of Article III:4 with an argument focusing 
on the administrative difficulties of treating imports in the same way as domestic products, 
however, the panel avoided considering the argument under the chapeau and conducted almost 
all the analysis under one of the subparagraphs.205  
Overall, the reasoning under the GATT Article XX in pre-WTO case law was mostly 
brief and inconsistent. Panels contradicted each other even regarding the analytical framework of 
important texts. For example, the US – Canadian Tuna panel applied the chapeau first before it 
applied the subparagraph under GATT Article XX, as mentioned earlier. The US – Spring 
Assemblies panel even stated that “if Article XX(d) applied, then an examination of the question 
of the consistency of the exclusion order with the other GATT provisions [Article III:4] cited 
                                               
203 GATT Panel Report, United States — Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (US – 
Canadian Tuna), L/5198 – 29S/91, adopted 22 February 1982, para. 4.8. 
204 GATT Panel Report, United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies (US – Spring Assemblies), 
L/5333 - 30S/107, adopted 26 May 1983, para. 56.   
205 GATT Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (US – 337), L/6439 – 36s/345, adopted 
7 November 1989, para. 5.30. 
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above would not be required.”206 It is shocking that the panel applied the exception clause first 
before it examined the disputed measures under GATT Article III:4. In US – Section 337, the 
panel avoided discussing the chapeau and literally treated the analysis under the chapeau as part 
of the analysis under the subparagraph.207 Most importantly, the pre-WTO case law did not 
engage in detailed discussion of GATT Article XX chapeau. Therefore, the pre-WTO case law 
was not very illuminating. However, on the other hand, it did not set precedents that opposed 
justifying regulatory measures with policy rationales beyond the list contained in the 
subparagraphs of GATT Article XX.   
  
2.2 WTO cases before Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
 
US – Gasoline was an interesting but confusing case, in which the AB employed a partial 
“necessity” test usually found under the subparagraphs of an exception clause. In this case, the 
US government introduced a program in order to “control toxic and other pollution caused by the 
combustion of gasoline.”208 The AB held that the US measure was provisionally justified under 
GATT Article XX (g).209  
However, in the US measure, while domestic refiners were allowed to have 
individualized baselines limiting pollutants, imported gasoline was subject to a single statutory 
baseline. It seemed that the discrimination could not be explained by the purported policy 
objective of the US measure. Domestic and imported gasoline were not different from an 
environmental perspective. Therefore there was an internal inconsistency in the US measure. The 
AB then examined the discrimination caused by the internal inconsistency under the chapeau of 
GATT Article XX. Under the chapeau, alternatives that were not discriminatory were discussed. 
The United States tried to dismiss the alternatives on the grounds of “the impracticability of 
verification and enforcement of [individual] foreign refiner baselines” because they required the 
                                               
206 GATT Panel Report, United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies (US – Spring Assemblies), 
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US government to collect data from individual refiners scattered in different foreign countries.210 
This resembled the arguments usually used by respondents when discussing whether a less trade 
restrictive alternative is reasonably available under the subparagraphs of an exception clause. 
The AB rejected the US argument, but one of the two primary reasons was that the 
United States did not explore other adequate means that were less burdensome or costly for 
foreign refiners.211 In other words, the AB believed there were probably ways for the United 
States to verify and enforce individual foreign refiner baselines; therefore, the discriminatory 
treatment was not justified under the chapeau. Or to put it in still another way, the AB did not 
agree that the administrative difficulty to verify and enforce foreign individual baselines was 
serious enough to justify a uniform baseline for foreign refiners.212  
If the United States had done a better job drafting the relevant law or regulations without 
substantive changes, there would be a likelihood that the WTO judiciary would have ruled 
otherwise. On the one hand, the panel suggested, as agreed by the AB, that since the United 
States had been able to collect foreign data that it relied upon for other trade purposes, for 
example, for the anti-dumping purpose, the United States should be able to collect reliable 
foreign data in this case as well.213 However, on the other hand, the panel also admitted and the 
AB also agreed that Members could turn to other information if information supposed to be 
provided by foreign producers was not available or unverifiable.214 The use of actual foreign data 
was not mandatory. The problem was that the United States didn’t even attempt to collect data 
from foreign refiners and make use of it. If the United States provided the use of data collected 
from individual foreign refiners as an option in its law or regulations, it would be off the hook 
even as it still imposed a uniform baseline instead of individual baselines. It could argue that data 
from individual foreign refiners were not available or unverifiable for the imposition of 
individual baselines after it probed that route. This argument would not work when the United 
States did not provide an option in the law or regulations. If the United States provided such an 
                                               
210 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 26. 
211 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 27. 
212 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, pp. 26, 27. 
213 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
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option, the WTO judiciary would probably not second guess its operational determination that 
administrative difficulty was so overwhelming that there were no alternatives but only to impose 
a uniform baseline upon foreign refiners.215  
The second reason why the AB rejected the administrative rationale proposed by the 
United States under the chapeau was that the costs of mitigating administrative problems faced 
by the US government were only borne by foreign gasoline refiners.216 That is to say, even if the 
US government was entitled to save administrative costs, there was no rationale to explain why 
only foreign refiners had to “incur the physical and financial costs and burdens” imposed by a 
statutory baseline.   
Interestingly, it was observed that the analysis by the AB resembled that of the 
“necessity” test.217 Waincymer particularly said that the AB in US – Gasoline “superimposed the 
necessity test on Article XX (g)” by smuggling the necessity test into the chapeau.218 It is true 
that the analysis of the US omission of plausible alternatives under the GATT Article XX 
chapeau resembled that in the “less trade restrictive” test as part of the “necessity” test under 
some subparagraphs of Article XX.219 It was particularly relevant to the analysis of whether an 
alternative was “reasonably available.” However, it was conducted under the chapeau. Most 
importantly, it was conducted to assess the policy argument offered by the United States to 
justify discrimination caused by the internal inconsistency of its measure. Therefore 
Waincymer’s comment is not entirely accurate. First, the necessity test under the subparagraphs 
can examine alternatives that are less trade restrictive no matter whether the alternatives are 
discriminatory or not, but, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, the key test under the chapeau is 
about discrimination. Second, it is more important to note that the test employed by the AB in 
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US – Gasoline was only part of a typical necessity test. To be more specific, it was not the 
“weighing and balancing” of the importance of the value protected, the contribution the measure 
made to the achievement of the policy objective, or the trade restrictiveness of the measure, but it 
was rather the less trade restrictive alternative assessment, which was only part of the usual drill. 
It was not even the entire alternative assessment. It only focused on whether the alternatives were 
reasonably available or not.  
For the part of the necessity test that focuses on the availability of an alternative that is 
not discriminatory, what is important is not the purported policy objective any more, but the 
administrative rationale. In US – Gasoline, the United States did not try to justify its 
discrimination with its environmental objective. Obviously, the discrimination was not consistent 
with its purported policy objective. In the perspective of its environmental objective, both 
domestic refiners and foreign refiners should be treated the same. Therefore, although the 
analysis under the chapeau in US – Gasoline was almost identical to part of the necessity test 
under the subparagraphs, what was at issue was actually not whether the purported policy 
objective of the US measure could explain and justify the discrimination. 
However, the similarity between the analysis under the chapeau in US - Gasoline and the 
necessity test under the subparagraphs can definitely create some confusion. Since usually the 
necessity test is conducted to see whether the entire disputed measure with its violation of the 
substantive obligations is necessary to achieve one of the legitimate objectives listed in the 
subparagraphs of an exception clause, people may take it for granted that a “necessity” test under 
the chapeau would be relevant to the purported policy objective of a disputed measure as well. 
Even comments 20 years later still misread the “necessity” test under the chapeau in US – 
Gasoline as conducted against the purported policy objective of the US gasoline baseline 
rules.220 However, it is not necessarily the case. As just discussed, there are quite a number of 
components within a full-fledged “necessity” test. Not all of them are analyzed with the 
purported policy objective of a disputed measure in mind. Although administrative rationales do 
not really expand the list prescribed in the exception clause subparagraphs because they are 
already acceptable under the subparagraphs of the exception clause, they are still different from 
the purported policy objective of a disputed measure. The relevant analysis by the WTO 
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judiciary can shed light on how rationales other than the purported policy and not listed under the 
subparagraphs should be examined under the chapeau. 
The next relevant case is US – Shrimp. In US – Shrimp, the United States originally 
conditioned the importation of shrimp on the installment of “turtle exclusion devises (TEDs)” on 
shrimp fishing vessels in order to conserve sea turtles.221 However, according to the rulings of 
the US Court of International Trade (CIT), shrimp caught by fishing vessels equipped with TEDs 
as prescribed by the US law were still prohibited from being imported into the United States as 
long as shrimp was caught by fishing vessels from countries not yet certified by the United 
States.222  To acquire the certificate, other countries needed to adopt essentially the same 
comprehensive regulatory program as the United States.223 In the application of the US measure, 
it seemed that all the countries were treated the same. They had to conform to the same 
requirements to get certified. However, discrimination was created among the trading partners of 
the United States—those who adopted essentially the same turtle conservation program as the 
United States were allowed to export shrimp to the United States while those who did not were 
prohibited from exporting shrimp to the United States even if their shrimp was caught with 
identical TEDs. This discrimination also suggested an internal inconsistency within the US 
measure. If turtle protection is the policy objective, why did the United States refuse to certify 
countries that did not have the required legislations regardless whether their fishing vessels were 
equipped with identical TEDs or not?224  
US – Shrimp had attracted great attention not only because it was a high-profile 
environmental case,225 but also because it triggered the debates about PPMs after the WTO was 
established. Jackson once said around 2000 that it was “one of the two most profound cases 
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among the 26 cases that have come through the WTO Appellate process so far.”226 The US 
measure was conditioned on PPMs, and thus had extraterritorial effects. However, the conditions 
were unilaterally set by the United States, which raised the fundamental issue of “the relationship 
of sovereignty to the international system in the area of domestic economic regulation.”227 Yes, 
the ban on shrimp was not particularly concerned with the shrimp but the harvesting techniques. 
However, the AB did not really rule on this point in US – Shrimp.228 As to the unilateral nature 
of the US measure, the AB did not really make a big deal out of it. Panels in the GATT era had 
been very unfriendly towards unilateral measures under the chapeau, literally making these 
measures unjustifiable, but the AB in US – Shrimp did not consider that the unilateral feature of 
the measure was determinant although it still took issue with it.229 It is certainly not correct to say 
these issues are not important. But the point is that, in US – Shrimp, they were not the key issues 
that determined the fate of the US measure in terms of legal technicalities.   
The US measure as a whole successfully passed the examination under one of the 
subparagraphs of GATT Article XX, but it had to face the chapeau next. The key question under 
the chapeau is whether the regulatory discrimination caused by the internal inconsistency of the 
measure could be explained by its purported policy objective recognized in the subparagraph. It 
is obvious that the internal inconsistency of the US measure could only be explained by some 
other policy rationales if the United States could offer them. The United States kept arguing that 
the discrimination could be explained by “a rationale legitimately connected with the policy of 
an Article XX exception,”230 and the discrimination was not arbitrary or unjustifiable because of 
“the policy goal of the Article XX exception being applied.”231 It did not offer any other 
rationale to justify its discriminatory measure. The AB held that “the policy goal of a measure at 
issue cannot provide its rationale or justification under the standards of the chapeau of Article 
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XX” instead of being relevant only under the sub-paragraphs of the exception provision.232 It 
seemed that the AB hinted that the United States should try to justify its discrimination under the 
chapeau by policy rationales different from the purported policy objective of its turtle protection 
scheme. Obviously, the AB tried to avoid mixing analysis under the GATT Article XX chapeau 
and the subparagraphs. If the policy objective of the disputed measure is used to provisionally 
justify a measure under the subparagraphs, it cannot be used again under the chapeau. Otherwise, 
the analysis in two places would overlap.  
However, the AB did not have a chance to examine any other policy rationale under the 
chapeau at all because the United States did not offer such a rationale. The AB concluded that 
there was unjustifiable discrimination because the US measures were rigid without taking 
consideration of different situations in different countries.233 Usually, the AB would hold that a 
discrimination could be found if there was different treatment “between countries where the 
same conditions prevail.” In this case, the AB interpreted this requirement of non-discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail double-negatively.234 That is to say, 
countries having different conditions should not be rigidly treated the same. A rigid uniform 
requirement on all relevant countries where the conditions were different constituted 
discrimination under the chapeau. Moreover, the different conditions of these countries were 
actually created with the help of the United States. The United States provided assistance to its 
Caribbean neighbors to make laws and regulations that were comparable to the relevant laws and 
regulations in the United States, it then refused to import from its Asian trade partners because 
they did not have the privilege to have the help from the United States to make and implement 
laws and regulations they were unfamiliar with although their fishing vessels might have 
equipped with decent TEDs.235 This makes sense, but may cause controversy because of lack of 
textual basis. In US – Shrimp 21.5, the AB made it clear again that one of the decisive 
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considerations was whether the US measures were flexible instead of being rigid under different 
conditions in other countries.236  
Like US – Gasoline, the measure concerned in US – Shrimp contained internal 
inconsistencies that caused discrimination, but unlike US – Gasoline, the United States, as 
respondent, did not argue that it had any policy rationale other than its purported policy objective 
to explain the discrimination. As a result, although US – Shrimp seemed to have provided an 
opening for rationales other than those listed in the GATT Article XX subparagraphs and not the 
purported policy objective of the measure at issue when it said the purported policy objective of 
the disputed measure could not justify the measure under the chapeau, there was no analysis in 
that regard. 
EC – Hormones is primarily concerned with the calibration to different risk levels when 
different treatments of like products are to be justified. However, there might be an opening in 
the panel’s report for justifying discrimination with rationales other than the purported policy 
objective of the measure at issue. In EC – Hormones, the European Union prohibited imported 
meat products treated with hormones for growth purposes.237 This prohibition was based on 
health concerns.238 The European Union was charged to have set too high a level of protection 
concerning the use of hormones for growth purposes while it did not set the same appropriate 
level of protection (ALOP) concerning the use of certain other hormones. Imported meat 
products were detrimentally impacted most by the prohibition and hence the European Union 
was charged of violating nondiscrimination/consistency obligation under SPS Article 2.3 and 
Article 5.5.239 
In this case, the panel held that the determination of “the absence of any plausible 
justification” for the significant difference in ALOPs in compatible situations is one important 
step of analysis in the assessment of whether arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination constitutes 
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a disguised restriction on international trade.240 Because the panel used the word “any” before 
“plausible justification,” this can be reasonably understood as an opening to justifying different 
ALOPs in compatible situations with rationales other than calibration to different risk levels and 
the purported policy objective of the SPS measure at issue. Once there is any plausible 
justification based on other reasonable rationales, the distinction in ALOPs does not constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade, and the discrimination is justified with such 
rationales. The AB, however, did not discuss this point at all during appeal.241 Although the 
panel’s interpretation was not explicitly endorsed by the AB, it was adopted without the AB’s 
objection. 
In EC – Hormones, although the relevant issue was discussed in the SPS context, it has a 
more general implications. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures challenged under the SPS are 
ones with policy objectives recognized under GATT Article XX (b), which is to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health. The discrimination/inconsistency in the EU measure, however, 
could not be explained by its purported policy objective, which is of course the sanitary and 
phytosanitary rationale. When the panel suggest “any plausible justification” could explain the 
discrimination/inconsistency under the SPS Agreement, it would certain create repercussions in 
GATT Article XX.       
GATS Article XIV chapeau is almost identical to GATT Article XX chapeau. GATS 
Article XIV jurisprudence and GATT Article XX jurisprudence are very similar and inform each 
other. Concerning the chapeau of GATS ArticleXIV, there is one relevant case – US – Gambling. 
In US – Gambling, the United States prohibited remote supply of gambling and betting services. 
This was held by the WTO judiciary to have violated the US commitment in its GATS 
schedule.242 The United States tried to justify its violation based on the public morals exception 
under GATS Article XIV (a). The US ban was held to be necessary for the protection of public 
morals, and therefore was provisionally justified under GATS Article XIV (a).243 The panel 
found that the United States had not prosecuted certain domestic remote suppliers of gambling 
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services and a US statute had permitted remote betting on horseracing.244 Then, it concluded that 
“the United States has not demonstrated that it applies its prohibition on the remote supply of 
these services in a consistent manner,” therefore “it does not apply its prohibition … in a manner 
that does not constitute ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination...’.”245 It seemed that the panel 
based its “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” analysis on the internal consistency of the 
measure applied at issue. Whether there were rationales other than the purported policy objective 
of the measure at issue that could justify the discrimination caused by the internal inconsistencies 
was not considered by the panel at all.  
On appeal, the United States contended that the panel’s analysis of “arbitrariness or 
unjustifiability” was inadequate because the analysis was only capable of revealing domestic 
services suppliers and foreign services suppliers were treated differently.246 The United States 
argued that the panel failed to analyze whether “differential treatment, or discrimination, is 
‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustifiable’.”247 The AB disagreed and said that it did not “read the panel to have 
ignored the requirement of ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustifiable’ discrimination.”248 Even if there was no 
detailed discussion of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability,” it was the fault of the United States. The 
AB stated clearly: 
The United States based its defence under the chapeau of Article XIV on the 
assertion that the measures at issue prohibit the remote supply of gambling and 
betting services by  any supplier, whether domestic or foreign. In other words, the 
United States sought to justify the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA on the 
basis that there is  no discrimination  in the manner in which the three federal 
statutes are applied to the remote supply of gambling and betting services. The 
United States could have, but did not, put forward an additional argument that even 
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if such discrimination exists, it does not rise to the level of ‘arbitrary’ or 
‘unjustifiable’ discrimination.249 
Therefore, the AB held that the panel was not wrong, as a matter of law, to focus on the 
inconsistency in the US measure to rebut “the United State’s claim of no discrimination at 
all.”(emphasis original)250 Then, the reason that there seemed to be no detailed analysis of 
whether the internal inconsistency was “arbitrary or unjustifiable” was the fault of the United 
States. Since the United States bore the burden of proof in an affirmative defense under GATS 
Article XIV including its chapeau, and since it only offered arguments regarding the analysis 
about “discrimination,”251 its choice to not offer argument regarding the analysis whether the 
discrimination was arbitrary or unjustifiable would mean that the United States would 
automatically lose on that issue once it lost on the issue of discrimination. Accordingly, the AB 
held that the panel was correct to conclude that the United States failed to demonstrate its 
measure was not “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” once the measure at issue was found 
to be discriminatory.252  
The AB finally reversed the panel’s finding, but not on the issue of “arbitrariness or 
unjustifiability.” It held the panel made a wrong finding of facts when conducting the analysis of 
whether there was discrimination or not. According to the AB, isolated instances of 
discriminatory enforcement such as those in this case could not be used as conclusive evidence 
for a finding of discrimination.253  
As to what kind of analysis the panel should conduct regarding the issue of whether 
discrimination is “arbitrary or unjustifiable,” the AB did not make any explicit statement. 
However, the AB hinted that the United States could “put forward an additional argument” to 
explain that the discrimination in its measure did “not rise to the level of ‘arbitrary’ or 
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‘unjustifiable’ discrimination.”254 It had been obvious in the AB’s analysis that the purported 
objective of the US measure, though it was recognized in subparagraph (a), could not explain the 
discrimination caused by the internal inconsistency. Therefore, the AB was possibly hinting that 
the United States could offer a policy argument that was different from its purported policy 
objective and not listed in the subparagraphs of GATS Article XIV either. Therefore, I would say 
the AB in US – Gambling kept the opening for rationales other than the purported objective of 
the disputed measure and not listed in the subparagraphs of an exception clause to justify the 
measure at issue. However, a later case—Brazil – Retreaded Tyres— soon narrowed the opening 
if not completely closing it. 
 
2.3 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres was a case in which the WTO judiciary greatly restricted 
domestic regulatory autonomy. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Brazil imposed both a importation 
prohibition on retreaded tires and domestic regulations to forbid the marketing of imported 
retreaded tires and regulate disposal of them.255 The panel found Brazilian measures were in 
violation of GATT Article XI:1 and Article III:4.256 The panel then examined the measures under 
GATT Article XX. The panel held that the ban on imports was provisionally justified under 
GATT Article XX (b)257 while all other measures were not justified under GATT Article XX (b) 
or (d) or any other subparagraph.258 For the importation ban that was provisionally justified, 
there were two exemptions. Brazil allowed the importation of used tires (for domestic 
manufacturers to produce retreaded tires) under Brazilian court injunctions and importation of 
retreaded tires from the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries under a 
MERCOSUR tribunal ruling. These exemptions created discrimination between MERCOSUR 
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countries and other foreign countries and between domestic retreaded tire producers and foreign 
tire producers. And the exemptions causing the discrimination were not consistent with the 
purported policy objective of the Brazilian measures. That is, they were not taken to protect life 
and health of human and animals.259 Permission to import used tires and retreaded tires from 
MERCOSUR countries had to be explained by some other rationales.  
It is clear that obeying domestic court orders and honoring international tribunal ruling 
were the reasons for the discrimination. Actually, the panel did take a similar position. For 
example, the panel did imply that the MERCOSUR ruling provided a rationale to save the 
MERCOSUR exemption from being found arbitrary or unjustifiable.260 However, the panel did 
not focus on whether there were rationales explaining the discrimination. The panel held that 
these exemptions did not constitute means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because 
importation of used tires or retreaded tires were not in such a large quantity that Brazil’s health 
protection policy under GATT Article XX (b) was undermined.261 The AB observed that “the 
panel’s interpretation of the term ‘unjustifiable’ did not depend on the cause or rationale of the 
discrimination but, rather, was based on the assessment of the effects of the 
discrimination”(emphasis original).262 In the panel’s eyes, the rationales behind the exemptions 
did not really matter in the analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability.” What really mattered 
was whether the discrimination was serious enough in terms of its economic impacts on 
international competition. Davies agreed that in the panel’s analysis under the key element of 
“arbitrariness or unjustifiability” under the chapeau, “the panel developed its effects-based 
approach,” and this approach was the “centrally important characteristic of the panel’s 
approach,” although he pointed out that the panel seemed to have incorporated policy analysis in 
the element of “countries where the same conditions prevail.”263 The panel’s reasoning seemed 
to have its origin in US – Gambling. However, in US – Gambling, the de minimis effects 
consideration was taken when determining the existence of discrimination, but in Brazil – 
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Retreaded Tyres, the panel moved the de minimis effects consideration to the analysis of whether 
the discrimination was arbitrary or unjustifiable.   
On appeal, the AB disagreed with the panel regarding how to conduct an analysis of 
“arbitrariness or unjustifiability.” First, the AB rejected the panel’s de minimis effects approach 
under the chapeau, emphasizing that “[t]he panel's approach has no support in the text of Article 
XX and appears to us inconsistent with the manner the Appellate Body has interpreted and 
applied the concept of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ in previous cases.”264 Second, 
the AB held that “[a]nalyzing whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable usually 
involves an analysis that relates primarily to the cause or the rationale of the discrimination.”265 
The AB then held the assessment of rationales used to justify discrimination under the chapeau 
should be made in the light of the purported objective of the measure at issue,266 and laid down 
the key test under the chapeau in a more explicit manner:  
there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure provisionally 
justified under a paragraph of Article XX is applied in a discriminatory manner 
“between countries where the same conditions prevail,” and when the reasons given 
for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the 
purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective.267  
Since Brazil tried to explain its discrimination with rationales that “bears no relationship to the 
objective of a measure provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of Article XX, or goes 
against that objective,”268 the AB held domestic court injunction and international tribunal ruling 
were not valid rationales.269 The rationales other than the purported policy objective offered by 
Brazil and not on the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs failed to justify discrimination under 
the chapeau.  
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The key test articulated by the AB in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres is a direct statement 
concerning the issue this thesis is discussing. If a rationale other than the purported policy 
objective of the measure at issue bears a rational relationship to the purported policy objective as 
recognized under one of the subparagraphs of the exception clause, it is able to justify 
discrimination caused by the disputed measure. If a rationale other than the purported policy 
objective of the measure at issue bears no relationship to the purported policy objective of the 
measure or even goes against it, the rationale is not able to justify discrimination caused by the 
disputed measure. As this statement of a test was made in the analysis of the chapeau of GATT 
Article XX,270 whether a rationale other than the purported policy objective of the measure at 
issue can justify discrimination caused by exceptions to the measure at issue becomes the 
determination of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” of the discrimination or “a disguised 
restriction on international trade” under GATT Article XX chapeau. If the rationale bears a 
relationship to the purported policy objective of the measure at issue, the measure at issue does 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or does not constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade. If the rationale bears no relationship to the purported 
policy objective of the measure at issue or even goes against it, the measure at issue constitutes a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or constitutes a disguised restriction on 
international trade.  
Lydgate observed that the underlying hypothesis of the WTO jurisprudence regarding the 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the chapeau of the exception clause seemed to be that 
“if a standard is not upheld uniformly to all the products being regulated, this throws into 
question the regulatory objective itself.”271 This observation makes a lot sense. In the light of this 
observation, it would be clear that measures containing exemptions can hardly pass the test under 
the chapeau. The exemptions and the rationales behind them would logically go against the 
purported objective of the disputed measure. Discrimination under the chapeau is actually 
required to be explained only by the purported policy objective.  
But, do domestic regulatory measures really have to be perfect in light of their purported 
policy objectives? Is there really an underlying hypothesis as found by Lydgate? In previous 
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cases, some of which are reviewed here, the AB did not categorically reject rationales that were 
not really closely related to the purported policy objective of the disputed measure as 
explanations for discrimination caused by internal inconsistencies. Even if the underlying 
hypothesis found by Lydgate might have existed to some extent before Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, 
after Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, it only lasted for a while before EC – Seal Products.  
 
2.4 After Brazil – Retreaded Tyres and before EC – Seal Products   
 
After Brazil – Retreaded Tyres and before EC – Seal Products, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
was highly cited when the GATT Article XX chapeau was concerned. However, the opening 
narrowed by Brazil – Retreaded Tyres was gradually widened indirectly in some cases where 
GATT Article XX chapeau was not applicable.  
In Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the Philippines complained that, among other 
things, Thailand violated GATT Article X:3 (a) by appointing domestic cigarette company 
officials to government positions in charge of its cigarette importation law and regulations.272 
GATT Article X:3 (a) requires that Members “shall administer in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings…” The panel decided to 
borrow from GATT Article XX chapeau jurisprudence to interpret GATT Article X:3 (a) 
because both of them deal with the manner in which relevant measures are administered or 
applied.273 In the panel’s view, GATT Article X:3 (a) imposed a reasonableness requirement on 
Thailand, which is identical to the requirements in the GATT Article XX chapeau.274 Then by 
citing Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the panel declared that the test for both GATT Article XX 
chapeau and GATT Article 10:3 (a) was the examination of the cause or rationale for prima facie 
violations of certain obligations.275 The panel held that appointing dual function officials in 
Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) appeared to constitute an act of “inappropriate and/or not 
sensible administration” and Thailand should justify the appointment of dual function officials 
                                               
272 WTO Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Thailand – 
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with “a particular rationale.”276 Thailand argued that there were “legitimate administrative 
objectives” behind its appointment of dual function officials.277 The panel was satisfied and 
emphasized that sovereign states had the discretion and authority with regard to government 
administrative matters.278 Since the Philippines did not appeal this issue, the AB did not have a 
chance to express itself.  
Therefore, for the first time, this case explicitly identified a specific type of acceptable 
causes or rationales, which were “legitimate administrative objectives,” for explaining and 
justifying prima facie inappropriate administration of laws, regulations, decisions and rulings in 
violation of WTO obligations. As I understand, government administrative efficiency and 
convenience in this case were not the purported policy objective of the cigarette importation 
regime, nor were they recognized in the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX.  
However, a few notes have to be made. First, the explicit identification was made only by 
the panel. The AB may not agree with the panel on this point. Second, “legitimate administrative 
objectives” are only acceptable to justify a prima facie GATT Article X:3 (a) violation in 
Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines). Although the panel held GATT Article XX chapeau 
jurisprudence is informative to GATT Article X:3 (a) interpretation, it is not necessarily true 
when we reverse the relationship of influence. Third, although the panel characterized 
obligations under both GATT X:3 (a) and GATT Article XX chapeau as a reasonableness 
requirement, GATT Article XX chapeau is about the reasonableness of discrimination in the 
application of disputed measures while GATT X:3 (a) is about more general application of 
disputed measures. Furthermore, since the panel’s ruling addressed issues arising out of GATT 
Article X:3 (a), its opinion on the interpretation of GATT Article XX chapeau was at best obiter 
dicta, even if reversed influence is acceptable. As a result, this case is not a very reliable footstep 
in the relevant jurisprudence development although it seemed to go in the right direction.  
                                               
276 WTO Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Thailand – 
Cigarettes (Philippines)), WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, para 7.921, para 7.922. 
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itself complies efficiently" with the Thai legislation; and (iii) they are making sure that TTM's activities are 
consistent with Thai public health policy (TTM Board includes an individual of the Ministry of Health). See WTO 
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)), WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, paras. 7.921, 7.923. 
278 WTO Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Thailand – 
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US – Clove Cigarettes can be counted as a more reliable case in our search for cases that 
allowed rationales other than the purported policy objective of the disputed measure to justify 
discrimination contained in the measure. In this case, the dispute arose out of a ban imposed by 
the United States on the manufacture and sale of cigarettes in the United States with 
“characterizing flavours” that appeal to youth.279 The ban, however, had an exemption. While all 
other flavoured cigarettes were banned, menthol cigarettes were allowed to continue to be 
manufactured and sold in the United States.280 The panel found “virtually all clove cigarettes” 
imported into the United States in the three years prior to the ban were from Indonesia.281 The 
United States submitted that menthol cigarettes accounted for about 26 percent of the total US 
cigarette market and that three domestic brands dominated the US market.282 Detrimental 
impacts on foreign clove cigarettes were obvious, which would certainly constitute violation of 
national treatment obligation under GATT Article III:4. However, in interpreting TBT Article 
2.1, the AB held that the detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imports did not 
necessarily result in “less favourable treatment,” and that some seemingly discriminatory 
technical regulations should be upheld if they “stem exclusively from legitimate regulatory 
distinctions.”283  
In the GATT Agreement, non-discrimination obligations and exceptions are written into 
different clauses. Determination of whether a measure is discriminatory is an economic exercise 
under GATT Article III separated from a policy analysis under Article XX. However, the TBT 
Agreement does not have an exception clause. This is the reason why the AB concluded that a 
policy consideration has to be added to TBT Article 2.1—the clause contains non-discrimination 
obligations although there is not a textual basis for a policy analysis. Interestingly, this insertion 
has little resemblance to the subparagraphs of the exception clause in the GATT Agreement. It is 
more like the chapeau of GATT Article XX. 
                                               
279 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove 
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282 United States’ first written submission to the panel in US – Clove Cigarettes, paras 27, 29, quoted by WTO 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – 
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283 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes 
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80 
 
The purported policy objective of the US measure was to discourage youth smoking by 
banning flavoured cigarettes. This rationale certainly could not explain the exemption of menthol 
cigarettes from the ban. The United States contended that the exemption stemmed from 
rationales other than the purported policy rationale of the regulation at issue.284 To be specific, 
the exemption stemmed from the considerations of “the potential impact on the health care 
system and the potential development of a black market and smuggling of menthol cigarettes.”285 
The panel held that these considerations were legitimate in principle but they were only excuses 
without factual evidence in this case.286 On appeal, the AB emphasized that the purported policy 
objective of the US measure could not explain the discrimination caused by the exemption.287 It 
reasoned that clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes had the same characteristics (containing 
flavors that are attractive to young people) from the regulatory perspective and that menthol 
cigarettes should be treated the same as clove cigarettes if the United States really wanted to 
discourage youth smoking.288 Thus, the US measure was not “even handed” in the purported 
policy perspective. Then, the AB analyzed the two rationales proposed by the United States. Like 
the panel, the AB did not deny that these two considerations were legitimate objectives in 
principle,289 but the AB was not persuaded that the two considerations existed as a matter of 
fact,290 which was the reason that the AB finally dismissed these two rationales. It is clear that 
the exemption and the rationales behind the exception were not related to or even went against 
the purported objective of the US ban on flavoured cigarettes. However, the AB did not base its 
rejection on the test articulated in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres.  
If the AB was persuaded that the two rationales proposed by the United States were real, 
it is possible that the discrimination would be justified with the two rationales. Therefore, as a 
matter of law, it is logical to infer that rationales other than the purported policy objectives of the 
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measure at issue are allowed to justify discrimination in US – Clove Cigarettes. Although US – 
Clove Cigarettes was a TBT case, it could certainly have repercussions in the GATT Agreement, 
particularly in the GATT Article XX chapeau. 
 
2.5 EC – Seal Products  
 
As I have argued elsewhere, in EC – Seal Products, the panel and the AB took the 
position that measures containing exemptions are still justifiable on the basis that the exemptions 
meet certain requirements, although they differed in terms of how.291 This is fundamentally 
different from the test articulated and applied under the GATT Article XX chapeau by the AB in 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. In EC – Seal Products, the AB assessed rationales behind the 
exemptions of the EU measure offered by the European Union – the respondent – to justify 
discrimination under the chapeau, implying that rationales behind exemptions are able to justify 
disputed measures. Rationales behind exemptions are not constrained by the purported policy 
objective of the disputed measure. Therefore, when the purported policy objectives always have 
to be recognized by the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX, rationales behind the exemptions 
are not limited by the list prescribed in the subparagraphs. If they are allowed to justify domestic 
regulatory measures otherwise in violation of substantive trade disciplines, the regulatory 
autonomy enjoyed by Members under the WTO would be greatly expanded. It seemed that the 
panel and the AB had for the first time recognized the need to thus expand the regulatory 
autonomy of Members. However, some commentators still see EC – Seal Products as following 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres.292  
 
2.5.1 Key facts of EC – Seal Products 
In EC – Seal Products, The European Union banned seal products on its market, but the 
EU ban had internal inconsistencies. Three exemptions were carved out, which were the Inuit or 
indigenous communities (IC) exemption that was to protect the “subsistence of Inuit and 
indigenous communities,” the marine resource management (MRM) exemption that was 
                                               
291 Henry Hailong Jia, ‘The Legitimacy of Exceptions Containing Exceptions in WTO Law: Some Thoughts on EC 
– Seal Products’, 14 (2) Chinese Journal of International Law 411-417 (2015), p. 411. 
292 Emily B. Lydgate, ‘Is it Rational and Consistent? The Wto’s Surprising Role in Shaping Domestic Public Policy’, 
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particularly for “controlling nuisance seals and seal culling” and the travelers exemption.293 Seal 
products falling into the three exemptions were not banned.294 The European Union asserted that 
its seal regime was aimed at addressing public moral concerns about the welfare of seals, which 
was that the public regarded the inhumane killing of seals to be morally unacceptable.295 But seal 
products falling into the three exemptions could still be sold on the EU market, even though they 
gave rise to the same moral concerns.296 The policy objective of protecting public morals could 
not explain the three exemptions, which created internal inconsistencies and discrimination even 
in the light of EU’ purported policy objective.  
Julia Qin commented that this case was the first WTO case involving “conflicts between 
different nontrade values.”297 This is a very interesting observation. EC – Seal Products is 
definitely not the first case where there are exemptions created by accommodating multiple 
objectives within a measure, but it is probably the first case where the rationales behind the 
exemptions were also based on well-recognized non-trade values. The rationales offered to 
explain the exemptions in the past cases were either non-existent or based on reasons like 
avoiding excessive administrative costs (US – Gasoline) or court orders (Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres). Those rationales are not in themselves of a lesser importance from a practical 
perspective, but some of the rationales behind the exemptions in EC – Seal Products seem to be 
“more” important non-trade values including protecting indigenous groups and maintaining 
ecological balance. These are substantive values that can hardly be rejected. This probably is the 
reason why this case was treated differently from previous cases, at least according to the panel’s 
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2.5.2. panel’s analysis in the TBT context 
The panel held that the EU measure was a technical regulation and therefore should be 
examined under the TBT Agreement.298 In the TBT context, the issue relevant to this thesis was 
whether the exemptions within the EU seal regime stemmed exclusively from “legitimate 
regulatory distinctions” under TBT Article 2.1. This is the last of the three issues under TBT 
Article 2.1. Concerning the first two issues, the panel found all seal products were “like 
products”299 and there was detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities of certain foreign 
seal products.300 To address the third issue, the panel proposed a three-step analytical framework 
in the TBT context： 
[F]irst, is the distinction rationally connected to the objective of the EU Seal 
Regime; second, if not, is there any cause or rationale that can justify the distinction 
(i.e. “explain the existence of the distinction”) despite the absence of the connection 
to the objective of the Regime, taking into account the particular circumstances of 
the current dispute; and, third, is the distinction concerned, as reflected in the 
measure, “designed or applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” such that it lacks “even-handedness.”301  
The first step and the second step can provide alternative justifications. Each of them alone is 
able to justify the disputed measure. The second step is the key here. According to the second 
step, if the distinction caused by the exemptions can be explained by rationales other than the 
purported policy objective of the measure at issue, the measures containing these exemptions can 
be justified. In EC – Seal Products, the exemptions could not be explained by the objective of 
protecting public morals. Without the second step of analysis, the EU seal regime would not 
stand a chance of surviving. The third step serves to prevent the abuse of the second step. If 
rationales behind the exemptions are allowed to justify the distinction caused by the exemptions 
and ultimately the disputed measure, they have to meet certain conditions such as “even-
handedness.”  
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When assessing the rationales behind the exceptions, the importance and wide 
recognition of the rationales, which constituted “the particular circumstances of the current 
dispute” in this case, were first established by the panel.302 The tests proposed by the panel in EC 
– Seal Products will accept rationales if they are very important or well accepted, treating the 
relationship between these rationales and the purported policy objective as only one factor of 
consideration.303 In application, none of the three exemptions passed the three-step analysis. The 
reason was not that the rationales behind the exemptions were not able to justify the EU measure 
containing distinctions caused by exemptions. At least two of the three exemptions passed the 
second step of analysis, however, the problem was that they failed the third step of analysis that 
requires “even-handedness” in the perspective of the rationales behind the exemptions.304   
In the panel’s view, EU – Seal Products was relevant to the issue of our concern in both 
the TBT context and the GATT context. But the AB reversed the panel’s finding that the EU seal 
regime was a technical regulation.305 As a result, the panel’s findings under the TBT Agreement 
ware held to be “moot and of no legal effect.”306 Therefore the panel’s reasoning and findings 
under TBT Article 2.1 in this case has no legal effect. Nevertheless, the AB did hint that the 
panel’s ruling concerning the TBT Agreement followed the AB in US – Clove Cigarettes and 
subsequent TBT cases.307 As a result, the panel’s findings relevant to the issue of our concern in 
the TBT context will not be totally useless.  
 
2.5.3. The analysis in the GATT context by the panel and the AB  
In the GATT context, the panel ruled that the EU seal scheme violated the non-
discrimination obligations under GATT Articles I:1 and III:4, which were different from these 
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under TBT Article 2.1.308 The AB agreed with the panel.309 As discussed earlier, the TBT non-
discrimination clause contains an policy consideration, which, under the GATT Agreement, is 
conducted under the GATT exception clause instead of under GATT Articles I:1 and III:4.310 
The EU seal regime was clearly discriminatory in the economic or competitive sense. The AB 
also agreed that the EU seal regime as a whole fell within the scope of GATT Article XX (a).311 
When discussing whether the three exemptions were acceptable in the GATT context, the panel 
held that the key examination should take place under the GATT Article XX chapeau and the 
analysis should be essentially the same as that in TBT Article 2.1.312 The panel’s ruling 
concerning the GATT Article XX chapeau, however, was not supported by the AB.  
The AB first refused to interpret the GATT Article XX chapeau by borrowing from the 
TBT Article 2.1 jurisprudence because it held the legal standards contained in them were 
different and their main functions and scopes were different.313 Then, the AB articulated the test 
under the chapeau. First, it should be determined whether there is discrimination and what type 
the discrimination is.314 Second, conditions in relevant countries should be compared to see 
whether they are the same or not.315 The AB further stated that “only ‘conditions’ that are 
relevant for the purpose of establishing arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the light of the 
specific character of the measure at issue and the circumstances of a particular case should be 
considered under the chapeau.”(emphasis original)316 This is a conceptually complex issue, but it 
did not cause much trouble in this case. The third step is the key step. The AB cited a number of 
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cases to establish that the key to justifying exemptions under the chapeau was to find an 
acceptable rationale or cause.317 To illustrate the third step, the AB reviewed US – Gasoline and 
US – Shrimp in some detail to demonstrate how the AB examined various rationales that tried to 
justify discrimination found under the chapeau.318 However, the AB did not try to develop a 
typology of what rationales had been considered by the AB in previous cases. It only stressed, by 
citing Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, that “one of the most important factors…is whether the 
discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with respect 
to which the measure has been provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article 
XX.”319 The AB then stopped further discussion of the third step of its test under the chapeau. It 
seemed that the AB followed Brazil – Retreaded Tyres regarding the GATT Article XX chapeau.  
Commentators have been mostly misled by the AB’s reiteration of the Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres test in EC – Seal Products. However, when the AB started to examine the EU seal regime, 
it actually applied the test very differently from that in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. In EC – Seal 
Products, it was only the discrimination caused by the IC exemption that was examined in detail 
under the chapeau.320 Regarding the IC exemption, the AB first found there was discrimination 
caused by it in the EU seal scheme, particularly discrimination between “seal products derived 
from IC hunts” and “commercial hunts”, and among “different indigenous communities.”321 The 
AB then found “the same animal welfare conditions prevail in all countries where seals are 
hunted,”322 therefore the IC exemption also caused discrimination in the perspective of moral 
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protection. The AB finally engaged in its third step of analysis under the chapeau, which was the 
exercise of looking for rationales for the discrimination.  
When looking for rationales for the discrimination between “seal products derived from 
IC hunts” and “commercial hunts,” the AB first followed Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, holding that 
“[t]he first relevant question before us is…how the discrimination resulting from the manner in 
which the EU Seal Regime treats IC hunts as compared to ‘commercial’ hunts can be reconciled 
with, or is related to, the policy objective of addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal 
welfare.”323 The AB particularly noted “that the different regulatory treatment of IC hunts, as 
compared to ‘commercial’ hunts, takes the form of a significant carve-out of the former from the 
measure’s ban on seal products.”324 It is clear that exemptions do not stand a chance under the 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres test. This is where Bartels paid more attention and concluded that the 
AB followed Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. 325  But the AB held that “the relationship of the 
discrimination to the [purported] objective of a measure is one of the most important factors, but 
not the sole test.”326 Bartels did take full notice of this statement and the consideration the AB 
took of the subsistence rationale that was not positively related to the purported policy objective 
of the EU seal scheme, and he made a very correct comment that “the Appellate Body 
considered the extent to which the measure actually supported subsistence hunting by Inuit 
communities…[t]his inquiry would have been precluded by the approach followed in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres.”327 Obviously Bartels realized the AB did consider a rationale irreconcilable 
with the purported policy objective of disputed measure instead of rejecting such a rationale 
categorically, but he still paid more attention to the AB’s conclusion that this rationale is 
irreconcilable with protection of morals.328  
The European Union argued that the discrimination could be explained by the reason that 
the Inuit and other indigenous communities hunted seals for their subsistence, which 
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328 Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
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distinguished IC hunting from commercial hunting.329 The AB did not reject the EU rationale 
just because it was not a rationale related to its purported objective to protect public morals. 
Instead, the AB examined the subsistence rationale in great detail. However, after careful 
examination, the AB worried that some seal products, “while formally compliant with the [IC] 
exception, appear to be outside the scope of the exception.”330 The reasons for the AB’s worry 
include that the criteria of the IC exemption were not clear and there were broad discretion in the 
application of these criteria.331 Therefore, seal products derived from commercial hunting were 
able to enter the EU market by taking advantage of the poorly designed and implemented 
exemptions.332 In other words, the EU measure could not well distinguish seal products derived 
from IC hunting from seal products derived from commercial seal hunting. Therefore, the EU’s 
subsistence rationale failed not as a matter of law, but as a matter of fact.  
As mentioned earlier, the AB noted there was discrimination between Inuit communities 
in different countries, particularly that the European Union “had not pursued cooperative 
arrangements to facilitate the access of Canadian Inuit to the IC exception” while it had 
facilitated the access of Greenlandic Inuit to the IC exception.333 This type of discrimination 
certainly could not survive the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres test as it could not be explained by the 
purported policy objective of moral protection, nor could it be explained by the subsistence 
rationale proposed by the European Union. If the European Union wanted to protect the 
subsistence of the Inuit, it should afford the protection to all Inuit no matter in which country 
they lived. Therefore, the subsistence rationale failed to explain both the discrimination between 
“seal products derived from IC hunts” and “commercial hunts” and the discrimination among 
“different indigenous communities.”  
The AB finally held the EU seal regime “is applied in a manner that constitutes a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
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in particular with respect to the IC exemption.”334 It then summed the reasoning for its analysis 
of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability”: 
First, we found that the European Union did not show that the manner in which the EU 
Seal Regime treats seal products derived from IC hunts as compared to seal products 
derived from “commercial” hunts can be reconciled with the objective of addressing 
EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare. Second, we found considerable 
ambiguity in the “subsistence” and “partial use” criteria of the IC exception. Given the 
ambiguity of these criteria and the broad discretion that the recognized bodies 
consequently enjoy in applying them, seal products derived from what should in fact be 
properly characterized as “commercial” hunts could potentially enter the EU market 
under the IC exception. We did not consider that the European Union has sufficiently 
explained how such instances can be prevented in the application of the IC exception. 
Finally, we were not persuaded that the European Union has made “comparable 
efforts” to facilitate the access of the Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with 
respect to the Greenlandic Inuit.335 
In the detailed analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability,” and in the summary, the AB 
did not seem to make it clear that the three steps of analysis constitute a new test of “arbitrariness 
or unjustifiability.” More importantly, it did not say that the examination of the purported policy 
objective in step one and the examination of the Inuit subsistence rationale in step two and also 
in step three provide alternative justifications for a disputed measure to be exonerated under the 
chapeau. The AB did not say that each of these two types of policy rationales alone could justify 
a disputed measure. It could be that the examination of the Inuit subsistence rationale was only to 
find whether the disputed measure has additional flaws in addition to its internal inconsistency in 
the purported policy objective found in the first step of analysis.  
However, coupled with the AB’s statement that “the relationship of the discrimination to 
the [purported] objective of a measure is one of the most important factors, but not the sole 
test,”(emphasis added)336 the second step can be seen as providing an alternative justification 
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based on an alternative rationale for the disputed measure. In situations where the discrimination 
cannot be explained by the purported policy objective of the disputed measure, if it is 
emphasized that the consistency between the measure and the purported policy objective is “not 
the sole test,” it is only logical for an alternative rationale as examined in the following steps to 
provide independent justification for a discriminatory measure. Therefore, the analysis in EC – 
Seal Products, could be understood as an attempt of the AB to modify the Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres test in the GATT Article XX chapeau context. Rationales other than the purported policy 
objective of the disputed measure seemed to be given a chance to justify discrimination alone 
under the GATT Article XX chapeau. This is the most logical understanding of the AB’s 
analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” in EC – Seal Products. This indicated a fundamental 
departure from Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. 
 
2.6 After EC – Seal Products 
 
After EC – Seal Products, panels in some cases seemed not to have taken EC – Seal 
Products very seriously in terms of the interpretation of the GATT Article XX chapeau. In US – 
Animals, the primary WTO instrument concerned was the SPS Agreement. After having 
reviewed a number of cases, the panel concluded that the reasoning under the GATT Article XX 
chapeau was applicable to SPS Article 2.3 and Article 5.5.337 Both SPS Article 2.3 and Article 
5.5 include text similar to that in the GATT XX chapeau.338 When interpreting the key element 
of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” in SPS Article 2.3 and Article 5.5, the panel relied 
on Brazil – Retreaded Tyres without mentioning the latest development in EC – Seal Products. 
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The panel report was adopted without being appealed, therefore, the AB did not have a chance to 
express its opinion.  
But not long after the US – Animals, the AB had such a chance. To date, US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) 21.5, is the only case after EC – Seal Products, in which the AB expressed explicitly its 
attitude towards the jurisprudential development under the GATT Article XX chapeau.  
In the original US – Tuna II (Mexico), the United States imposed a “dolphin-safe” label 
scheme on tuna products imported into or marketed or sold in the United States. In essence, the 
United States conditioned eligibility for a “dolphin-safe” label on certain documentary evidence 
that varied according to five criteria, including the area where the tuna was caught and the 
fishing methods used. 339  As a result, Mexican tuna products needed more burdensome 
documentary evidence to qualify for the label because Mexican fleet fished tuna “almost 
exclusively” in a particular area (the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP)) with a particular fishing 
method (setting on dolphins), while the documentary burdens on US tuna products were less 
because the US fleet fished in both the ETP340 and other areas (outside the ETP) with other 
fishing methods (other than setting on dolphins).341 The AB was not persuaded that the more 
burdensome documentary requirements under certain conditions were calibrated to the risks they 
were supposed to address and the discrimination contained in the US “dolphin-safe” scheme was 
not justified by a legitimate regulatory distinction.342  
The United Stated then modified its “dolphin-safe” scheme. The essence of its 
modifications was to add certain documentary and other requirements to more accurately 
calibrate to the risks posed by tuna fishing to dolphins outside the ETP under certain 
conditions.343 That is to say, the United States increased the levels of protection for dolphins 
outside the ETP according to its assessment of risks to dolphins while it did not lower the level 
of protections for dolphins under the threat of certain fishing methods in the ETP.344 Mexico 
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claimed the new US “dolphin-safe” scheme was still in violation of non-discrimination 
obligations under both the TBT Agreement and the GATT Agreement.345 Therefore, an Article 
21.5 proceeding was initiated.    
In the Article 21.5 case, the AB supported the panel for relying on the GATT Article XX 
chapeau jurisprudence to interpret “treatment no less favorable,” particularly “whether 
detrimental treatment stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction,” under TBT Article 2.1.346 
The AB further stated that the panel was correct to rely on the statement of the AB in EC – Seal 
Products that “[o]ne of the most important factors in the assessment of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination [under GATT Article XX chapeau] is the question of whether the discrimination 
can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with respect to which the 
measure has been provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX.”347 
However, the AB acknowledged that the AB in EC – Seal Products also stated “other factors – 
beyond the question of whether the discrimination can be reconciled with the policy objective – 
could also be relevant to the analysis of whether the discrimination is arbitrary or 
unjustifiable.”348 But, the AB did not consider “other factors” in this case because the arguments 
offered by the United States were again about “calibration” to different levels of risks to 
dolphins.349 Therefore, we do not see the explicit reiteration of what the AB had stated when it 
actually examined the disputed measure in the light of the rationale unrelated to the purported 
policy objective of the disputed measure in EC – Seal Products, nor do we see an actual 
examination of policy rationales different from the purported policy objective of the disputed 
measure in this case. Under GATT Article XX chapeau, the AB only restated the importance of 
examining discrimination in the light of the purported policy objective of the disputed measure 
and also cautioned that other factors could be relevant as well.350  
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Although the AB stressed in US – Tuna II (Mexico) 21.5, that discriminatory measures 
were justifiable not only when the discrimination could be explained by the purported policy 
objectives, the statement about “other factors” that can influence the consideration of whether the 
discrimination was justifiable has been ignored in later cases. In Colombia – Textiles, the panel 
considered the arbitrariness or unjustifiability of discrimination under the GATT Article XX 
chapeau entirely according to the test set forth in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, stating “the 
assessment of whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in the light of 
the objective of the measure.”351 The AB stated that since the disputed measure was not 
provisionally justified under the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX, it was not necessary to 
consider the measure under the chapeau. Therefore, it “express[ed] no view on the panel’s 
reasoning in that regard.”352  
Overall, the WTO judiciary has been not very clear about the tentative development 
concerning the interpretation of GATT Article XX chapeau after EC – Seal Products. In the 
cases where the panels and the AB discussed the interpretation of GATT Article XX chapeau, 
there was no argument offered by respondents that the discrimination in their measures could be 
explained by rationales other than the purported objectives of the disputed measures and not 
listed in the subparagraphs of the exception clause. The fate of the new development in EC – 
Seal Products is to be determined in yet another case to come, when the right question is 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 3: RECONSTRUTION OF THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE CHAPEAU 
 
From the review of the cases, it has been clear that, under the GATT Agreement, 
assessing the legitimacy of trade measures violating substantive trade disciplines will depend on 
assessing the rationales behind the measures. EC – Seal Products implies that a disputed measure 
can be justified with rationales that are often not only different but also conflict with the 
purported policy objectives of the disputed measures that are usually recognized under the 
subparagraphs. This development effectively allows the circumvention of the closed-end list as 
prescribed in the GATT Article XX subparagraphs and greatly expands domestic regulatory 
autonomy. It is particularly important for disputed measures containing internal inconsistencies 
such as exemptions. So far, a couple of scholars acknowledged somewhat that the AB in EC – 
Seal Products refined its test under the chapeau and left openings for rationales beyond the list 
prescribed in GATT Article XX subparagraphs to justify disputed measures, particularly those 
measures with internal inconsistencies.353  
However, even if rationales not on the list are able to justify disputed measures in 
principle, the detailed test is still unclear. On what conditions can a disputed measure be justified 
by rationales not on the list? Measures that violate substantive disciplines under the GATT 
Agreement may also have different characteristics that may require the test contained in the 
chapeau to be inclusive and flexible to provide meaningful examination of all sorts of measures. 
What elements does a test need to be able to perform this task? The EC – Seal Products case 
revealed some key components for testing measures in the perspective of the rationales other 
than their purported policy objectives. Although the AB summarized its analysis under the 
chapeau, particularly regarding “arbitrariness or unjustifiability,”354 it is far from a complete test 
appropriate for the examination of measures that cannot be justified by their purported policy 
objectives that are on the closed-end list prescribed in the subparagraphs of the exception clause. 
The actual examination by the AB of the rationales behind the EU’s exemptions were prompted 
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by the particular facts of this case. When another case that needs to be justified by rationales 
other than its purported policy objective and not on the closed-end list presents a different set of 
facts, the examination and the actual components of the test may vary. The test implied in EC – 
Seal Products is at best incomplete. Fortunately, earlier cases, particularly the TBT cases, have 
also provided clues to construct a more comprehensive test. This chapter will try to synthesize 
EC – Seal Products and other cases to propose a reconstruction of the chapeau jurisprudence that 
can handle the examination of various cases that need (and need not) to be justified by rationales 
other than their purported policy objectives and more importantly not on the closed-end list.   
    
3.1 Chapeau text and the overall analytical structure 
 
Again, GATT Article XX chapeau provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
In the earliest WTO case, the AB clarified that the chapeau contains three conditions that 
a disputed measure provisionally justified under a subparagraph must meet under the chapeau, 
which are: (a) no “arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail”; (b) no “unjustifiable discrimination” with the same qualifier; or (c) no “disguised 
restriction” on international trade.355 To pass the examination of the chapeau, a measure must not 
fail any one of these three conditions.356 It makes no sense if a disputed measure can survive the 
chapeau when it constitutes a disguised restriction although it constitutes no arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination, or when it constitutes an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
while it is not identified as a disguised restriction on trade.   
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The AB in US – Gasoline said the standards embodied in the three key phrases 
overlapped.357 The AB particularly thought “that ‘disguised restriction,’ whatever it covers, may 
properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
in international trade.”358 It seems that the AB thought the third condition has a wider scope and 
encompasses the first two conditions. At least the AB said the considerations pertinent to the 
consideration of the first two conditions were also pertinent to the consideration under the third 
condition.359 In a pre-WTO case, a panel had ruled that a measure “should not be considered to 
be a disguised restriction on international trade, noting that the [respondent’s] prohibition of 
imports…had been taken as a trade measures and publicly announced as such.”360 It would be 
too simplistic that a “disguised” restriction is equated with restrictive trade measures not 
announced, but the condition for making something public was certainly the first attempt by the 
adjudicators of the world trading system to distinguish the third condition from the first two 
under the chapeau.  
However, after US – Gasoline, the AB has not tried to further clarify the third condition, 
and has not even cited the pre-WTO case anymore.361 In all the cases reviewed in the previous 
chapter, the disputed measure discriminates, at least in the sense as used under the chapeau. 
Therefore, the examination of these measures was conducted against the first two conditions, i.e. 
whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable. Even in US – Gasoline, in which the AB 
first held the three conditions overlapped, the AB did not make any finding regarding the third 
condition.362 According to the AB, considerations under the first two conditions are pertinent to 
the third condition, but it did not use them to draw a conclusion under the third condition. The 
AB simply refused to make determination regarding it. Thus, the third condition has not been 
applied in WTO cases. Therefore, we cannot observe how a disputed measure would be 
examined under the third condition. If the third condition is different from the first two or if it 
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has a wider scope than the first two, there is no clue in the WTO case law for us to say much 
about it. Whether a disputed measure can be justified with a rationale other than its purported 
policy objective and not on the closed-end list as prescribed in the GATT Article XX chapeau is 
therefore only discussed under the first two conditions in the light of the current jurisprudence.  
Most disputed measures in WTO cases have not passed the tests under the first two 
conditions in chapeau. Therefore, it may not be necessary to examine those measures under the 
third condition. However, there are some cases, particularly disputes about compliance with 
adopted dispute settlement reports such as US – Shrimp 21.5, where the AB did find the revised 
measures of the respondents met the first two conditions. But the AB did not go on to examine 
the revised measures under the third condition. In US – Shrimp 21.5, the AB said that “[i]t is 
clear from the language of the chapeau that these two standards [i.e. the first two conditions] 
operate to prevent a Member from applying a measure provisionally justified under a sub-
paragraph of Article XX in a manner that would result in ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’.”363 The AB, in its final conclusion, vaguely stated that the revised measure of the 
United States satisfied the “good faith” condition that is a generalization of the three conditions. 
But the review of two groups of efforts made by the United States to revise its measure was 
obviously done against the first two conditions.364 Interestingly, the panels and the AB in later 
cases simply ignore the apparent abandonment of the third condition under the chapeau. 
Therefore, that the WTO judiciary has not really utilized the third condition is not 
because it is not necessary in all cases. At least in a 21.5 case, examining the disputed measure 
against the third condition was needed. Another explanation is needed to reconcile with the 21.5 
case. Then, the statement of the AB in US – Gasoline that the three conditions overlapped may 
need to be reread more carefully. The AB in US – Gasoline stated: 
“Arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction” on 
international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one 
another. … We consider that “disguised restriction”, whatever else it covers, may 
properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable 
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discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within 
the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a somewhat different manner, the 
kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular 
measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, may also be taken into 
account in determining the presence of a "disguised restriction" on international trade.365  
It has to be admitted that the AB did not say that the three conditions completely 
overlapped and one or two of them were redundant. But after a more careful reading, I find that 
the AB did hint that a determination of an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination could not be 
really different from a determination of a disguised restriction on trade because they would take 
into consideration the same factors. Therefore, at least in some cases, when the WTO judiciary is 
confident that the considerations needed under the three conditions are not different given the 
specific facts and circumstances in these cases, they could just exercise discretion and only 
examine the disputed measures under one or two conditions. We can assume the same 
conclusion would be reached under the condition that is not employed.    
This abandonment or the omission of the third condition may lead to an observation 
regarding what measures can be justified by rationales other than those listed in the GATT 
Article XX subparagraphs. Since the measures in WTO cases are all examined under the first 
two conditions in the chapeau, it may be inferred that they are all discriminatory or accused of 
being discriminatory. A commentator therefore even remarks that “[i]n general terms, the 
chapeau is an anti-discrimination provision.”366  
As to the first two conditions, they are not treated differently in WTO cases. the panel in 
EC – Seal Products observed that the AB mixed the analyses of “arbitrary discrimination” and 
“unjustifiable discrimination” together in key cases concerning the chapeau, such as US – 
Gasoline, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), US – Gambling, and Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres.367 In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the AB explicitly said that: 
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The AB also said in EC – Seal Products that “to consider the design, architecture, and revealing structure of a 
measure in order to establish whether the measure, in its actual or expected application, constitutes a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”, which “involves a 
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 The chapeau's requirements are two-fold. First, a measure provisionally justified 
under one of the paragraphs of Article XX must not be applied in a manner that 
would constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ between countries 
where the same conditions prevail. Secondly, this measure must not be applied in a 
manner that would constitute “a disguised restriction on international trade.”368 
Clearly, “arbitrariness” and “unjustifiability” were not treated differently. Although the AB in 
US – Shrimp appeared to perform two separate analyses of “arbitrary discrimination” and 
“unjustifiable discrimination,” the analyses were actually not different. Therefore, the chapeau in 
fact only contains one condition, at least in application, which is that no “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” is permitted.  
 
3.2 More general issues that are relevant to the expansion of domestic regulatory autonomy 
 
There are a couple of structural issues under the chapeau which have a bearing on how to 
interpret the conditions set in the chapeau. Before I discuss the details of the condition that a 
disputed measure has to meet in order not to constitute an “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same condition prevail,” I would like to discuss 
these structural issues. In one of the most enlightening articles about the GATT Article XX 
chapeau written by Bartels recently, he identified two general issues that have overarching 
impacts not only on how to approach the interpretation of the Article XX chapeau but also the 
interpretation of the subparagraphs.369 These general issues regarding the chapeau are (a) the 
extent to which the chapeau is viewed as guarding against the abuse of the exception clause; and 
(b) whether the chapeau is only concerned with the “application” of the disputed measure.370 As 
Bartels correctly commented, these two general approaches to the chapeau have implications 
beyond the chapeau. They led to the two-tier analysis structure of GATT Article XX, in which a 
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line of equilibrium between the right to regulate and trade disciplines can be marked with the 
subparagraphs responsible for providing comparatively easy access to the exceptions to a 
disputed measure and the chapeau responsible for preventing the abuse of the exceptions, and 
also in which the subparagraphs are concerned with the “contents” or the design and structure of 
the disputed measure and the chapeau is concerned with the application.371  
Bartels correctly criticized the WTO judiciary for their early jurisprudential 
developments concerning these issues, basically saying the exception vis-a-visa abuse prevention 
and content vis-à-vis application distinctions are not reasonable but superficial. However, the 
unreasonableness of the jurisprudential developments concerning them is only one version of the 
story. Bartels did not try to tell another version in the light of the issues faced by the WTO 
judiciary and the structural and language constraints the WTO judiciary is under. I venture to 
argue that the seemingly unreasonable jurisprudential developments actually are not that 
unreasonable in light of the need to preserve (or expand) domestic regulatory autonomy under 
the structural and language constraints of GATT Article XX. The structural context, of course, 
includes the subparagraphs. Therefore, any critique of the chapeau jurisprudence has to take into 
consideration the subparagraphs. However, the discussion of the subparagraphs is limited to the 
extent where the purpose of discussing of the chapeau is well served. A more detailed treatment 
of the subparagraphs will be deferred to another chapter. 
  
3.2.1 Prevention of the abuse of the exceptions 
The AB in the case as early as US – Gasoline stated that “the purpose and object of the 
introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention of ‘abuse of the exceptions of 
[what was later to become] Article [XX]’.” (brackets original)372 After mentioning the drafting 
history, the AB continued to elaborate that the objective of the chapeau was to ensure the 
disputed measure provisionally justified under subparagraphs is applied “reasonably,” and to 
maintain a balance between invoking “the exceptions of Article XX… as a matter of legal right” 
and “the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other 
                                               
371 Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction’, 109 (1) American Journal of International Law 95-125 (2015), pp. 104-105. 
372 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 22. 
 101 
parties.”373 When the AB began to examine the US baseline rules, it said that “[t]he fundamental 
theme [of the chapeau] is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate 
use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.”374 This was the beginning in 
the WTO history of the idea that the chapeau was to prevent abuse of the exceptions to take hold.  
The AB in US – Shrimp reviewed the drafting history of the chapeau in some detail. Then 
it stated more articulately that:  
The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good 
faith. This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of 
international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this 
general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, 
prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the 
assertion of a right “impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be 
exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.” An abusive exercise by a Member of 
its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members 
and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting.375 
Later cases that concern the chapeau almost always reiterate this idea and quote this passage. 
Bartels’ major criticism is that the principle of good faith or abuse prevention is not only 
applicable under the chapeau but also applicable under the subparagraphs.376 Bartels’ point is 
reasonable. The subparagraphs also contain conditions that the disputed measure has to meet to 
pass the examination under the subparagraphs. Do these conditions not have the function of 
preventing the abuse of the exceptions? For what else is the use of the well-know “necessity” test 
in some of the subparagraphs? The stress by the AB that the chapeau serves as a balance vis-à-
vis the subparagraphs does imply that the subparagraphs are primarily to revive measures failing 
GATT substantive obligations without worrying about being abused, which is not entirely true if 
we take into consideration the conditions contained in the subparagraphs.  
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However, the root of this unreasonableness was created by the AB in one of the 
subparagraphs in US – Gasoline. As reviewed in Chapter 1, the AB in US – Gasoline broke away 
from the GATT jurisprudence that required the subparagraphs to examine the discrimination 
caused by the disputed measure. In US – Gasoline, the AB refused to examine whether the 
discrimination against foreign refiners was justifiable under GATT Article XX subparagraph (g). 
Instead, it emphasized that the language used in Article XX was “measures” suggested it was the 
“measure” instead of the part of the measure which is not consistent with the substantive 
obligations that needed to be examined under subparagraph (g).377 Therefore, the conditions in 
subparagraph (g) are not very useful to examine measures that are discriminatory. The use of 
subparagraph (g) is primarily to provide an easy portal for discriminatory measures to access the 
exception while the chapeau has to take up the task as the gate-keeper. With this in mind, it 
seems not very unreasonable to stress the objective of the chapeau is to prevent abuse of 
exceptions. 
Why did not the AB choose to examine the discrimination under subparagraph (g)? 
Avoiding examining discrimination under the subparagraph by manipulating the scope of the 
measure at issue is already confusing.378 And if it did, it need not to stress that chapeau serves as 
a safeguard against abuse of exceptions, which is unreasonable according to Bartels. There is no 
explanation offered by the AB. However, there might be two untold reasons. First, it would make 
the AB look bad in the eyes of the environmentalists if it equipped subparagraph (g) with sharp 
teeth to strike down the American measure purported to conserve clean air. Even if a 
discriminatory measure has to be struck down, do it under the chapeau instead of doing it upfront 
in the subparagraphs. It might be able to take some heat off by striking it down in the second 
round instead of in the first round. Second, if discrimination is examined under the 
subparagraphs, the tests would be too strict. The language in the subparagraphs does not seem to 
leave room for rationales other than the purported policy objectives while discrimination caused 
by internal inconsistencies necessarily needs to be explained by these rationales, which made it 
even further less likely for the AB to examine discrimination under the subparagraphs. 
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It is also clear from the US – Gasoline and some later cases that, as observed by one 
commentator, the major abuse the chapeau guards against is discrimination since the AB avoided 
examining discrimination under the subparagraphs.379 As discussed earlier, although there are 
three conditions under the chapeau, only the condition of no “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” has been applied, which also supports the idea that the chapeau guards against 
abuse of exceptions by providing a serious examination of discrimination contained in the 
disputed measure.  
I would further argue that it is exactly the choice of the AB to examine discrimination 
under the chapeau that makes it possible to justify a disputed measure under the GATT Article 
XX chapeau with rationales that are not its purported policy objective nor any policy objective 
listed in the subparagraphs. As already discussed in Chapter 2, the AB did not reject in principle 
the US arguments that there were some reasons other than its purported environmental objective 
to explain the discrimination. If these arguments were presented under subparagraph (g), it 
would have been rejected as a matter of law. Of course, EC – Seal products is even a better 
example to illustrate this point. If the discrimination created by the exemptions contained in the 
EU seal scheme was examined under subparagraph (a), the European Union would have not been 
able to present rationales such as the subsistence of the Inuit as justifications. After all, the 
discrimination has to be “necessary to protect public morals” under subparagraph (a). 
There is another repercussion of the emphasis of the AB on the objective of the chapeau 
in early cases, which is the worry that the AB would replace the conditions based upon actual 
treaty languages under the chapeau with a presumed general objective.380 However, this worry is 
not justified. In the very first case that went through the WTO appellate procedure-US – 
Gasoline-the AB applied the condition of no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, which 
has textual basis under the chapeau, instead of the general abuse-prevention principle to the 
facts.381 Also in US – Shrimp, where the AB reviewed the drafting history at length to establish 
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the general objective of the chapeau, it still applied the condition of no “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” to the facts.382  
If the WTO judiciary had decided to ignore the languages in the chapeau, the abstract 
general objective might have given it more flexibility, which might have helped to expand the 
domestic regulatory autonomy of Members. However, on the other hand, it might turn out to be a 
disguised curse on Members’ regulatory autonomy. The objective of the chapeau established by 
the AB is to guard against the abuse of the exceptions. If unfettered by the language that spell the 
conditions under the chapeau, this objective may be interpreted and applied more rigorously and 
may very well create a more hostile environment for domestic regulatory measures under the 
chapeau. 
 
3.2.2 Focus on application 
Also in US – Gasoline, the AB gave the chapeau another structural feature. The chapeau 
requires that measures are not “applied in a manner” which would fail the three conditions listed. 
The AB therefore stated that “[t]he chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the 
questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure 
is applied.”383 The implications of the statement are two-fold. First, there is a distinction between 
the “contents” of a measure and the “application” of the measure. Second, the “contents” of a 
disputed measure should be examined under the subparagraphs while the “manner” of 
application should be examined under the chapeau. 
Yoshiko Naiki explained that there were distinctions between mandatory legislation and 
discretionary legislation in international law and the WTO law. In general international law, if a 
piece of domestic legislation is not applied, generally it cannot be challenged even if its contents 
may violate international law. In the WTO law, if a piece of domestic legislation of a Member 
mandates an action that conflicts with trade disciplines contained in the WTO, that Member can 
be sued and may lose in dispute settlement; but if a piece of domestic legislation leaves 
discretionary space for domestic authorities to implement the legislation in more than one way, 
the possibility that the actual application of the legislation may violate the WTO law does not 
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warrant a challenge to the legislation by other Members while the actual application can 
definitely be challenged in specific cases.384 I find the distinction between mandatory legislation 
and discretional legislation can support the distinction between the contents of a measure and its 
application. For discretionary legislation, we can see it as containing no specific contents that 
may fail the chapeau, but its application may.  
If the distinction between mandatory legislation and discretionary legislation does not 
convince you that the distinction between the contents of a measure and its application is valid, 
US – Gambling provides a good example to illustrate a clearer distinction between the contents 
and the application of a measure. In US – Gambling, the panel found that the US laws prohibited 
remote gambling services provided both by foreign suppliers and domestic suppliers, but it also 
found, among other things, that some domestic illegal supply of remote gambling services was 
not prosecuted by the authorities.385 In this case, as in other cases of law enforcement, domestic 
authorities may act contrary to the content of the laws. The distinction between (lousy) law 
implementation and the law is obvious.  
In WTO law, the distinction between the contents of a measure and its application has 
some positive implications for domestic regulatory autonomy. For discretionary legislation that 
may potentially violate trade disciplines, it not only can pass the examination of contents easily, 
but also can pass the examination of application if the implementing authorities constrain 
themselves. The panel in US – Section 301 found the US law “mandates the USTR in certain 
cases to make a unilateral determination on whether US rights have been denied…However, the 
statutory language…neither mandates the USTR to make a determination of inconsistency nor 
precludes him or her from making such a determination.” (emphasis original)386  Therefore, the 
relevant US law is discretionary. The US government, through a Statement of Administrative 
Action, promised “to ‘base any section 301 determination that there has been a violation or 
denial of US rights…on the panel or Appellate Body findings adopted by the DSB’,” which was 
taken by the panel as a guarantee to preclude the US government from implementing its law in a 
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way violating the relevant DSU clause.387 US – Section 301 was a case concerning the obligation 
of Members not to take unilateral measures to deal with disputes governed by the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, however, it can provide an example to illustrate the WTO judiciary could 
defer further to national autonomy by distinguishing the contents and the application of national 
laws. In the vein of US – Section 301, the separate examination of the contents and the 
application could be very friendly also in other context, such as under the GATT Article XX 
chapeau. 
However, Bartels argued that the distinction between the contents of a measure and its 
application was “spurious.”388 He saw the logical flaw of the distinction was that “‘measure’ 
could not really be divided into an abstract element that is not ‘applied’ and a concrete element 
that is ‘applied’” according to the distinction.389 Moreover, this distinction can be problematic 
for the examination of discriminatory measures. As argued earlier, the AB has generally refused 
to examine discrimination in a disputed measure under the subparagraphs. If the discrimination is 
created by the “contents” of the measure, it cannot be examined under the chapeau either because 
the chapeau only focuses on the application. In theory, this will greatly expand the domestic 
regulatory autonomy of WTO Members. Such measures are not subject to rigorous examination 
at all under GATT Article XX. However, the AB will not get away with it. Shielding 
discrimination from an earnest examination under GATT Article XX would be devastating to the 
world trading system. It is of course a violation of the good faith principle contained in the 
chapeau. 
Fortunately, the AB soon clarified that the chapeau could examine not only the 
application of the disputed measure but also its contents. The AB in US – Shrimp stated:    
We note, preliminarily, that the application of a measure may be characterized as 
amounting to an abuse or misuse of an exception of Article XX not only when the 
detailed operating provisions of the measure prescribe the arbitrary or unjustifiable 
activity, but also where a measure, otherwise fair and just on its face, is actually 
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applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner. The standards of the chapeau, in our 
view, project both substantive and procedural requirements.390  
Clearly, the “detailed operating provisions of the measure” as opposed to a “measure, otherwise 
fair and just on its face, are actually applied an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner” does not refer 
to the application of a measure. They are the contents of the measure. Although the AB still 
refers to detailed operating provisions of a measure as the application of the measure instead of 
the general contents of it, thus managing to maintain the distinction between the contents and the 
application of a measure under the chapeau, it has not been successful.  
The AB continued to expand the scope of examination under the chapeau to include the 
contents of a disputed measure. For example, in EC – Seal Products, the AB stated: 
By its terms, the chapeau of Article XX is concerned with the “manner” in which a 
measure that falls under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX is “applied”. 
Although this suggests that the focus of the inquiry is on the manner in which the 
measure is applied, the Appellate Body has noted that whether a measure is applied 
in a particular manner “can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, 
and the revealing structure of a measure”. It is thus relevant to consider the design, 
architecture, and revealing structure of a measure in order to establish whether the 
measure, in its actual or expected application, constitutes a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. 
This involves a consideration of “both substantive and procedural requirements” 
under the measure at issue.391  
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the discrimination created by both the contents of a 
disputed measure or its application can be challenged and examined under the chapeau. But it is 
not a undue constraint on the domestic regulatory space. Actually, it serves to truly safeguard the 
balance between the right to regulate and trade disciplines when appropriate conditions are 
applied. Do not forget that examining a discriminatory measure does not mean that measure 
would eventually fail the examination. Whether the chapeau can help expand domestic 
regulatory autonomy or not depends on what the conditions, tests or standards employed in the 
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examination are. More importantly, only when we can examine discrimination in both the 
contents and the application of a measure, can we have a chance to fully exonerate it with its 
rationales that are not its purported policy objective or one of the recognized objectives listed in 
the subparagraphs. Trying to keep discriminatory measures alive by avoiding examination of its 
contents is not the right way to expand domestic regulatory autonomy. 
   
3.3 The key test  
 
After discussing the general issues, it is time to focus on the operative condition 
contained in the chapeau, which is that a measure must not “constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.” As discussed 
earlier, the subparagraphs only maintain relaxed conditions for a disputed measure that is 
discriminatory. Therefore, the condition in the chapeau take the major responsibility to more 
rigorously examine such a measure. The tests and standards the condition employs will 
ultimately determine whether a disputed measure can be justified under GATT Article XX. The 
fact that the chapeau does not maintain a list of legitimate policy objective provides a necessary 
precondition for a disputed measure to be justified by a rationale not listed in the subparagraphs.  
 
3.3.1 Overview 
In its early cases, the AB did not try to articulate the specific elements or steps of analysis 
in the “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” condition. In US – Gasoline, immediately after 
it made a brief comment on the relationship between the three conditions it identified under the 
chapeau, the AB began to discuss the two alternatives that could remedy the discrimination in the 
Baseline Rules. Then it concluded that the United States did not probe the possibility of taking 
alternatives and the United States failed to offer good explanations for its omissions, therefore, 
the discrimination was arbitrary and unjustifiable.392 Although the AB, in the same case, 
criticized the panel for failing to observe treaty interpretative rules codified in the Vienna 
Convention and neglecting the text of subparagraph (g),393 it did not engage in a textual analysis 
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of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” under the chapeau. The important condition under 
the chapeau was not refined. It was more like a black box. It took in the facts and spilled out the 
results, but we do not how the condition really worked in detail.  
Soon, the AB made the condition of no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” more 
formal and sophisticated. It stated in US - Shrimp:  
First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination. As we stated in 
United States – Gasoline, the nature and quality of this discrimination is different 
from the discrimination in the treatment of products which was already found to be 
inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as 
Articles I, III or XI. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in 
character. We will examine this element of arbitrariness or unjustifiability in detail 
below. Third, this discrimination must occur between countries where the same 
conditions prevail.(emphasis original)394  
Obviously, the condition of no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” was read together with 
terms adjacent to it and then was divided into three elements. This three-element reading of the 
key condition under the chapeau has been followed since then. However, the order of the three 
elements changed over time, which also changed the order of analysis in application of the 
elements. The “discrimination” element and the “the same conditions” element usually come 
first, then the “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” element comes last.395 And since the chapeau is 
basically an anti-discrimination provision, the “discrimination” element logically becomes the 
first element of analysis. 
However, can the condition of no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” be divided 
into three comparatively independent elements? Bartels expressed some serious doubts.396 
Another commentator also said the analysis under the chapeau was circular, suggesting that the 
analysis under one element depends on or overlaps with analysis under the other elements.397 
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Their doubts make a lot sense, but I will discuss them later when I discuss the three elements 
respectively. It is sufficient to say here that the analysis under the element of “condition” and the 
analysis under the element of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” both depend on analysis in the 
same policy perspectives, which makes people doubt the independence of the two analyses.398 It 
also needs to be noted that the analysis under the element of “discrimination” has a similar 
relationship with the analysis under the element of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability”, which will 
also be discussed later. Bartels suspected that the analyses regarding different elements were 
conducted in the perspective of the purported policy objective of the disputed measure.399 
However, it is much more complicated.   
Nevertheless, the division of the three elements has been maintained in WTO law, not 
only when the panels and the AB interpret the chapeau but so when they apply the chapeau to 
facts. Among the three elements, the “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” element is the most 
important. The analysis under the “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” therefore is key in the 
chapeau to decide the scope of domestic regulatory autonomy.   
  
3.3.2 discrimination  
A determination of whether a disputed measure “would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” logically starts 
with the determination of the existence of discrimination caused by the disputed measure.400 
However, although the WTO judiciary did discuss the relationship between discrimination under 
the chapeau and that under the substantive clauses of the WTO Agreements, I fail to find that 
they define “discrimination” under the chapeau clearly and apply the definition to the facts. The 
existence of discrimination in most cases has just been assumed.  
In US – Gasoline, the AB was not concerned with the definition of discrimination under 
the chapeau. Although both the chapeau and Article III:4 are clauses about discrimination, the AB 
thought that the two clauses had two related but completely different tasks to perform. The AB 
stated that:  
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The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a 
violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred. To proceed down 
that path would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the exceptions 
in paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the question of 
whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the further and separate 
question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that inconsistency was 
nevertheless justified.401 
To the AB, while Article III:4 is about the existence of discrimination in the competitive/economic 
sense that is inconsistent with the substantive obligations provided by this very clause, the chapeau 
is about “the further and separate question” of “whether that inconsistency [i.e. discrimination]” is 
“nevertheless justified.” Since the chapeau is not concerned with the issue whether discrimination 
exists or not, that issue should be already decided before it engages in deciding a different issue 
whether the discrimination can be justified or not. 
However, in US – Shrimp, the AB said that “[a]s we stated in United States – Gasoline, 
the nature and quality of this discrimination is different from the discrimination in the treatment 
of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of 
the GATT 1994, such as Articles I, III or XI.”402 Then, the AB directly quoted the sentence “[t]he 
provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a violation of a 
substantive rule has been determined to have occurred” from its report in US – Gasoline to support 
its claim that the AB in US - Gasoline distinguished discrimination under the chapeau and 
discrimination under GATT clauses that contain substantive non-discrimination obligations.403 This 
is an obvious misreading. The AB in US – Gasoline only said that the legal standards were 
different under the chapeau vis-à-vis under the clauses such as Articles III.  
However, it is one thing that the AB wrongly cited US – Gasoline to support the 
distinction between the chapeau and certain GATT clauses regarding the determination of 
discrimination, but it is another thing to say that the AB was wrong in US – Shrimp to make that 
distinction. Bartels commented that the AB’s reasoning was hard to follow and discrimination in 
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two different contexts was hard to appreciate.404 But he failed to appreciate the important 
difference in the two cases. In US – Gasoline, the measure concerned was a typical domestic 
regulation that fell under GATT Article III:4. However, in US – Shrimp, the measure concerned 
was an import ban imposed at the border that only fell under GATT Article XI. GATT Article XI 
is to eliminate “prohibition or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges…on the 
importation of any product” into the territory of a WTO Member. Measures falling under GATT 
Article XI are also called border measures as tariffs and customs rules because they are usually 
taken “on” the importation of foreign products. A border measure directly impacts on imports 
only and could not possibly violate the national treatment obligation provided by Article III. And 
the US ban in US – Shrimp did not violate most favored nation treatment obligation as provided 
by Article I either. Thus US – Shrimp does not involve a violation of the conventional non-
discrimination obligations as provided in GATT Articles I and III. In US – Gasoline, the 
discrimination was first found under Article III:4 and then needed to be justified under the 
chapeau of Article XX (as the AB refused to examine the discrimination under the 
subparagraph). In US – Shrimp, discrimination falling under Article III or Article I did not exist. 
The discrimination that did exist was not identified in the first place before the import ban 
needed to be justified under Article XX. Therefore the AB in US – Shrimp had to identify the 
discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX, and discrimination found under the chapeau 
could not possibly be the same discrimination found in Article III or Article I in that case.  
Therefore, the distinction made by the AB in US – Shrimp looks not that unreasonable. In 
cases where competitive discrimination has been already found to exist according to the 
substantive non-discrimination clauses, there seems to be no need to find discrimination under 
the chapeau. Discrimination under the chapeau should be identical to discrimination found in the 
substantive clauses. What is needed is to find out whether the discrimination can be justified or 
not, just as required by the AB in US – Gasoline. However, in cases where a search for 
discrimination has not been conducted before the exception clause is invoked, it is still necessary 
to determine whether there is discrimination under the chapeau.  
However, the AB was only technically correct to make such a distinction. When 
disregarding the legal technicalities, discrimination in the competitive sense between imports and 
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domestic like products can be created by quantitative measures imposed at the border. Actually, 
subparagraph (g) of Article XX, which requires that “such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption,” is particularly needed to 
examine border measures that may potentially discriminate against imports.405 Subparagraph (g) 
is an anomaly among the subparagraphs. The other subparagraphs do not care about 
discrimination. However, the same logic applies in the chapeau. The chapeau needs to identify 
discrimination against imports created by border measures. In US – Shrimp, if the United States 
substituted its import ban on shrimps with domestic regulations, just like the measures taken in 
cases such as US – Clove Cigarettes or EC – Seal Products, we would have identical 
discrimination under both Article III and the chapeau of Article XX. Therefore, discrimination 
under the chapeau is basically competitive discrimination found in the substantive non-
discrimination clauses, or should be found if we convert border measures into domestic 
regulations in some cases.  
The AB in EC – Seal Products tried to connect the discrimination under the chapeau back 
to the discrimination under the clauses that contain non-discrimination obligations by stating that 
the statement made by the AB in US – Shrimp “does not mean, however, that the circumstances 
that bring about the discrimination that is to be examined under the chapeau cannot be the same 
as those that led to the finding of a violation of a substantive provision of the GATT 1994.”406 
Bartels correctly commented that the AB clearly implied that “an identical distinction test can be 
used in both contexts [under the chapeau and under the clauses containing substantive non-
discrimination obligations].”407 The AB in EC – Seal Products did not overrule US – Shrimp 
outright, but it in effect deviated from US – Shrimp and regressed toward US – Gasoline. The 
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AB in EC – Seal Products further cited the AB report in US – Gasoline to support its leaning 
towards US – Gasoline.408    
However, the AB still had reservations in EC – Seal Products when it tried to connect 
discrimination under the chapeau and discrimination under clauses containing non-
discrimination obligations. It still cited the AB in US – Shrimp to claim that “the nature and 
quality of this discrimination [under the chapeau] is different from the discrimination in the 
treatment of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive 
obligations of the GATT 1994.”409 To understand why the AB in EC – Seal products only 
switched the precedent it would follow from US – Shrimp to US – Gasoline halfheartedly, we 
need to discuss EC – Seal Products in greater detail. 
In EC – Seal Products, the discrimination in the competitive sense was between 
Greenland seal products on the one hand and Canadian and Norwegian seal products on the other 
hand (violation of the most favored nation treatment obligation),410 and between EU domestic 
seal products and imported seal products from Canada and Norway (violation of the national 
treatment obligation).411 Under the chapeau, the AB first tried to explain the discrimination with 
the purported policy objective of the EU seal scheme, which was to protect public morals.412 If 
the purported policy objective could not explain away the discrimination in the competitive 
sense, the discrimination not only remained in the competitive sense but also is rediscovered now 
in the policy sense. That was what happened in EC – Seal Products. Therefore, discrimination 
under the relevant substantive clauses is the same as that under the chapeau when looked at from 
the competitive perspective, but at the same time they are different since discrimination under 
the chapeau may also exist in the policy sense.  
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However, the transformation of the discrimination under the chapeau did not stop here in 
EC – Seal Products. The AB next tried to explain the discrimination with the rationales behind 
the exemptions, particularly with the subsistence rationale behind the IC exemption. However, 
because the EU seal scheme was not really able to distinguish IC seal products from commercial 
seal products and the IC exemption was not designed or implemented even-handedly, the 
discrimination could not be explained by the additional policy rationales offered by the European 
Union. Then the discrimination had acquired the third facet, which was in the sense of additional 
policy rationales.    
Did the discrimination really change in EC – Seal Products during the analysis? No, it 
did not. As the AB said, the discrimination under the chapeau was still caused by the same 
circumstances that caused discrimination under Article III or Article I.413 The difference is only 
regarding perspective. The change of perspective was actually caused by the analysis under the 
last element of the key condition under the chapeau, which focuses on assessing policy 
objectives or rationales offered to explain the discrimination under the chapeau. When a number 
of the objectives or rationales are examined in the analysis of the last element, there is possible 
discrimination in as many policy perspectives. That is also why I said the element of 
“discrimination” is not completely independent of the element of “arbitrariness or 
unjustifiability.”  
 
3.3.3 countries where the same conditions prevail  
It is easy to understand why it is needed to compare the conditions between countries 
affected by a disputed measure, including the country taking the measure. If the conditions are 
not the same, it is natural the countries involved get different treatment. But if the conditions are 
the same, they are expected to be treated in the same way.  
First of all, the conditions referred to under the chapeau are not the competitive or 
economic conditions the “like product” test cares about under Article III or Article I. The 
competitive or economic conditions are only relevant to whether there is discrimination in the 
competitive sense. To justify competitive discrimination with non-economic policies under the 
exception clause, we should compare the conditions in the perspective of the policies invoked to 
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determine whether like products are different when they are in different conditions in the 
perspective of the invoked policies. If like products are in the same conditions in the perspective 
of a legitimate policy, they should be treated the same by the policy and the invoked policy 
cannot justify discriminatory treatment. If like products are in different conditions in the 
perspective of the legitimate policy, they should be treated differently by the policy and the 
competitive/economic discrimination is justified if it is caused or related to the different 
treatment by the policy. The AB in EC – Seal Products stated clearly that “‘conditions’ relating 
to the particular policy objective under the applicable subparagraph are relevant for the analysis 
under the chapeau.”414 
The AB in EC – Seal Products also added that “the provisions of the GATT 1994 with 
which a measure has been found to be inconsistent may also provide useful guidance on the 
question of which ‘conditions’ prevailing in different countries are relevant.” 415  This is 
misleading. Under the chapeau, we should only be concerned with discrimination in the policy 
perspective. 416  The WTO judiciary should focus on assessing policy explanations for the 
discrimination. A better way to compare the “conditions” was proposed by Bartels, which is to 
look at the risks that a disputed measure meant to address in its policy.417 For example, if the 
conditions in different areas pose different levels of danger to turtles, shrimp in these areas 
should be treated differently to save the turtles although the shrimp is still “like.” In most cases, 
the conditions are largely shaped by the characteristics of the products that may not be important 
in the “like products” standard but are important in the policy sense when we take Bartels’ 
approach. For example, meat products containing hormones or not may constitute different 
conditions according to the risks they pose to human health while they may still be like products 
in the competitive sense.   
Bartels’ view has been supported by the observations of other commentators. Gaines 
once said that “[t]he only principled basis on which to select the relevant conditions for 
comparison is that they should have something to do with the declared objectives of the 
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measure.”418 Davies argued that “prevailing conditions between countries” should be “compared 
with reference to the likeness of the products manufactured in these countries,” but the 
“likeness” of the products should be determined in the non-protectionist policy sense.419 
Generally speaking, if it is established that the involved countries have the same 
conditions in the perspective of its purported policy, any discrimination in the sense of that 
policy cannot be explained by that policy. Therefore, the process of determining the conditions 
between involved countries is mixed together with the determination of whether a discrimination 
in the policy perspective exists and the determination of whether that policy perspective can 
explain the discrimination or not, which is also the analysis of whether the discrimination is 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable.”  
Usually, different treatment is apt to constitute discrimination. However, in US – Shrimp, 
an interesting question was raised, which is whether the identical treatment of products can turn 
into discrimination. The AB stated : 
[W]e understand that the United States also applies a uniform standard throughout its 
territory, regardless of the particular conditions existing in certain parts of the 
country… However, it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO 
Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially 
the same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that 
in force within that Member's territory, without taking into consideration different 
conditions which may occur in the territories of those other Members.(emphasis 
original)420  
This statement of the AB makes sense. However, there is no textual basis to determine whether 
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable in different conditions instead of in the same 
conditions.421 A commentator suggested that, in US – Shrimp, the relevant countries were 
actually in the same conditions, but the US facilitative actions (to help some foreign countries to 
                                               
418  Sanford Gaines, ‘The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on 
Environmental Measures’, 22 (4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 739-862 
(2001), p.779. 
419 Arwel Davies, ‘Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the ‘New’ Approach in Brazil – Tyres’, 
43 (3) Journal of World Trade 507-539 (2009), p. 513. 
420 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 164. 
421 Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction’, 109 (1) American Journal of International Law 95-125 (2015), p.113. 
 118 
meet its turtle conservation rules) changed the conditions in some foreign countries, therefore, 
these facilitative actions constituted discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevailed.422 Bartels argued that facilitative actions taken towards certain foreign countries in this 
case was not in violation of any substantive WTO obligation and therefore taking issue with 
them would compel complaints to take the route of non-violation claims, which were rare and 
would create difficulties for the chapeau jurisprudence.423 He proposed to discount the changes 
of the conditions in relevant countries that were attributable to the US facilitative actions and 
then make the comparison to see whether they were the same.424 Anyway, no matter which 
approach is taken, the point is that there is a way to work around the constraints of the text to 
address discrimination between countries where the conditions are different. 
Let’s get back to the more common approach to the comparison of conditions. In EC – 
Seal Products, the AB assessed the “conditions” in involved countries when the European Union 
tried to justify the discrimination created by the Inuit exemption in its seal scheme.425 The AB 
concluded that the conditions prevailing in Canada and Norway, on the one hand, and Greenland, 
on the other hand, were the same because “the same animal welfare concerns…arise from seal 
hunting in general [mostly commercial hunting] also exist in IC hunts.”426 Obviously, the 
comparison of the conditions was conducted in the perspective the purported policy objective of 
the EU seal scheme, which was to protect public morals. The European Union resorted to the 
public moral exception as provided in GATT Article XX (a) to justify the exemptions contained 
in its seal scheme in the first place. It was acknowledged by the AB that the EU seal scheme as a 
whole was provisionally justified under subparagraph (a) because it was necessary to protect 
public morals.427 Now the AB examined the discrimination created by the Inuit exemption under 
the chapeau. But the discrimination between seal products that were in the same condition giving 
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rise to the same animal welfare concerns could not be explained by its purported policy of public 
morals protection. That is to say: “the European Union has failed to demonstrate…how the 
discrimination resulting from the manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats IC hunts as 
compared to ‘commercial’ hunts can be reconciled with, or is related to, the policy objective of 
addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare.”428  
Then the AB said “the relationship of the discrimination to the objective of a measure is 
one of the most important factors, but not the sole test.”429 Therefore, “in this connection,” the 
AB began to examine the EU’s alternative argument “that only seal products derived from hunts 
conducted by Inuit communities for subsistence purposes can benefit from the exception.” 
(emphasis added)430 However, in the AB’s analysis that followed, the elements of “condition” 
were not discussed any more. Logically, two countries being in the same condition in the 
perspective of the purported policy objective of a disputed measure does not necessarily mean 
they are still in the same condition in the perspective of an alternative policy objective of the 
disputed measure. For example, in EC – Seal Products, commercial seal products and Inuit seal 
products both gave rise to “animal welfare concerns,” therefore countries exporting commercial 
seal products and Inuit seal products respectively were in the same condition. However, 
commercial seal products did not concern the subsistence of the Inuit while Inuit seal products 
were important for the subsistence of the Inuit, therefore countries exporting commercial seal 
products and Inuit seal products respectively should be in different conditions when AB assessed 
the discrimination in the perspective of the Inuit subsistence rationale. Unfortunately, the need to 
re-compare the conditions in countries involved in a dispute has not been recognized by the 
WTO judiciary yet. 
Anyway, what is important is that the comparison of conditions is not static. Instead, it is 
dynamic, changing in tune to the change of policy objectives or rationales that are assessed to see 
whether discrimination can be explained or not. And since the discrimination under the chapeau 
can have multiple facets, there may be a corresponding relationship between the conditions and 
the discrimination under the chapeau. Therefore, it is also fair to say that the comparison of the 
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conditions in countries involved is not really independent of the determination whether the 
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable or the determination of discrimination under the 
chapeau. As said earlier, when discrimination exists between countries where the same condition 
prevail in the perspective of a certain policy objective, that policy objective is unable to explain 
the discrimination and hence the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable. When 
discrimination exists between countries where different conditions prevail in the perspective of a 
certain policy objective, that policy objective has already explained the discrimination and hence 
the discrimination becomes justifiable or not arbitrary. Conversely, when a determination of 
whether a discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable, even if no comparison of the conditions in 
countries involved is conducted explicitly, it is already conducted implicitly. Therefore, the 
comparison of the conditions is actually not important as long as a thorough determination of 
whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable is conducted. I now turn to the discussion 
of that element.  
 
3.3.4 Arbitrariness or unjustifiability  
To assess weather discrimination is “arbitrary or unjustifiable,” the pre-WTO 
jurisprudence offers little clue.431 The early WTO jurisprudence is not very helpful either. The 
AB said once in US – Shrimp that “[t]he policy goal of a measure at issue cannot provide its 
rationale or justification under the standards of the chapeau of Article XX” and “[t]he legitimacy 
of the declared policy objective of the measure, and the relationship of that objective with the 
measure itself and its general design and structure, are examined under Article XX (g).”432 It 
seems the AB anticipated that rationales other than the purported policy objective of a disputed 
measure and not on the closed-end list as prescribed in the exception clause subparagraphs 
should be able to justify the discrimination and eventually the disputed measure if certain 
conditions were met under the chapeau. However, this approach to justifying discrimination 
under the chapeau was soon abandoned and an opposite approach was taken.433 
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In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the AB stated that the analysis of whether discrimination is 
arbitrary or unjustifiable under the chapeau “should focus on the cause of the discrimination, or 
the rationale put forward to explain its existence.”434 However, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres has 
become a very restrictive precedent by establishing a clear test, which is that “one of the most 
important factors…is whether the discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related 
to, the policy objective with respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified under 
one of the subparagraphs of Article XX.”435 
Fortunately, in EC – Seal Products, as revealed from the actual analysis by the AB 
although not from the articulation of the test, the straightjacket Brazil – Retreaded Tyres imposed 
on the choice of rationales seemed to be lifted. Rationales that are not related to the purported 
policy objective, or even go against it, can be relied upon to explain discrimination under the 
chapeau. Since rationales not related to the purported policy objective of a disputed measure are 
usually not on the list of legitimate objectives as prescribed in the subparagraphs of the exception 
clause, domestic regulatory autonomy is greatly expanded.  
When the analysis regarding “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” in EC – Seal Products is 
more formally recognized as establishing a new test, it will in essence become an exercise of 
using alternative policy rationales to explain discrimination identified under the chapeau. To 
extract a test capable of examining alternative policy objectives from EC – Seal Products, we 
need to look again at the summary of its analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability”: 
First, we found that the European Union did not show that the manner in which the 
EU Seal Regime treats seal products derived from IC hunts as compared to seal 
products derived from “commercial” hunts can be reconciled with the objective of 
addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare. Second, we found 
considerable ambiguity in the “subsistence” and “partial use” criteria of the IC 
exception. Given the ambiguity of these criteria and the broad discretion that the 
recognized bodies consequently enjoy in applying them, seal products derived from 
what should in fact be properly characterized as “commercial” hunts could 
potentially enter the EU market under the IC exception. We did not consider that 
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the European Union has sufficiently explained how such instances can be prevented 
in the application of the IC exception. Finally, we were not persuaded that the 
European Union has made “comparable efforts” to facilitate the access of the 
Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with respect to the Greenlandic Inuit.436 
Although the AB earlier in EC – Seal Products only articulated the test to determine 
whether discrimination is “arbitrary or unjustifiable” between countries where the same 
conditions prevail by following Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, this summary of its application of the 
test reveals that the actual test it employed is different from that in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. 
Particularly, read together with the AB’s statement that “the relationship of the discrimination to 
the [purported] objective of a measure is one of the most important factors, but not the sole 
test,”437 the summary can be seen as a new test.438 Now, the new test is restated with a few more 
tweaks and explanations: (i) whether discrimination can be explained by rationales reconcilable 
with the purported policy objective of the disputed measure, which, as will be argued in the next 
paragraph, actually required that discrimination should primarily be explained by the purported 
policy objective of a disputed measure; if not, (ii) whether it can be explained by the rationale 
behind the exemption (and flexibilities) that actually give rise to internal inconsistencies within 
the disputed measure and hence discrimination, particularly whether the exemption (and 
flexibilities) is consistent with the rationale behind it (i.e. protecting IC subsistence) without 
unintended consequences (allowing seal products derived from commercial hunting to access the 
EU market); and (iii) whether the exemption (and flexibilities) is designed or implemented even-
handedly in the perspectives of the rationale behind the exemption. 
The first step is the reiteration of the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres test, which is quite strict. 
However, what is the requirement in the first step of analysis is a little ambiguous, which has not 
been clearly discussed in the literature yet. The AB said once in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres that 
“there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination… when the reasons given for this 
discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the purview of a 
                                               
436 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 5.338. 
437 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para 5.321. 
438 Henry Hailong Jia, ‘The Legitimacy of Exceptions Containing Exceptions in WTO Law: Some Thoughts on EC 
– Seal Products’; 14 (2) Chinese Journal of International Law 411-417 (2015), p.415. 
 123 
paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective.”439 Therefore there is no problem if 
the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres test is seen as a “rationale connection requirement” that assesses 
whether the alternative rationale is related to the purported policy objective or not.440 However, 
this understanding is not well supported by the above quoted summary in EC – Seal Products, or 
by the reiteration of the test by the AB in EC – Seal Products, which emphasized that the test 
focused on “whether the discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the 
policy objective with respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified under one of 
the subparagraphs of Article XX.” 441  Regarding the determination of “arbitrariness or 
unjustifiability” of discrimination under the chapeau, the AB also said that “the relationship of 
the discrimination to the [purported] objective of a measure is one of the most important 
factors.”442 Therefore, the first step can also be a requirement to examine whether discrimination 
can be explained by the purported policy objective of a disputed measure. Also the AB has 
repeatedly emphasized that the key to determining “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” was to see 
whether the rationale or cause offered could explain the discrimination, which supports treating 
the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres test as one assessing whether discrimination can be explained by 
the purported policy objective of a disputed measure.  
Nonetheless, the two different understandings are not contradictory. If a respondent 
offers to explain discrimination with rationales unrelated to the purported policy objective of its 
measure, the discrimination that needs to be explained certainly cannot be explained by the 
purported policy objective. Therefore, the “rationale connection requirement” is actually a proxy 
test of the first step. The proxy test performs the function of a door keeper. If the offered 
rationale is positively connected to the purported policy objective, it is let into the door. If not, it 
will be kept out. However, this proxy does not work well in all situations when the respondent 
tries to explain the discrimination under the chapeau with an alternative rationale. It works when 
it turns down those rationales that are not positively connected to the purported policy objective, 
                                               
439 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil — Retreaded 
Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, para 227. 
440 Gracia Marin Duran, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a 
Conflict between GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 467-495 (2016), pp. 475-476.  
441 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 5.306. 
442 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para 5.321. 
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but it cannot further examine the rationale that has been allowed to enter the door. It is not 
enough to know a rationale is positively connected to the purported policy objective. An 
independent examination of the connection between the rationale and the discrimination it tries 
to explain still needs to be conducted. At least we need to see whether the discrimination under 
the chapeau contributes to the policy goal the rationale offered wants to achieve. If we see that 
the first step is an “rationale connection requirement,” we will have to accept that an additional 
step to examine whether the purported policy objective can explain discrimination coexists with 
the “rationale connection requirement.”443 The “rationale connection requirement” seems to 
further complicate the already messy chapeau jurisprudence.  
Fortunately, the “rationale connection requirement” has been implicitly ditched by the 
AB in EC – Seal Products. Therefore, I would propose to understand the first step as a 
requirement to explain the discrimination under the chapeau with the purported policy objective 
of the disputed measure. But, how should the WTO judiciary go about determining whether a 
purported policy objective can explain the discrimination? I’m not sure there is much 
jurisprudence in this regard. Usually, the relevant reasoning is quite brief because it is so obvious 
that the purported objective cannot explain the discrimination in most cases. The AB said once in 
US – Shrimp that “[t]he policy goal of a measure at issue cannot provide its rationale or 
justification under the standards of the chapeau of Article XX.”444 It was exactly referring to 
situations where disputed measures were discriminatory because they had internal 
inconsistencies in the perspective of their purported policy objectives. Therefore, the first step of 
analysis in most cases where disputed measures have internal inconsistencies is only nominal. 
We do not really have a chance to observe what test has been employed to examine whether the 
purported policy objective can explain discrimination. If the first step does need to be seriously 
conducted, it would be analogous to the second step. Both the first step and the second step 
assess whether policy objectives or rationales can explain the discrimination. The difference is 
                                               
443 Duran clearly identified two sub-steps within the first step of analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability”. The 
first sub-step is the rational connection requirement while the second sub-step is “the assessment of whether 
discrimination is unjustifiable”, which “should be made in the light of the objective that provided the basis for the 
measure’s provisional justification under a given subparagraph of Article XX GATT”. See Gracia Marin Duran, 
‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a Conflict between GATT Article 
XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) Journal of International Economic Law 467-495 (2016), p. 475. 
444 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para.149.  
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that the purported policy objective is assessed in the first step while the policy rationale behind 
the exemption (and flexibilities) is assessed in the second step. 
When most scholars read EC – Seal Products, they seemed to stop examining the AB’s 
detailed analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” after they saw the first step was not 
different from a typical analysis following Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. Upon the first step, some 
commentators paid a little too much attention.445 However, the most interesting step in this 
analytical framework is the second step. 
The second step of the test is an examination of the alternative rationale assessing 
whether it can explain discrimination or not. In EC – Seal Products, the Inuit subsistence 
rationale was proposed and examined to see whether it could explain the discrimination. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this second step offers an alternative justification for the disputed 
measure. In general, it means rationales other than the purported policy objective of a disputed 
measure alone can justify that measure. The general condition is that alternative rationales have 
to be able to account for the discrimination. In EC – Seal Products, it means that the exemption 
has to be consistent with the rationale proposed to explain the exemption so as to guard against 
pure excuses. In cases where the disputed measure does not have exemptions but has some 
flexibilities such as setting different levels of attainment of the purported policy objective for 
different products, the policy rationale proposed should be able to account for the flexibilities 
and discrimination caused by the flexibilities. In EC – Seal Products, if the IC exemption was 
designed and applied in a way consistent to its IC protection rationale, it would be fine and 
would not drag down the entire EU seal regime with it even if it was inconsistent with the 
purported policy objective of the overall EU seal regime. However, the problem in EC – Seal 
Products was that the IC exemption itself could be abused, and therefore was not entirely 
consistent with the IC protection rationale. That is to say, the IC rationale could not fully explain 
the exemption carved out in the name of IC protection because some seal products could enter 
the EU market according to the operative rules of the IC exemption although they were not 
derived from IC hunting. Thus the Inuit subsistence rationale did not pass the second step of 
analysis not as a matter of principle but as a matter of fact. 
                                               
445 For example, Bartels saw the AB implied that some other factors beyond policy rationales related to the 
purported policy objective of the disputed measure should be looked at, but he finally concluded that the AB 
eventually followed Brazil – Retreaded Tyres after the AB concluded the EU seal scheme failed the first step of 
analysis here. See Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS 
Agreements: A Reconstruction’, 109 (1) American Journal of International Law 95-125 (2015), p.117. 
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As argued earlier, in a fair share of the cases concerning the exception clause, the 
disputed measures are discriminatory because of they have internal inconsistencies even in the 
perspective of their purported policy objectives. In such cases, the purported policy objectives 
are not able to explain discrimination caused by internal inconsistencies of the disputed 
measures. Step one would certainly fail to find that the disputed measures are justified with their 
purported policy objectives. Then, step two provides the key test that has the potential to give 
measures containing discrimination caused by internal inconsistencies a chance to survive.    
The third step of analysis was also a safeguard against abuse of alternative rationales, but 
it is different from the second step. It requires “even-handedness” regarding the design and 
application of the exemptions, which was also the third step of analysis in the panel’s analytical 
framework in the TBT context in EC – Seal Products. In EC – Seal Products, the AB was 
concerned that the IC exemption was not even-handed regarding seal products derived from IC 
hunting in different countries. 446  Since the IC exemption was accessible to the Inuit in 
Greenland, but not so to the Inuit in Canada,447 the IC exemption also failed the third step. As the 
alternative rationale failed the second step and/or the third step of the analysis, it could not 
explain the discrimination caused by the exemption and ultimately failed to justify the EU seal 
scheme in EC – Seal Products.448  
The detailed test employed within steps two and three will be discussed together. Bartels 
argued that, regarding “whether discrimination…was justified on the ground of protecting 
indigenous interests” in EC – Seal Products, “the question would have been whether any 
alternative measures reasonably available to the European Union would have achieved its 
objectives of protecting indigenous interests in a less discriminatory manner.”449  Bartels’ 
observation is very interesting. In his view, the AB in EC – Seal Products again employed the 
necessity test in the form of the less trade restrictive alternative test under the chapeau. But 
different from US – Gasoline, what was at issue in EC – Seal Products was clearly whether the 
                                               
446 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 5.333. 
447 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 5.333. 
448 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para 5.338. 
449 Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction’, 109 (1) American Journal of International Law 95-125 (2015), p.119. 
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discrimination was necessary in light of the IC rationale, which was not the administrative 
rationale as in US – Gasoline but a rationale with values that are of a more substantive nature.  
However, in EC – Seal Products, the relevant discussion did not really revolve around 
less discriminatory alternatives while in US – Gasoline, less discriminatory, which also happened 
to be less restrictive, alternatives were indeed the focus of discussion under the chapeau. In EC – 
Seal Products, the relevant discussion was more like analysis of the contribution the disputed 
measure made to the achievement of the alternative rationales such as the protection of the IC. 
The bulk of the relevant discussion by the AB was about how the EU seal scheme or certain 
characteristics of the EU seal scheme would fail to protect the IC (failure to distinguish 
commercial hunts form IC hunts) or IC in certain countries (failure to be even-handed). It was 
not about the availability of possible alternatives as in US – Gasoline. Of course, the contribution 
analysis and the alternative analysis are integral part of the “weighing and balancing” exercise 
when determining whether a disputed measure is necessary to achieve a policy objective. They 
may mutually influence each other. When failures of the disputed measure are identified in the 
contribution analysis, they could make it easier to find an alternative that are not only less 
discriminatory or restrictive but also able to achieve the policy objective.  
No matter whether the AB focused on the contribution analysis or the alternative 
analysis, we can see that the essence of the “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” assessment is some 
sort of “necessity” analysis. The EC – Seal Products does not provide a comprehensive necessity 
test regarding the second and third steps of analysis, but I would propose a comprehensive 
“necessity” test is needed and the “necessity” jurisprudence under the subparagraphs of the 
exception clause can be very useful. There is one caveat though. The typical “necessity” test has 
been mostly used to examine the trade-restrictive facet of a disputed measure under the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause. When borrowed to examine the discriminatory facet of a 
disputed measure under the chapeau, the test may need some tweaks. Again, a full-fledged 
necessity test may not be triggered every time when assessing whether an alternative rationale 
can explain discrimination under the chapeau. Specific facts in different cases may only need to 
be analyzed by part of the full test. Therefore, we need to wait for more cases where the WTO 
judiciary analyzes the same issues in different factual contexts to have a bigger picture.  
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In overview, the AB’s analytical framework is not really different from that borrowed by 
the panel from the TBT Article 2.1 jurisprudence.450 Concerning the issue of finding a rationale 
to explain the discrimination (“distinction” in the TBT context) caused by the disputed measure, 
the panel said: 
[F]irst, is the distinction rationally connected to the objective of the EU Seal 
Regime; second, if not, is there any cause or rationale that can justify the 
distinction (i.e. “explain the existence of the distinction”) despite the absence of 
the connection to the objective of the Regime, taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the current dispute; and, third, is the distinction concerned, as 
reflected in the measure, “designed or applied in a manner that constitutes 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” such that it lacks “even-handedness.”451 
Duran once proposed that the analysis of discrimination and its justification should be the same 
in both the GATT context and the TBT context.452 Actually, Duran’s hope is already reality 
when the AB’s analysis under the chapeau in EC – Seal Products is read more carefully. We can 
see both the panel and the AB recognized that measures containing internal inconsistencies 
caused by exemptions were still acceptable when certain conditions were met. Rationales 
different from the purported policy objective of a disputed measure and not on the list as 
prescribed in the subparagraphs of the exception clause alone can justify that measure. It seems 
the real difference between the AB and the panel is that the AB did not agree to borrow from the 
TBT jurisprudence for fear of the repercussions of the TBT jurisprudence in GATT Article III:4. 
 
 
                                               
450 I have to disagree with Julia Y. Qin on this point. Qin argued that the AB did not follow through its latest position 
that independent IC rationale might justify the IC Exemption under the chapeau. The evidence for her argument is 
that the AB found the IC exemption unacceptable because it could not be reconciled with the immediate objective. 
But as seen in the analytical framework, the immediate objective and the IC rationale are alternative justification. 
The finding regarding the immediate objective was not fatal to the IC exemption. The AB’s conclusion that the IC 
exemption was not acceptable was not solely based on the find that the IC exemption was not reconcilable with the 
immediate objective. As Qin admitted, it was also because the IC exemption failed the examination in the 
perspective of the IC rationale. For Qin’s arguments, see Julia Y. Qin, ‘Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives 
under WTO Law: Reflections on EC – Seal Products’, 108 American Journal of International Law Unbound 308-
314 (2014). 
451 See WTO panel Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 7.259. 
452 Gracia Marin Duran, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC – Seal Products: Avoiding a 
Conflict between GATT Article XX-chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT Agreement’, 19 (2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 467-495 (2016), pp.468-469. 
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3.4 An illustrative hypothetical case 
 
Then what would a measure that can successfully pass the new tests of the chapeau be 
like? Of course, measures without internal inconsistencies definitely have a much better chance. 
Their purported policy objectives can provide justification for discrimination they may have 
created under the chapeau. For example, Let us assume that all alcoholic beverages are like 
products. WTO Member Gepan bans all alcoholic beverages that contain 40% alcohol content 
and above. According to Gepan, the ban aims to protect public morals. People in Gepan think 
drinking alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol content is not morally acceptable. 
And according to reliable statistics, alcoholics who cause public discomfort usually drink 
alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol content. The Federation of Ulopa, another 
WTO Member, initiates a WTO dispute settlement procedure and challenges the ban. The panel 
finds that Gepan discriminates against alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol 
content from the Federation of Ulopa as compared with domestic like alcoholic beverages that 
contain alcohol content less than 40%, and violates the NT obligation under GATT Article III:4.  
However, the panel agrees that alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol 
content pose a genuine threat to public morals in Gepan while alcoholic beverages contain 
alcohol content less than 40% does not. It then finds that the ban is necessary to protect public 
morals under GATT Article XX (a). Under the chapeau of GATT Article XX, it re-discovers the 
discrimination it finds under Article III:4, which exists between countries where the same 
conditions prevail. It also finds that the public morals policy objective, which is the purported 
policy objective of the ban, can perfectly account for the discrimination.453 The panel therefore 
finds that the ban is not arbitrary or unjustifiable, which is the first step of analysis of 
arbitrariness or unjustifiability in the analytical framework I propose. When the ban is found not 
to be arbitrary or unjustifiable, it is not necessary for it to be examined under the second and 
third steps. It is finally justified.  
Now, let us further assume that the ban imposed by Gepan has an exemption. A kind of 
spirit contains 53% alcohol content only produced in Gepan. This spirit has a unique color and 
                                               
453 As mentioned earlier, finding that a policy rationale can explain discrimination in the second step of the analysis 
of arbitrariness and unjustifiability can be as complicated as the necessity analysis under the paragraphs of the 
exception clause, but I will not elaborate the analysis here. the discussions of the necessity analysis in the literature 
review part of chapter 1 and in chapter 5 can help understand the analysis that may be conducted in the second step 
of the analysis of arbitrariness and unjustifiability. 
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flavor. More importantly, it is the only kind of spirit people drink on occasions of ancestor 
worship and holiday celebration. It is an essential part of the ritual on these occasions. The 
Federation of Ulopa adds another complaint in the WTO dispute settlement procedure, claiming 
that the exemption creates discrimination against alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more 
alcohol content from the Federation of Ulopa as compared with the special spirit produced in 
Gehan instead of alcoholic beverages containing alcohol content less than 40%, and violates the 
NT obligation under GATT Article III:4. Or since the original complaint has little chance of 
winning, The Federation of Ulopa may only raise the new complaint. Under GATT Article III:4, 
the panel finds that foreign produced alcoholic beverages containing 40% or more alcohol 
content and the special spirit produced in Gepan are like products. The panel also finds that 
under GATT Article III:4 foreign produced alcoholic beverages containing 40% or more alcohol 
content are treated less favorable than the special spirit produced in Gepan and hence 
discriminated against.  
Gepan tries to justify its measure under GATT Article XX. First, Gepan’s measure has to 
go through the examination of at least one of the subparagraphs of the exception clause. The 
Federation of Ulopa argues that the panel should only examine the exemption carved out of 
Gepan’s ban. But, the panel examines the entire ban with the exemption as imposed by Gepan 
because it holds the exception clause requires it to examine the entire measure. It finds that 
Gepan’s ban is necessary to protect public morals when the ban is examined in its entirety 
although it has an exemption. Therefore, Gepan’s measure passes the examination under GATT 
Article XX (a) and is hence provisionally justified. 
Next, Gepan’s measure has to go through the examination under the chapeau of the 
exception clause. According to the new analytical framework I propose, the panel first finds that 
there is discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. Alcoholic 
beverages from foreign countries containing 40% or more alcohol content are discriminated 
against first in a competitive sense. Then from the public morals protection perspective, 
alcoholic beverages from foreign countries containing 40% or more alcohol content are 
discriminated against as well since the special spirit produced in Gepan poses the same public 
morals threat as those foreign like products banned. In the perspective of the purported policy 
objective of Gepan’s measure, there is an internal inconsistency caused by the exemption. Then 
comes the key examination that is to see whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable. 
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The first step is to see whether the purported policy objective already examined under 
subparagraph (a), which is to protect public morals, can explain the discrimination. However, to 
achieve its public morals policy objective, Gepan should have banned the special spirit along 
with all other alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol content. Obviously, the 
purported policy objective cannot explain the discrimination caused by the exemption.  
If Brazil – Retreaded Tyres is followed, this would be the end of the case and Gepan’s 
measure would definitely fail under the chapeau. However, according to my proposal based on 
EC – Seal Products, the panel should go on to determine whether there is any other policy 
rationale able to explain the discrimination. Gepan argues that the discrimination caused by the 
exemption can be explained by a cultural consideration, which is different from the purported 
policy objective of Gepan’s measure or even goes against it, and which is not on the list of 
acceptable policy objectives as provided in the subparagraphs of the exception clause. The 
special spirit produced in Gepan is part of its culture, particularly important for ancestor worship 
and traditional holiday celebration. The panel finds the cultural rationale is bona fide. Then under 
the second step of the analysis of arbitrariness and unjustifiability, the panel finds the 
discrimination between the special spirit produced in Gepan and all other alcoholic beverages 
that contain 40% or more alcohol content stems exclusively from the cultural rationale proposed 
by Gepan. Therefore, Gepan’s measure passes the second step of examination. Under the third 
step, the panel further finds that Gepan’s measure, particularly its exemption, is even-handed in 
the perspective of its cultural policy rationale. There is no other spirit that is important for 
ancestor worship and holiday celebration. It is not possible for Gepan to implement its 
exemption not even-handedly. Therefore, Gepan’s measure, with its exemption, does not create 
discrimination that is arbitrary or unjustifiable. Thus, Gepan’s measure is finally justified under 
the exception clause.  
Most cases where disputed measures containing internal inconsistencies, including Brazil 
– Retreaded Tyres, US – Clove Cigarettes, and EC – Seal Products, are as complicated as our 
hypothetical case so far. But our hypothetical case can get more complicated and my proposal is 
still able to handle it. Let us further assume that another WTO Member, Corea, also produces 
identical spirit as the special spirit produced in Gepan. Corea is close to Gepan geographically 
and had been colonialized by Gepan for half a century. The spirit produced in Corea is identical 
to the special spirit produced in Gepan in terms of color, flavor, and other qualities. And people 
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in Gepan had accepted the special spirit produced in Corea in ancestor worship and holiday 
celebration during the colonial time and they still do today. However, the special spirit produced 
in Corea is also banned in Gepan’s market.  
Corea decides to join the dispute settlement initiated by the Federation of Ulopa. It may 
bring three complaints. It may complain about the discrimination against its alcoholic beverages 
that contain 40% or more alcohol content as compared with like alcoholic beverages that contain 
alcohol content less than 40%. It may complain about the discrimination against its alcoholic 
beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol content as compared with the special spirit produced 
in Gepan. It may also complain about the discrimination against the special spirit produced in 
Corea as compared with the special spirit produced in Gepan. We have known how the first two 
complaints would be handled by my proposal. Let us assume that Corea only brings the third 
complaint here. 
The panel finds under GATT Artice III:4 that special spirit produced in Corea and that 
produced in Gepan are like products. The ban covers the special spirit produced in Corea, which 
is not exempted as the special spirit produced in Gepan. The panel therefore finds under GATT 
Article III:4 that the special spirit produced in Corea is treated less favorably and hence 
discriminated against.  
Then, Gepan tries to justify its measure under the exception clause. Now, there are more 
twists in Gepan’s measure. First, there is an exemption of the special spirit carved out of the ban 
on alcoholic beverages containing 40% or more alcohol content. Second, the special spirit 
produced in Corea is excluded from the coverage of the exemption. Corea argues that the 
discrimination is directly caused by the exclusion of its special spirit from the exemption of 
special spirit instead of the general ban or the exemption. It asks the panel to examine the 
particular exclusion of its special spirit from the exemption of special spirit. Again, the panel 
insists that the exception clause is supposed to examine the entire measure taken by Gepan. 
Therefore, the panel find that Gepan’s measure is necessary to protect public morals and 
therefore is provisionally justified under GATT Article XX (a). 
Under the chapeau, discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
is rediscovered by the panel. Actually, discrimination found under the chapeau is more 
complicated. There can be three counts of discrimination in the competitive sense: (1) the 
discrimination against alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or more alcohol content produced in 
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Corea as compared with like alcoholic beverages that contain alcohol content less than 40% 
produced in Gepan; (2) the discrimination against its alcoholic beverages that contain 40% or 
more alcohol content produced in Corea as compared with the special spirit produced in Gepan; 
and (3) the discrimination against the special spirit produced in Corea as compared with the 
special spirit produced in Gepan. Since Corea only brings the complaint concerning the third 
count of discrimination, the panel only needs to find one count of discrimination in the 
competitive sense under the chapeau. This discrimination remains when viewed form the 
perspective of the public morals policy objective. The special spirit produced in both Gepan and 
Corea poses the same public morals issue. This discrimination persists when we look at it from 
the perspective of the cultural policy rationale. Since the special spirit produced in Corea is 
identical to that produced in Gepan in terms of its qualities and the perception by people in 
Gepan.  
Then, the panel has to determine whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable. 
In step one, the panel finds the discrimination cannot be explained by the public morals policy 
objective. This is already clear in our analysis the discrimination found under the chapeau. Then 
the panel goes to step two and finds that the cultural policy rationale fails to explain the 
discrimination either. Again, this  is already clear in our analysis the discrimination found under 
the chapeau. Gepan argues that the exclusion of the special spirit from the exemption is because 
of public safety concerns. The special spirit produced in both Gepan and Corea is used in 
worship rituals that memorize people who conquered and occupied Corea during the colonial 
time. A radical group in Corea think it is a humiliation if the special spirit produced in Corea is 
used in rituals memorizing the invaders. They have threatened terrorist attacks in Gepan and 
some members have been caught preparing for attacks in Gepan. The government of Gepan 
believes the radical group would stop targeting Gepan once the special spirit produced in Corea 
is banned in Gepan’s market. The panel finds that the public safety rationale is bona fide, and it 
explains why the special spirit produced in Corea is excluded from the exemption of the ban. 
Here, we should note that the public safety rationale is different from the purported policy 
objective of Gepan’s measure, nor is it on the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of the 
exception clause. The panel further finds that the exclusion is implemented even-handedly under 
the third step of analysis of arbitrariness and unjustifiability. This is obvious since no other 
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countries produce the special spirit. Thus, Gepan’s measure is finally justified under the 
exception clause once again.  
Cases in the third scenario would be rare. So far, the cases containing internal 
inconsistencies that pose the great challenge to the current jurisprudence regarding the balance 
between trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy resemble our hypothetical case in 
the second scenario. Nevertheless, the third scenario helps to further illustrates how my proposal 
would work. We have seen three levels of distinctions, which amount to discrimination under 
GATT Article III:4, in the three scenarios with one nested in another. Hypothetically, there could 
be infinitely more finer distinctions created within the distinctions already existing. No matter 
how many fine distinctions are made, be them relatively minor internal inconsistencies or 
complete exemptions, they would all be justifiable. Domestic regulatory measures would thus 
enjoy utmost freedom for flexibilities. The condition is that they have to offer credible policy 
rationales to account for the distinctions made at all the levels, all the way down the finest 
distinction they make.   
There is one more thing. As we can see the policy rationales that regulating authorities 
offer to explain the discrimination created by their measures in the second step of the analysis of 
arbitrariness and unjustifiability need not to be on the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs, is 
there a boundary for them? Are all sorts of policy rationales acceptable to provide explanation to 




CHAPTER 4: SCOPE OF ACCEPTABLE POLICY RATIONALES 
  
The greatest advantage of advocating for the new development in interpreting the 
chapeau of the exception clause is the circumvention of the closed-end list of acceptable policy 
objectives. Domestic regulatory measures in violation of substantive trade disciplines, 
particularly the NT treatment as provided in GATT Article III, are able to be justified under the 
exception clause with more variety of policy rationales. This chapter is going to probe the 
expanded scope of acceptable policy rationales. This chapter is not concerned with the criteria 
for how a WTO Member can successfully invoke an acceptable rationale to justify its measure 
otherwise in violation of trade disciplines. It focuses on the possible scope of acceptable policy 
rationales, the invocation of which may or may not pass the criteria under the chapeau in 
particular cases.  
There are no clear boundaries for the scope of acceptable rationales provided in the text 
of the chapeau. The textual basis is short and simple, containing little useful information to 
delineate the scope of acceptable policy rationales. The proposed test in its tentative form as 
discussed in the previous chapter does not shed much light on the scope of acceptable policy 
rationales either. Therefore, I will have to resort to discussion of standard of review under the 
WTO, which is the most relevant jurisprudential theory about policing WTO Members’ domestic 
regulations, and the jurisprudence in different but relevant contexts to find out what would be 
included and excluded.  
 
4.1 Standard of Review 
 
The issue of standard of review is more noticed in the trade remedy cases, but it actually 
permeates the WTO jurisprudence. Standard of review under the WTO is concerned with the 
degree to which the WTO, particularly the WTO judiciary, should second-guess a decision of a 
national government agency concerning economic and non-economic regulations.454 In a sense, 
the issue of policing WTO Members’ domestic regulations is all about standard of review under 
                                               
454 Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, ‘WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National 
Governments’, 90 (2) American Journal of International Law 193-213 (1996), p. 194. 
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the WTO. In the jurisprudence relevant to GATT Articles III and XX, some key articles of the 
SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement, standard of review has been an central issue.455  
Reviewing whether national governments’ domestic policies are acceptable seems to be 
an extreme case of standard of review. Standard of review in a certain legal system dictates 
different degree of deference a court accords to the executive branch or the administrative 
agencies regarding various matters. In an international legal system, that deference has another 
dimension, which is an international institution needs defer, to different degrees, to the decisions 
made by national governments. Therefore, standard of review under the WTO is not only 
concerned with the issue of the separation of power, accountability, professional expertise, 
optimal use of resources,456 but also sovereignty, anti-globalization movements, and efforts to re-
embed liberalism into non-economic social institutions.457 Obviously, standard of review bears 
on these very politically sensitive issues. Reviewing whether national governments’ domestic 
policies are acceptable or not in principle is probably most susceptible to triggering the great 
tensions inherent in these issues. It involves the restriction of sovereignty from an international 
judiciary regarding the choices of values and interests domestic governments can make. One 
commentator observed that the WTO had exercised considerate amount of power when 
examining the means Members take to achieve their policy objectives, but had almost never 
second-guessed their policy objectives in terms of their appropriateness or acceptability under 
the WTO.458 Compared with choices of implementing means, the choice of policies is more 
political.459 It is said that one important function of standard of review set in a particular legal 
system is to establish “no go” areas for the judiciary, requiring them not to second-guess the 
decisions already made by the regulators.460 It looks that the acceptability of WTO Members’ 
domestic policy objectives is within one of the “no go” areas. 
                                               
455 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law’, 7 (3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 491-521 (2004), p. 520. 
456 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law’, 7 (3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 491-521 (2004), p. 492; Joel P Trachtman, ‘International Legal Control of Domestic Administrative 
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457 Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’, 14 (3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 639-675 (2011),  pp.641-647, 650-652. 
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459 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law’, 7 (3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 491-521 (2004), p. 492. 
460 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, ‘Standard of Review in WTO Law’, 7 (3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 491-521 (2004), p. 493. 
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Against the backdrop of the anti-globalization movement, national governments are more 
intolerant to the intrusion upon their power by the WTO. The once receding sovereignty issue 
becomes once again salient now. More importantly, the anti-globalization movement has been 
more pronounced in developed countries that are most powerful in the world trading system. 
Administrations in these democratic countries, whose legitimacy and survival depends on 
elections and votes, have to cater to the demands of domestic groups who have not benefited 
much in globalization. When the political support and commitment of these countries, such as 
the United States and major European countries, to the WTO recede, the survival of the WTO 
would be at risk. The right-wing political powers have apparently gained traction in these 
countries in recent years. They are more inclined to use domestic regulations to address social 
issues or even use explicit market protective measures in the hope of boosting domestic 
production and employment, or simply to gain support from their hard-core constituents. The 
restriction of their discretion to do so would draw strong opposition. In such a situation, standard 
of review under the WTO would definitely shift towards greater domestic regulatory autonomy, 
particularly regarding the issue whether a domestic policy objective is acceptable or not. 
Particularly, national government should be given the discretion to adopt policies even if they are 
not explicitly endorsed in the closed-end list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of the exception 
clauses. No wonder that some scholars thought international tribunals should stay away from the 
issue of whether domestic policy objectives are legitimate or not.461 
However, will the WTO judiciary accord complete deference to domestic regulators 
concerning the legitimacy of their policy objectives after the closed-end list is circumvented? Is 
this issue completely in a “no go” area? Scholars have made an analogy of standard of review 
under the WTO to that in the US administrative law, arguing the WTO judiciary should accord 
complete deference to domestic regulatory authorities in certain areas.462 Although they did not 
name the scope of acceptable policy objectives as falling into one of the areas, it is probably one 
of the issues they would have in mind. According to the classical Chevron case, if the Congress 
had “directly spoken to the precise question at issue”, and if “the intent is clear”, then “that is the 
                                               
461 Jan Neumann & Elisabeth Turk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law after 
Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines’, 37 (1) Journal of World Trade 199-233 (2003), p. 218.  
462  Joel P Trachtman, ‘International Legal Control of Domestic Administrative Action’, 17 (4) Journal of 
International Economic Law 753-786 (2014), p. 758, 759; Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, ‘WTO Dispute 
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end of the matter”; and “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the Court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”463 If it is permissible, then courts should accord complete deference to it. Article 
17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement clearly resembles the Chevron doctrine.464 It looks like 
there is at least one clear example that the WTO has accorded complete deference to national 
regulators in the Chevron sense. However, Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement is 
the only text that is analogous to the Chevron doctrine in the WTO covered agreements. More 
importantly, it may not be easy for the Chevron doctrine to be applied in the general WTO 
context. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Chevron deference, a doctrine in 
American domestic law, is applicable in general WTO law, we should first ask whether WTO 
law is silent or ambiguous on the scope of acceptable policy objectives of domestic regulations, 
then can we decide whether the WTO judiciary should accord complete deference to national 
regulators. The chapeau of GATT Article XX is silent on what domestic policy objectives are 
acceptable, but it is not true that GATT Article XX is silent on that point. The subparagraphs 
reflect that the WTO has spoken on that point. Although I am trying to argue interpretive 
innovation under the chapeau should be encouraged in order to circumvent the closed-end list as 
prescribed in the subparagraphs, it does not mean the subparagraphs can be totally ignored. 
Then, the next question is whether GATT Article XX is ambiguous on the scope of acceptable 
regulatory policy objectives. In law, we can always find holes and ambiguities. Let us simply 
assume there is ambiguity. We will return to the ambiguity of certain subparagraphs regarding 
the acceptable policy objectives listed later. But the focus here is whether the ambiguity is 
intended. Or is it generally a common problem of drafting? The answer is probably the latter. 
                                               
463 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), pp. 842-844.  
464 Article 17.6 of Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(the Anti-Dumping Agreement) reads:  
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5: 
(i)   in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities’ 
establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and 
objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even 
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned; 
(ii)  the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the 
Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ 
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations. 
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The list of acceptable policy objectives in the subparagraphs cannot be said to reflect an intention 
of delegation.  
Then, even if the WTO is ready to accord Chevron deference to national regulators 
regarding certain issues, there are still other constraints on domestic regulations. There are at 
least two obvious examples. First, the WTO judiciary still has to decide whether national 
regulators’ decision of what acceptable policy objectives are is permissible.465 Second, Mead, 
which was a later U.S. Supreme Court Case, held agency decisions enjoying Chevron deference 
would not be upheld by the court if they were procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.466  
Furthermore, the WTO jurisprudence need not necessarily borrow from US domestic law. 
The WTO has developed a legal system that can be quite different from domestic laws. The 
principle concerning standard of review explicitly provided by the WTO is “objective” 
determination of matters of law and facts.467 This principle was regarded as “a departure from the 
international law default rule of auto-interpretation” of treaties.468 In EC – Hormones, the AB 
said the applicable “objective” standard of review in WTO disputed settlement was “neither de 
novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’.”469 Article 11 of the DSU articulates a general 
standard of review for all disputes unless otherwise provided in specific WTO treaty clauses. 
Therefore, standard of review under the WTO is generally thought not to be total deference by 
the WTO judiciary. Besides, the standard of review as provided in Article 17.6 of the AD 
Agreement is only applicable to anti-dumping disputes.470 When the WTO was established, a 
Ministerial Decision was adopted to require WTO Members to review the standard of review 
provided in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement after three years “with a view to considering the 
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question of whether it is capable of general application”.471 However, such a review has not been 
conducted yet.  
Ehlermann and Lockhart examined WTO case law and found that there was no uniform 
standard of review as the WTO judiciary had conducted “objective” review of Members’ 
domestic regulations regarding both legal and factual matters.472 What standards of review are 
adopted in WTO dispute settlement depends on the nature of issues and what specific legal texts 
are involved. When the WTO judiciary reviews a purely legal issue, it “conducts an original or 
de novo interpretation of the WTO agreement, using the rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention,” whereas when the WTO judiciary reviews a factual issue, the standards of review it 
adopts spread across the spectrum from high deference in trade remedy disputes to little 
deference in disputes concerning national measures that do not have a formal investigative 
process at the national level.473 What regulatory policies are acceptable in the chapeau of the 
exception clause would not be an issue of facts. If through judiciary interpretation, a standard is 
created under the chapeau, it would be a legal standard and the WTO judiciary would not defer 
completely to its Members with regard to it. 
Overall, although the scope of acceptable policy objectives of domestic regulations is a 
very sensitive issue, the WTO has not relinquished its power to define it. When the WTO 
judiciary takes the step to get rid of the confinement on the scope imposed by the subparagraphs 
of the exception clause, it is difficult to imagine it would go to the extreme opposite end to 
completely defer to national regulators. Given its conservativeness when dealing with issues 
such as the characterization of policy objectives and the appropriate levels of 
Protection/enforcement (ALOPs), it is probable that it will defer, to a greater extent, to national 
regulators regarding what policy objectives they can try to achieve, but reserve the right to draw 
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4.2 Legitimacy as a general standard  
 
When standard of review in WTO law would not bar the WTO from determining what 
regulatory policies are acceptable, it is therefore meaningful to discuss the expanded scope of 
acceptable policy rationales under the WTO. The alternative to a closed-end list is a general 
standard for acceptable policy rationales. If the general standard is not very strict, the scope of 
the acceptable policy objectives can be larger than that limited by a closed-end list. If such a 
general standard exists, the immediate question would be how to construe it. Obviously, the 
exception clause chapeau does not provide a textual basis for developing such a standard, nor 
does the existing jurisprudence of the chapeau offer any clue. Therefore, I will look for 
jurisprudential clues offered by different but relevant texts in various WTO agreements. 
 
4.2.1 TBT Article 2.2 
In a few contexts under the WTO, whether the policy objective is legitimate seems to 
have been used as a general standard for the purpose to determine whether a disputed measure 
can be justified when it is inconsistent with trade disciplines. For example, under TBT Article 
2.2, domestic technical measures can restrict trade if they are necessary to fulfil a “legitimate” 
objective. TBT Article 2.4 also has a “legitimate” objective requirement regarding when WTO 
Members can deviate from international standards as they set their own technical standards. But, 
TBT Article 2.2 is more analogous to the exception clause and draws most attention.474 It reads: 
“2.2  Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted 
or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade.  For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such legitimate objectives are, inter 
alia:  national security requirements;  the prevention of deceptive 
practices;  protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or 
                                               
474 Simon Lester & William Stemberg, ‘The GATT Origins of TBT Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2’, 17 (1) Journal 
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the environment.  In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration 
are, inter alia:  available scientific and technical information, related processing 
technology or intended end-uses of products.” 
It appears, under TBT Article 2.2, whether a policy objective can justify the disputed technical 
measure depends on, besides other conditions, whether it is legitimate or not. Although TBT 
Article 2.2 contains a list of legitimate policy objectives, the  legitimacy requirement in the text 
provides a more general standard for the scope of acceptable policy objectives. TBT Article 2.2 
is different from the GATT exception clause in text, structure, and coverage of measures, but the 
legitimacy standard may be introduced into the chapeau of the exception clause.  
As mentioned earlier, deciding the legitimacy of domestic policies, particularly when 
domestic policies are targeting domestic non-economic issues, would be a grievous intrusion of 
sovereignty. In the necessity jurisprudence under the exception clause, the WTO judiciary may 
accord great although not complete deference to WTO Members. It allows domestic regulatory 
authorities to connect their measures to recognized policy objectives quite freely.475 For example, 
in EC – Seal Products, the EU seal scheme is actually more targeted on seal protection, but the 
EU declared its overall policy objective is to protect the public morals of its people, which was 
not questioned by the WTO judiciary. The WTO judiciary also accords great discretion as to the 
ALOP of a measure.476 It appears, regarding these sensitive issues, the WTO judiciary is very 
conservative. Under TBT Article 2.2, the WTO judiciary have to ask and answer the question 
whether a policy objective that the disputed measure is after is legitimate or not, which is more 
sensitive than the issues the WTO judiciary has dealt with under the subparagraphs of the 
exception clause. After all, the legitimacy of domestic policies has been decided by the list 
provided by the subparagraphs.  
Interestingly, although it looks like the WTO judiciary may become more intrusive into 
domestic regulatory autonomy because it now may have to decide whether a domestic policy 
objective is legitimate or not, it actually would expand domestic regulatory space since 
legitimate policy objectives a domestic regulatory authority can have are not limited by an 
closed-end list any more. More importantly, the WTO judiciary cannot completely defer to its 
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Members regarding these issues. For example, the WTO judiciary has tried to differentiate 
acceptable policy objectives according to the “importance” of the values they protected as an 
implicit part of the exercise of determining whether the disputed measure is necessary to 
facilitate the policy objectives recognized in a few subparagraphs of the exception clause. Under 
TBT Article 2.2,  the WTO judiciary has said that the legitimacy issue would not be completely 
left to Members. The AB said clearly in EC – Sardines that “there must be an examination and a 
determination on the legitimacy of the objectives of a measure.”477 
Zleptnig found the EC – Sardines panel borrowed from Canada – Pharmaceuticals 
Patents to define what a legitimate policy would be.478 In Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents, 
the panel elaborated the concept of “legitimate interests” under TRIPs Article 30 that provides an 
exception to patent protection, stating a legitimate interest is “a normative claim calling for 
protection of interests that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are supported by relevant public 
policies or other social norms.”479 Although the “legitimate interest” Canada – Pharmaceuticals 
Patents was concerned with was the interest of a private nature, the EC – Sardines panel 
nevertheless cited the Canada – Pharmaceuticals Patents panel to define legitimacy under TBT 
Article 2.4.480 The EC – Sardines panel further held that legitimacy under Article 2.4 should be 
interpreted in the context of Article 2.2, which implies that the interpretation of legitimacy under 
the two articles should be similar.481 However, since the parties agreed that the policy objectives 
offered by European Union, the respondent, were legitimate, the panel did not further clarify the 
legitimacy standard.482 Thus what “public policies” and “social norms” should be used to 
determine the legitimacy of domestic policy objectives are still unknown.  
When having an opportunity to directly interpret TBT Article 2.2, the AB in US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) articulated a two-step process to assess whether the policy objectives of the disputed 
technical regulations are legitimate or not. The first step is to discern the objective of the 
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disputed technical regulations while the second step is to determine its legitimacy.483 Discerning 
the objectives of the disputed technical regulations requires a consideration of “the texts of the 
statues, legislative history, and other evidence regarding the structure and operation of the 
measure.”484 The AB suggested that, to determine the legitimacy of the objective, the third 
sentence of TBT Article 2.2, the sixth and seventh recitals of the preamble of the TBT 
Agreement, and objectives recognized in the provisions of other covered Agreements could 
provide guidance for or inform the determination of the legitimacy of the objectives of the 
disputed technical regulations.485 However, the AB still avoid directly defining “legitimacy” in 
US – Tuna II (Mexico) and later TBT cases. 
In summation, what we now know is that there is a standard for the legitimacy of 
domestic policies, but the WTO judiciary has refrained from elaborating on it and applying it. 
This reflects the philosophy the WTO judiciary may hold. When faced with politically sensitive 
issues, it accords great deference to WTO Members while it does not give up its power to set a 
standard although it knows that it is wise not to exercise that power unless pressured hard. 
 
4.2.2 TBT Article 2.1 
TBT Article 2.1 only provides non-discrimination obligations. However, because there is 
no general exception clause in the TBT Agreement, the WTO judiciary has had to create an 
exception within TBT Article 2.1 to provide a counter-balance to trade disciplines. Therefore, the 
AB held that seemingly discriminatory technical regulations should be upheld under TBT Article 
2.1 if they “stem exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions.”486 It seems if a responding 
WTO Member wants to justify its discriminatory measure in a dispute, its measure must have a 
legitimate policy objective. 
In US – Clove Cigarettes, the United States banned the manufacture and sale of cigarettes 
in the United States with “characterizing flavours” that appeal to youth.487 However, while all 
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other flavoured cigarettes were banned, menthol cigarettes were exempted from the ban.488 A 
discrimination against imports seemed to exist. The United States argued that the discrimination 
stemmed from the policy considerations of “the potential impact on the health care system and 
the potential development of a black market and smuggling of menthol cigarettes.”489 The panel 
did not deny that these policy considerations were legitimate in principle, but it dismissed the US 
argument on the ground that these policy considerations were only excuses without factual 
evidence in this case.490 On appeal, the AB did not deny that the two policy considerations were 
legitimate either,491 but like the panel, the AB dismissed the two considerations on a factual 
basis.492 It is clear the two rationales proposed by the United States are legitimate. However, the 
WTO judiciary did not provide the details about how it reached the conclusion under TBT 
Article 2.1. Maybe, the WTO judiciary did not feel it would be worth the trouble of spelling out 
a legitimacy standard and conducting a full analysis under it since these two policy rationales 
offered by the United States were in fact only excuses without firm factual bases.  
In the following TBT cases including US—Tuna II (Mexico) and US—COOL heard by 
the WTO judiciary, the responding parties did not raise policy rationales other than those listed 
in the exception clause to justify discriminatory measures. The policy objectives listed in the 
exception clause are legitimate without question. Therefore, the WTO judiciary has not had 
another chance to discuss the legitimacy standard under TBT Article 2.1. 
    
4.2.3 GATT Article III and the subparagraphs of the exception clause 
Legitimacy has been used by scholars and the WTO judiciary to refer to characteristics of 
measures that pursue acceptable policy objectives in some other contexts as well. Policy 
objectives listed in the subparagraphs of the exception clause have been referred to as legitimate 
policy objectives or purposes.493 The “aim and effects” test under GATT Article III also involves 
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the issue of legitimate policy objectives.494 However, different from TBT Article 2.2, both the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause and GATT Article III do not have the language to provide 
a legitimacy standard for policy objectives. 
Of course, lacking a textual basis does not seem to be a fatal problem. TBT Article 2.1 
still can host a legitimacy standard through interpretive creation. However, the subparagraphs of 
the exception clause and GATT Article III face more serious problems if they need to provide a 
general legitimacy standard. The subparagraphs of the exception clause rely on the list instead of 
a general standard to determine whether a policy objective is legitimate or not. That list looks 
exhaustive and has been interpreted as exhaustive. Therefore, any mentioning of legitimacy 
regarding the policy objectives of the disputed measure is actually another way to say these 
policy objectives fall under one or more of the subparagraphs of the exception clause.  
The difficulty to provide a general legitimacy standard faced by GATT Article III is at 
least equally serious. The brief-lived GATT “aim and effects” jurisprudence and relevant 
academic discussions do require the aim of the disputed domestic regulatory measure to be 
legitimate. However, the “aim and effects” test under GATT Article III has been rejected by the 
WTO judiciary. Any elaboration of a general legitimacy standard under GATT Article III would 
not carry any authority under the WTO. Furthermore, the “aim and effects” jurisprudence and 
relevant discussions focus on the negative side of the legitimacy standard. GATT Article III:1, as 
the introduction to Article III, requires that domestic regulatory measures “should not be applied 
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.” The concern 
of the “aim and effects” test therefore is to determine whether there is a protective purpose of the 
disputed measure. Hudec analyzed the US – Malt Beverages case, where the “aim and effects” 
test was first introduced, believing the panel focused on whether there was a bona fide regulatory 
purpose instead of a protective purpose.495 But as to whether a regulatory objective can be 
regarded as legitimate when it is found bona fide, there is little clue in the jurisprudence and 
relevant academic discussions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.620. 
494 GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles (US – Automobiles), DS31/R, circulated 11 October 
1994 (unadopted), paras. 5.10. 
495 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.627. 
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4.3 Expansive interpretation 
 
The general legitimacy standard can be supplemented by an expanded list of important 
policy rationales, which serves an illustrative purpose. In beginning to look for the expanded 
scope of acceptable policy rationales, it would be particularly useful to start the probe from the 
already recognized policy objectives and enlarge the scope through expansive interpretation. The 
obvious important regulatory policy objectives accepted under the WTO are those already listed 
in the subparagraphs of the exception clause. If the WTO judiciary is ready to further develop the 
interpretation and application of the chapeau of the exception clause in EC – Seal Products, it 
can certainly take advantage of an expansive interpretation of the subparagraphs of the exception 
clause.496 Again, given the language of the subparagraphs and relevant jurisprudence, it is 
difficult for this approach to completely circumvent the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of 
the exception clause. It is only of complementary use and can provide illustration of acceptable 
policy rationales within a larger scope. 
 
4.3.1 Enforcement exception   
The subparagraph that has the greatest potential to expand the scope of acceptable 
domestic policy objectives is GATT Article XX (d) (and its GATS equivalent – Article XIV (c)). 
The exception provided by GATT Article XX (d) is usually called the enforcement exception. 
Traditionally, there are two elements of analysis in GATT Article XX (d). That is, to invoke the 
enforcement exception requires a disputed measure to “secure compliance with laws and 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement” and the measure 
must be “necessary” to secure such compliance.497 In Mexico – Soft Drinks, the element of “laws 
and regulations” was separated and became independent, which dealt with the issue whether an 
international agreement to which a WTO Member is a party is a law or regulation under GATT 
Article XX (d) , the element of “laws and regulations” was separated and became independent.498   
                                               
496 It was argued that the WTO leaves a wide constitutional space of constitutional for the judiciary to protect non-
trade values or interests through constitutional clauses in important WTO documents. See Henrik Anderson, 
‘Protection of Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic Arguments, and 
Eluding Questions’, 18 (2) Journal of International Economic Law 383-405 (2015), p. 387. 
497 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea – 
Beef), WT/DS161 & 169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 157. 
498 WTO Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Mexico – Soft Drinks), 
WT/DS308/R, adopted 24 March 2006, para. 8.162 
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The element of “secur[ing] compliance with laws and regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement” is more of interest here. It seems that 
measures falling under GATT Article XX (d) do not need to have a specific policy objective, 
which is very different from measures falling under other subparagraphs. As long as the 
domestic laws and regulations a disputed measure is trying to enforce do not violate WTO 
obligations, the measure can be justified even if it violates these obligations. Since there is no 
requirement, and hence no limitation, on the scope of policy objectives the enforced laws and 
regulations have, the measure enforcing them seem to be free of limitation as well regarding the 
policy objectives it may have. 
This line of reasoning does look reasonable. However, there is a very fine complication. 
In WTO case law, it is not regarded as securing compliance with laws and regulations not 
inconsistent with the GATT Agreement if a disputed measure is to achieve a substantive 
domestic policy objective. In a pre-WTO case, the panel held that a measure was deemed to 
“secure compliance with” laws and regulations not inconsistent with the GATT Agreement only 
when it was effective to “enforce obligations” of these laws and regulations instead of to ensure 
the broad achievement of a policy objective.499 This statement was affirmed by the panel in US – 
Gasoline500 after the WTO was established and the Gasoline panel’s ruling on this point was not 
appealed.  
It is unfortunate that the distinction between enforcement of the specific obligations and 
general attainment of a policy objective has not been seriously discussed by the AB and the 
panels in relevant cases. In fact, the AB did not even discuss this issue at all. We can only 
speculate why the panels in a couple of cases made such a distinction. One probable reason is 
that the panels wanted to limit the reach of the enforcement exception. If measures trying to 
“enforce” any general domestic policy objective fall under GATT Article XX (d), WTO 
Members can design “hollow” laws and regulations and put operative obligations that may be 
inconsistent with their GATT obligations into separate enforcement regulations. This way, those 
“hollow” laws and regulations remain consistent with the GATT Agreement because they can be 
only like a statement of acceptable policy objectives while the violation of the GATT Agreement 
                                               
499 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components (EEC – Parts and Components), 
BISD 37S/132, adopted 16 May 1990, paras. 5.17-5.18. 
500 WTO Panel Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), 
WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, para. 3.56. 
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in the operative regulations can be justified if the operative regulations meet other requirements 
under GATT Article XX (d). As the case law requires disputed measures, if they need to be 
justified under GATT Article XX (d), to enforce specific obligations in the laws and regulations 
not inconsistent with the GATT Agreement, those laws and regulations must contain operative 
contents that are not inconsistent with substantive GATT clauses. When the enforced laws and 
regulations have to be detailed to a certain extent, it would be difficult to design substantive 
operative clauses that are GATT consistent while having the implementing regulations 
inconsistent with the GATT Agreement. It is more likely that while the implementing regulations 
are inconsistent with the GATT Agreement, the substantive operative clauses are GATT 
inconsistent in a similar manner. Thus, by requiring the laws and regulations to contain specific 
obligations that need to be enforced, quite a lot of disputed measures may not successfully 
invoke GATT Article XX (d) because the laws and regulations they are trying to enforce may not 
be GATT consistent and those laws and regulations themselves may be challenged at the same 
time. 
That is to say, if we can argue that it needs both substantive obligations and 
implementing regulations to attain a domestic policy objective, there are two possible ways to 
legislate. The first way is to have a “hollow” law or regulation that is basically a statement of the 
policy objective while making a separate implementing regulations that have both the substantive 
obligations and implementing rules and procedures that are secondary regarding the attainment 
of the policy objective. The second way is to have a law or regulation that contains the 
substantive obligations with operative details of the policy objective while leave the 
implementing rules and procedures to a separate regulation. If the first way is recognized by the 
WTO judiciary, Members would easily manipulate GATT Article XX (d) and be able to 
successfully get away with violation of the GATT Agreement. If only the second way is 
recognized, GATT Article XX (d) would not be very helpful for them to get away with violation 
of the GATT Agreement. 
It seems that the second way has been taken by the WTO judiciary. Measures falling 
under GATT Article XX (d) should be value-free in a sense. Thus, it is technically incorrect to 
say that GATT Article XX (d) permits disputed measures falling under its purview to have 
policy objectives not limited by the closed-end list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of the 
exception clause.  
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 GATT Article XX (d) has received less attention than some other high-profile 
subparagraphs such as (b) and (g) probably because it does not directly protect more recognized 
non-economic values.501 In Korea – Beef, the Korean dual retail system was held not necessary 
to enforce its Unfair Competition Act.502 While it is required the adjudicators to “take into 
account the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be 
enforced is intended to protect” in the necessity analysis,503 it was suspected that the necessity 
analysis would be more strict than that under some other subparagraphs where substantive values 
are protected and the Korean measure in Korea – Beef was thus not justified under GATT Article 
XX (d).504  
Nevertheless, the distinction between enforcement of the specific obligations and general 
attainment of a policy objective is also an important restriction that makes GATT Article XX (d) 
less utilized by WTO Members. Laws and regulations that need implementing regulations 
inconsistent with the GATT Agreement may themselves contain substantive obligations that are 
GATT inconsistent. Such implementing regulations, along with the laws and regulations they are 
supposed to enforce, then need to be examined under the other subparagraphs of the exception 
clause. Thus, the use of  GATT Article XX (d) is greatly limited in practice.  
However, the distinction between enforcement of the specific obligations and general 
attainment of policy objectives does not mean that GATT Article XX (d) directly limits the 
scope of acceptable domestic policy objectives. Although GATT Article XX (d) lists a few 
domestic policy objectives that the laws and regulations may try to achieve, it is directly 
concerned with the effective enforcement of specific obligations in laws and regulations aiming 
at these policy objectives. It does not base the examination under GATT Article XX (d) on 
achieving any substantive policy objective. Moreover, GATT Article XX (d) states that the 
domestic laws and regulations not inconsistent with the GATT Agreement include those trying to 
achieve domestic policy objectives on the list provided by subparagraph (d). The list of domestic 
policy objectives in GATT Article XX (d) is only illustrative. 
                                               
501 Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010, pp.179-180. 
502 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea – 
Beef), WT/DS161 & 169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 171. 
503 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea – 
Beef), WT/DS161 & 169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 162 
504 Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010, p. 180. 
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More importantly, although the laws and regulations referred to under GATT Article XX 
(d) are not measures falling under it, the scope of the laws and regulations allowed to be enforced 
by measures falling under GATT Article XX (d) is not limited. This is definitely helpful to 
expand the scope of acceptable policy rationales under the chapeau.   
The only constraint on the scope of acceptable policy objectives of the laws and 
regulations under GATT Article XX (d) is probably the requirement that the laws and regulations 
disputed measures enforcement should not be GATT inconsistent. Comparing with the “aim and 
effects” test under GATT Article III, this requirement of GATT consistency may concern both 
the objectives and the effects of domestic laws and regulations. When it is concerned with the 
policy objectives of domestic laws and regulations, the GATT consistency requirement imposes 
a constraint on the scope of acceptable policy objectives.  
This constraint on the scope of acceptable policy objectives is obviously a negative one. 
It only requires domestic laws and regulations do not have intent to violate the GATT 
Agreement. In the “aim and effects” test, it was argued that a disputed measure would pass the 
“aim” test if has a bona fide regulatory purpose instead of a discriminatory intent.505 If the same 
logic is followed, a law or regulation would be GATT consistent as long as it has a bona fide 
regulatory purpose instead of a trade restrictive or discriminative intent under GATT Article XX 
(d). Thus, it can be argued that subparagraph (d) does not really set any limit on the scope of 
acceptable policy objectives. 
 
4.3.2 Public morals as a mediator of other policy objectives 
The next subparagraph that has potential to expand the acceptable domestic policy 
objectives is GATT Article XX (a) (and its GATS equivalent – Article XIV (a)), which provides 
the public morals exception. Public morals concerns may arise regarding three groups of 
products: (1) products offensive to the prevailing religion or culture in a country, including 
“alcohol, pork and pork products in some Islamic states…’’; (2) “immoral products,” including 
“pornography, drugs or human organs…”; (3) “National Socialist propaganda.”506 Historically, 
“opium, pornography, liquor, slaves, firearms, blasphemous articles, products linked to animal 
                                               
505 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.627. 
506 Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010, p. 128 
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cruelty, prize fight films, and abortion-inducing drugs” were all recognized in trade treaties to be 
products giving rise to public morals concern.507 A current survey of the relevant legal rules in 
some countries reveals the scope of products that give rise to moral concerns does not change 
much.508 These products are diverse, but they do not seem to constitute an endless list. 
In US – Gambling, the first WTO case involving the public morals exception, the panel 
relied on dictionary meanings and defined “public morals” as “standards of right and wrong 
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation” in the GATS context.509 It was 
followed by the panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products in the GATT context.510 
This definition may be conducive to expansive interpretation since “any form of human behavior 
could be declared as morally right or wrong”511  or “any law passed by a representative 
government prohibiting any behavior could be considered a social judgment about right and 
wrong, thus falling within a broad textual definition of public morals.”512 Measures trying to 
achieve some other substantive policy objectives can be seen through a moral lens and claim the 
achievement of other policy objectives has moral implications. Thus, measures aiming at a 
variety of policy objectives that are not listed in the subparagraphs of the exception clause may 
take advantage of the exception clause through the mediation of the public morals exception.  
Also in US – Gambling, the panel noted that “the content of these concepts [‘public 
morals and public order’] for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of 
factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.”513 The panel in EC – 
Seal Products confirmed the panel in US – Gambling, more clearly stating that “[m]embers 
should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of ‘public morals’ in 
their respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of values,”514 These 
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statements show that there is less consensus as to the content of “public morals,”515 but they can 
also further support that the scope of public morals is quite wide and flexible.516 Both these 
statements and the definition of “public morals” were not questioned by the AB. It seems the 
WTO judiciary is willing to greatly defer to Members regarding the scope of public morals.  
However, there is voice against allowing WTO Members to freely characterize the policy 
objectives of their measures as public morals rationales. For example, in EC – Seal products, 
Iceland, in its third-party submission, stated that the public morals exception "is bound to be 
based on more subjective and less tangible arguments” and that they were not to be equated with 
“broad political and public support for a measure.”517 Japan stated more explicitly in the same 
case that “while Members have the right to determine whether a specific objective forms part of 
‘public morals’ on the basis of their own prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values, 
… Members are not free to label any policy objective as forming part of public morality.”518  
More generally, when determining the policy objective of a disputed measure, what the 
WTO judiciary should do in the opinion of the AB is as follows: 
It “should take into account the Member’s articulation of the objective or the 
objectives it pursues through its measure, but it is not bound by that Member’s 
characterizations of such objective(s). Indeed, the panel must take account of all 
evidence put before it in this regard, including ‘the texts of statutes, legislative 
history, and other evidence regarding the structure and operation’ of the measure at 
issue.”519  
Thus, WTO Members cannot really freely characterize the policy objectives of their measures as 
public morals promotion or protection if the true intent is to achieve some other policy objectives 
that are a little detached from moral concerns.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 7.409. 
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519 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
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The WTO has not pressed for a universal public morals consensus, but it does require the 
real concerns of its Members cannot be too remote from the established moral grounds. What is 
meant here is that even if a WTO Member claims an issue involves public morals while it is not 
regarded as an moral issue by other Members, it is still possible that the WTO defer to its 
determination as long as it can demonstrate it is a moral issue according to the prevailing social, 
cultural, ethical and religious values within its territory. On the other hand, if circumstances 
concerning its disputed measure lead to the conclusion that the measure is trying to achieve 
another objective instead of public morals protection, this measure would not fall under the 
public morals exception.  
GATS Article XIV (a) provides not only the public morals exception but also a public 
order exception. There is no clue in the drafting history as to why GATS Article XIV (a) was 
drafted differently from GATT Article XX (a).520 The concept of “public order” was also first 
interpreted by the WTO judiciary in US – Gambling. The panel in US – Gambling also relied on 
dictionary meaning to define “public order” as “refer[ing] to the preservation of the fundamental 
interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law” and “[t]hese fundamental interests 
can relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security, and morality.”521 The panel further implied 
that the concept of “public order” and “public morals” both “refer to the fundamental interests 
and values maintained by a society” and therefore overlap to a large extent.522 
Therefore, WTO Members should enjoy the same discretion when determining the scope 
of “public order” as that when determining the scope of “public morals”. The panel in US – 
Gambling commented on the general characteristics of “public order” and “public morals” 
together without any differentiation.523 At the same time, the caution against abusing the public 
morals exception voiced by Iceland and Japan in EC – Seal Products should also apply to the 
public order exception.  
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4.3.3 The other exceptions  
GATT Article XX (b) and (g) are the two subparagraphs most frequently invoked to 
justify measures violating trade disciplines. The exceptions provided in these two subparagraphs 
are often called the health and safety exception and the conservation exception. While GATS 
Article XIV (b) is identical to GATT Article XX (b), there is no subparagraph in GATS Article 
XIV equivalent to GATT Article XX (g). Since GATT Article XX (b) and (g) are very specific, 
they do not really have potential to expand to recognize more domestic policy objectives. 
Although there has accumulated a large body of jurisprudence concerning these two exceptions, 
it is mostly concerned with various other issues under these two subparagraphs. 
The only possible expansion the health and safety exception and the conservation 
exception can make is to cover the full range of environmental policy objectives. The texts of 
GATT Article XX (b) and (g) do not explicitly recognize general environmental policy 
objectives. These two exceptions, if interpreted literally, may only cover some environmental 
policy objectives. However, some commentators observed that these two exceptions had already 
been interpreted expansively to include environmental policy objectives quite comprehensively, 
even before the establishment of the WTO.524  
Interestingly, although the policy objectives the two exceptions cover are quite narrow, 
they nevertheless overlap with each other. For example, in the very first case heard by the WTO 
AB—US – Gasoline, the US measure was held to fall under both GATT Article XX (b) and (g). 
The panel in US – Gasoline held that “a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the 
consumption of gasoline was a policy within the range of those concerning the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health mentioned in Article XX (b).”525 The panel also held that “a 
policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX (g).”526 The panel’s opinion on Article XX (b) was not appealed while its 
opinion on Article XX (g) was appealed but was confirmed by the AB.527 
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The rest of the exceptions in GATT Article XX (and GATS Article XIV) have rarely 
been invoked in dispute settlement. Among them, GATT Article XX (e) and (f) have some 
potential to expand the scope of acceptable domestic policy objectives. But the remaining 
subparagraphs are outdated, dealing with measures with objectives that are not really relevant 
any more.528 These outdated exceptions include (c) that is concerned with measures “relating to 
the importation or exportation of gold or silver”; (h) that is concerned with measures based on 
“obligation under any intergovernmental commodity agreement”; (i) that is concerned with 
measures “involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential 
quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry” on exceptional occasions; and (j) 
that is concerned with measures “essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general 
or local short supply.”   
GATT Article XX (e) provides the prison labor exception. Some commentators probed 
the possibility of expanding the prison labor exception to cover measures with labor standards or 
human rights objectives, but the conclusion is that it should be done through legislation instead 
of interpretation.529 The wording of the GATT Article XX (e) is quite specific, there is little 
room to read it to cover trade concerning labor standards beyond that concerning prison labor.530 
Moreover, a labor exception may help developed countries to target PPMs in developing 
countries, therefore it is strongly opposed by developing countries. I will come back later on the 
labor issue. 
GATT Article XX (f) provides that measures that are “imposed for the protection of 
national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value” are permitted even if they have 
violated trade disciplines. This subparagraph seems to be able to provide a basis for a more broad 
cultural exception, but the United States, the current hegemon, may not be happy. Plus, the 
wording of the GATT Article XX (f) is also quite specific. I will return to a possible cultural 
exception later. 
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4.4 What to include? Some high-profile borderline policy objectives and some trendy 
miscellaneous rationales 
 
In theory, it is important to have a general standard or learn the boundaries of the 
expansive interpretation. In reality, people may only care about whether certain domestic policy 
objectives would be accepted by the WTO as justifications for trade discipline violation. In fact, 
some policy objectives are more of a concern than others with respect to their acceptability as 
justifications for violation of trade disciplines. The most high-profile regulatory policy objectives 
that have dominated trade negotiations, dispute settlement, and academic debates include 
environmental protection, culture protection, labor standards, and human rights. For measures 
having internal inconsistencies, these high-profile policy objectives may be useful for their 
justification. But in recent WTO cases, policy rationales offered to justify discrimination caused 
by the internal inconsistencies within disputed measures often do not concern these high-profile 
policy objectives but some miscellaneous policy rationales difficult to categorize, some of which 
seem to have been accepted by the WTO judiciary. 
 
4.4.1 Some high-profile policy objectives 
Some of the high-profile policy objectives have been briefly discussed earlier. However, 
their discussions were basically based on the texts of the exception clause subparagraphs. I will 
further discuss them in a broader context, which may reveal their acceptability as justification for 
trade disciplines violation differently. 
 
4.4.1.1 Environmental policy objectives  
As mentioned earlier, environmental policy objectives have been recognized 
comprehensively by the judiciary before and after the WTO was established. However, since 
there is no textual basis in the exception clause, there are definitely worries that the coverage by 
GATT Article XX (b) and (g), and GATS Article XIV (b) is not complete. 
These worries can be eased if we take into consideration the broader context. First and 
foremost, the preamble of the WTO Agreement explicitly recognizes the importance of 
environmental protection and preservation. In the very beginning, the preamble states: 
         “The Parties to this Agreement, 
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Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development…” 
The WTO Agreement provides the constitutional foundations for the WTO. Its preamble 
certainly informs the entire body of the WTO agreements. It should also be noted that while the 
GATT preamble only cares about “developing the full use of resources of the world”, the 
addition of environmental objectives in the WTO preamble indicates the beginning of a reform 
of the world trading system regarding environmental issues. The explicit mentioning of 
environmental protection and sustainable development in the preamble can be used as a context 
to further expansively interpret relevant subparagraphs of the exception clause and the WTO 
judiciary did rely on it to deliver environmental friendly opinions in cases such as US – 
Shrimp.531  
The Ministerial Declaration on Trade and Environment (1994) is legally non-binding, but 
it is an important political pledge of WTO Members to take the relationship between trade and 
environment seriously. It particularly states that “there should not be, nor need be, and policy 
contradiction” between the trade regime and the protection of environment. This demonstrates 
the political commitment of the WTO Members to respect environmental policy objectives. The 
final results of the Uruguay Round also includes the Decision on Trade in Services and the 
Environment (1994) and the Decision on Trade and Environment. These two Decisions contain 
more elaborative treatment of the relationship between trade and environment. Although they 
emphasize on guarding against trade restriction, their respect to environmental policy objectives 
is also obvious. Environmental issues have continued to be an important agenda for the WTO, 
                                               
531  John H. Jackson, ‘Justice Feliciano and the WTO Environmental Cases: Laying the Foundations of a 
“Constitutional Jurisprudence” with Implications for Developing Countries’, in Steve Charnovitz, Debra P. Steger 
and Peter van den Bossche (eds), Law in the Service of Human Dignity. Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 40. 
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particularly before and around the time when the Doha Round was launched. The WTO has kept 
reiterating the importance of the relationship between trade and environment in various formats. 
Particularly, the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was also established along with 
the WTO. Its mandate is to “identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental 
measures” and to “make recommendations on whether modifications of existing rules of WTO 
law are required.”532 The work conducted by the CTE has not helped to produce anything that is 
legally binding, but it has certainly kept the discussion of environmental issues going in the 
world trading system. 
After the establishment of the WTO, legal instruments with operative clauses under the 
umbrella of the world trading system began to directly address the relationship between trade and 
environment. Charnovitz made a catalog, which includes the Agreement on Agriculture, the SPS 
Agreement, the TBT Agreement, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures (the particular clause 
involved has lapsed though).533 
The WTO judiciary certainly feels the trend. Although it has not officially turned GATT 
Article XX (b) and (g) or GATS Article XIV (b) into a broad environmental exception, its 
rulings have obviously turned in favor of environmental policy objectives. The most well-known 
example is the “evolutionary” interpretation the AB employed in US – Shrimp. In US – Shrimp, 
the AB interpreted “exhaustible natural resources” in GATT Article XX (g) in accordance with 
the current multilateral environmental agreements and expanded the scope of “exhaustible 
natural resources” from minerals to endangered living species.534 Another illustrative example is 
that the AB tends to grant greater discretion to WTO Members under GATT Article XX (b) 
when they determine the level of protection afforded to human health and life. For example, in 
EC – Asbestos, the AB said that “it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine 
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.”535 Compared 
with the AB’s attitude towards Korea’s anti-fraud measure under GATT Article XX (d), the total 
                                               
532 The Decision on Trade and Environment. 
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534 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), 
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deference to WTO Members under GATT Article XX (b) regarding the ALOP also indicates the 
WTO judiciary treats environmental policy objectives more respectfully.  
Nevertheless, the WTO judiciary has not categorically recognize the acceptability of 
environmental policy objectives. The environmentally friendly rulings by the WTO judiciary are 
not about the acceptability of general environmental policy objectives. However, when the WTO 
judiciary is presented with the opportunity to explicitly recognize certain environmental policy 
objectives that are not typical ones covered by GATT Article XX (b) and (g) or GATS Article 
XIV (b), there is no reason that it could not continue to follow the trend.  
 
4.4.1.2 Protection of culture 
The protection of culture was also generally supported by the majority of WTO Members 
except the United States and a few other countries,536 although they may not be able to agree on 
a definition of culture.  It seems the issue of the protection of culture was a struggle primarily 
fought by Europe against the US entertainment industry in the beginning.537 Proud of its once 
cultural glory, Europe has been especially vigilant of the invasion of American popular culture. 
Later, many countries have joined European countries, trying to preserve their cultures in a wider 
scope.538  
Before the GATT Agreement was first negotiated more than 70 years ago, Hollywood 
movies were already such a big concern for European countries that they set restrictions. Given 
the particular restrictions on movies, the world trading system was originally only concerned 
about “screen quota”, which was written into GATT Article IV. Although the term “culture 
industry” had been coined already,539 the rules concerning movies were not written under the 
name of culture.  
The conflict over movie trade between the United States and European countries lingered 
on. During the Uruguay Round, the conflict extended beyond movies. The relevant discussions 
                                               
536 Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010, p. 219. 
537  Mary E. Footer & Christoph Beat Graber, ‘Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy’, 3 (1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 115-144 (2000), p. 119. 
538 For one authoritative definition of culture or delineation of the scope of culture in the economic development 
context, which is more relevant for trade law, see the report of the UN World Commission on Culture and 
Development entitled Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, 
UNESCO, Paris, 1995. 
539  Mary E. Footer & Christoph Beat Graber, ‘Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy’, 3 (1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 115-144 (2000), p. 117. 
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began to use the culture languages and culture became the synonym of audiovisual products.540 
In the Uruguay Round, Canada and the European Communities proposed to add a separate 
cultural justification in the exception clause under GATS Article XIV.541 However, the United 
States obviously had the upper hand in the Uruguay Round and the cultural exception was not 
included in the GATS general exception clause. 
Besides GATT Article IV that is only about screen quota, the GATT general exception 
clause does contain a justification that looks relevant to measures based on cultural policies. 
GATT Article XX (f) can justify measures that are “imposed for the protection of national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value”. There is no definition of national treasures 
of artistic, historic or archaeological value in WTO law. Goods of artistic value may include a 
large variety of art products, including most typical art works such as pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works and products of modern entertainment industry. 542  Domestic regulatory 
measures concerning these art works may fall under GATT Article XX (f).   
However, it has been argued that GATT Article XX (f) could not cover contemporary 
cultural products, particularly those produced by the entertainment industry.543 This argument 
implies that this subparagraph is of little practical use in today’s international trade. It is true that 
not all art works can become national treasures. Instead, only a small fraction can probably 
qualify as national treasures. Moreover, even if GATT Article XX (f) can cover more measures 
having cultural policy objectives, some more effective measures WTO Members prefer are 
measures affecting trade in services.544 When measures are governed by the GATS Agreement, it 
is not possible to invoke GATT Article XX (f) and the GATS Agreement does not provide an 
equivalent to GATT Article XX (f) in its general exception clause. The fact that not many 
Members made specific commitments or substantial commitments in services sectors related to 
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culture seems to make a cultural exception under the GATS Agreement unnecessary, but things 
may change in the future when negotiations concerning services make progress. It is true that 
WTO Members are allowed to keep exemptions to MFN obligations under the GATS 
Agreement. However, the exemptions annexed to the GATS Agreement are only temporary.  
  As intellectual property rights (IPRs) are pertinent to “cultural” products and services, 
including entertainment products and services,545 the TRIPS Agreement may be relevant to 
measures based on cultural policies. Interestingly, under the TRIPS Agreement, it can be argued 
that both rules rigorously protecting intellectual property rights and the rules allowing 
flexibilities are relevant to the attainment of certain cultural policy objectives. For example, we 
can argue that the rules protecting copyrights are important for the creation of original works of 
literature and arts, which is essential to cultural prosperity. We can also argue that restrictions on 
copyrights are important for people to take advantage of copyrighted works in a lot of situations 
such as where general education and follow-on creation are conducted, which is also essential to 
cultural prosperity. Therefore, the relationship between trade in products and services with IPRs 
protection is complicated.   
 Overall, compared with environmental protection, the protection of culture does not have 
the endorsement of the United States. When the interests of the United States conflict with those 
of other WTO Members, it would be difficult for the WTO judiciary to decide.  
 
4.4.1.3 Protection of labor standards 
The protection of labor standards under the WTO is certainly more controversial. The 
issue of PPMs546 is more pronounced regarding labor protection through measures affecting 
trade. Along with the protection of human rights, measures protecting labor standards are more 
like trade sanctions targeting practices in foreign territories instead of domestic regulatory 
measures aiming to directly protect domestic interests. More importantly, different countries 
have different ideas about appropriate labor standards. Particularly, developing countries 
disagree greatly with developed countries regarding labor standards, especially conditions of 
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work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health, and 
many more issues. 
Apparently, developed and developing countries could not agree on labor issues in the 
WTO. The only labor justification for violating substantive trade disciplines is provided by 
GATT Article XX (e) which is only concerned with measures affecting “products of prison 
labor”. It can be argued that measures based on labor policy objectives can invoke GATT Article 
XX (a) or (b) for protecting public morals or human health.547 However, if the WTO judiciary 
expands GATT Article XX (a) or (b) to cover measures having labor policy objectives, it would 
draw strong opposition from developing countries. 
 As a matter of fact, developed countries and developing countries are so divided 
regarding the labor issues that they could not even agree on whether to talk about labor issues in 
the WTO. At the very first Ministerial Conference preparing for the launch of the first round of 
trade negotiation under the WTO, developed countries tried to put labor issues on the WTO’s 
agenda but failed due to the strong opposition from developing countries.548  
Workers, especially unionized workers, and civil societies in developed countries have 
kept pressuring their governments for stronger international labor protection. The trade 
implications of labor standards has been the major argument developed countries rely upon to 
bring labor issues into the WTO. It is not hard to understand that labor standards are linked with 
costs of production. Higher labor standards may result in a cost disadvantage in international 
competition and job losses. It is not conceivable to have a universal labor law, but developed 
countries still want to target PPMs in developing countries to narrow the gap of labor standards 
between developed and developing countries so that the governments of developed countries can 
please their relevant domestic constituents who suffer from international competition. 
Undoubtedly, this motive of developed countries grew stronger and stronger as some developing 
countries such as China became more and more successful in international trade. 
  There is another major reason for developed countries to insist on dealing with labor 
issues under the WTO. Labor issues have been taken care of under its proper international 
institution – the International Labor Organization. But, the international labor law, as most areas 
of international law, is not enforceable on its own, either because they lack operative rules or 
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because there is no effective enforcement mechanism. Different from the slow development of 
international labor law, the development of the international trade law built up momentum in the 
1990s with the establishment of the WTO as its apex. The WTO is not only the highest 
achievement in international trade law, but also a remarkable phenomenon in general 
international law. As an international organization of more than 160 parties, it has very 
comprehensive and detailed rules, which are backed up by a compulsory and effective dispute 
settlement mechanism. It was the dispute settlement mechanism--the “crown jewel” of the world 
trading system--that attracted the labor issues to the WTO. If incorporated into the WTO, labor 
standards would become enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which 
would be appealing to labor rights advocates. Moreover, the WTO covers substantial sectors of 
international trade, enabling every Member to find something interesting in the overall package it 
offers. Developed countries therefore can use concessions in certain areas of trade, which are of 
interest to developing countries, to lure developing countries to raise their labor standards.     
  Developing countries therefore strongly oppose introducing labor issues into the WTO 
for fear that the WTO would be used to enforce labor standards. The developed countries kept 
trying to bring labor standards into the WTO, but at Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, the 
first round trade negotiation was officially launched without taking labor issues onboard.549 
Against such a background, it is clear that the WTO judiciary will be caught up in a very difficult 
situation if the labor issues are brought up under the WTO.  
 
4.4.1.4 Protection of Human Rights 
Human rights can be quite broadly defined. Labor rights can also be counted as human 
rights.550 Some of the discussions regarding the protection of labor standards are useful here 
where they are applicable. Particularly the discussions regarding making use of certain 
subparagraphs of the exception clauses of the GATT Agreement and the GATS Agreement are 
useful for the protection and promotion of human rights. In fact, if a broad view of human rights 
is taken, people are free to characterize the general exception clause of the GATT Agreement or 
the GATS Agreement as the human rights exception clause, claiming that it provides protection 
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 165 
to “the right to life, the right to a clean environment, the right to food and to health, the right to 
self-determination over the use of natural resources, the right to development and freedom from 
slavery…”551 Therefore, we can certainly find supports for human rights sanctions under the 
WTO. 
However, the protection of human rights is more controversial than the protection of 
labor standards. Besides being mostly “externally focused” and targeting PPMs, which is also 
true with labor standards, trade measures protecting human rights are also “non-trade-related”.552 
PPMs have already created great controversies under the WTO because measures targeting 
PPMs usually exert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the protection of labor standards 
targeting PPMs is usually implemented through restricting trade in products that have labor 
implications.553 That is to say, products affected by measures aiming at labor protection are 
usually produced with PPMs violating labor standards. However, this is not true with human 
rights sanctions. 
Human rights sanctions may target products or services that do not give rise to human 
rights concerns. Cleveland divided human rights sanctions into three groups according to the 
connection between targeted products and human rights violation. If the connection is direct and 
targeted products originated from activities violating human rights, the trade sanctions are called 
“tailored sanctions”; if the connection is indirect and targeted products may have an arguably 
logical relationship with human rights violation, the trade sanctions are called “semi-tailored 
sanctions”; if there is no connection between targeted products and human rights violation, the 
trade sanctions are called “general sanctions.”554 Among the three types, general sanctions are 
many.555 Dealing with human rights issues that do not have trade implications under the WTO 
would raise serious institutional questions such as the appropriate subject matters a trade regime 
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should cover, particularly when human sanctions are unilateral. A trade regime may only tolerate 
human rights sanctions to the extent where they are tailored, just like the treatment of measures 
that protect or promote labor standards.556 
Human rights sanction issues are further complicated by fundamental difference between 
developed countries and developing countries regarding the priority of different types of human 
rights or the appropriate ways to enforce different types of human rights. For developed 
democratic countries, civil and political rights are “fundamental, universal, individual, absolute 
and negative…and enforceable”, while social, economic, and cultural rights are more likely to be 
positive, requiring the state to provide services, collective, conditional, indeterminate, 
programmatic, and not suitable for enforcement.557 Civil and political rights are originated in 
natural law concepts and more compatible with orthodox ideas of democracy while social, 
economic, and cultural rights are newer generation of human rights and have a socialist 
heritage.558 As the developed countries have the capability to impose economic sanctions, human 
rights sanctions are most likely taken to protect or promote civil and political rights in 
developing and non-democratic countries. Such human rights sanctions would certainly be seen 
as support to political opposition in the targeted countries and as interference with their domestic 
affairs and direct threats to the ruling elites. It is therefore difficult to imagine the WTO, either 
its political body or its judiciary branch, would get themselves involved in efforts enforcing civil 
and political rights in foreign countries.  
Fortunately, since the downfall of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the 
communist bloc, developed democracies have been willing to take the “engagement” approach to 
bring about favorable changes in some of the totalitarian countries. They hope that through 
integrating some totalitarian countries into the world economy, the peoples in these countries 
would be able to demand more human rights after their economic conditions improve. However, 
things may turn out differently and “where repression and neo-liberal policies were combined”, 
“injustice and instability” may have been intensified.559 It can be imagined that when the 
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“engagement” approach is forsaken by major democratic powers, particularly the United States, 
human rights sanctions will become a serious challenge to the WTO.   
 
4.4.2 Miscellaneous policy rationales 
In some recent cases, certain miscellaneous policy rationales have been proposed by 
WTO Members as justification for discrimination caused by internal inconsistencies of their 
measures. it can be argued that some of these rationales are related to the policy objectives on the 
list as provided by the subparagraphs of the exception clause or the high-profile policies we have 
just discussed, but Members invoking them in dispute settlement did not try to argue that way. 
They simply table these policy rationales without wrapping them up. 
In US – Clove Cigarettes, the purported policy objective of the US measure was to 
discourage youth smoking by banning flavoured cigarettes. However, menthol cigarettes that are 
primarily produced by American producers were exempted from the ban,560 which created an 
internal inconsistency within the US measure and hence discrimination against foreign flavoured 
cigarettes, particularly clove cigarettes. The United States argued that the internal inconsistency 
could be explained. The policy rationales it offered to explain the internal inconsistency were to 
avoid “the potential impact on the health care system” and to avoid “the potential development 
of a black market and smuggling of menthol cigarettes.”561 The panel agreed that these rationales 
were legitimate in principle.562 On appeal, the AB did not reject the two rationales as illegitimate 
either.563 Nevertheless, the AB did finally dismiss these two rationales, but on the ground the two 
rationales were only excuses given the specific facts of the case.564  
In EC – Seal Products, the European Union banned seal products on its market, but the 
EU seal measure had internal inconsistencies. The internal inconsistencies were caused by three 
exemptions, which were the Inuit or indigenous communities (IC) exemption based on the 
rationale of protecting the “subsistence of Inuit and indigenous communities”, the marine 
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resource management (MRM) exemption based on the rationale of “controlling nuisance seals 
and seal culling”, and the travelers exemption based on the rationale of facilitating day-to-day 
life of international travelers.565 The parties did not question the legitimacy of these rationales. 
Therefore, the panel and the AB did not say anything about their acceptability. 
Under the chapeau where their acceptability is important, the travelers exemption and the 
MRM exemption were not really at issue. Only the IC exemption was examined to determine 
whether it can explain the discrimination between seal products derived from IC hunting and 
these derived from commercial hunting. The examination is only necessary when the IC rationale 
is legitimate under the chapeau. Therefore, the examination of the IC exemption implied that its 
legitimacy was already recognized. 
From the two cases, we can see that the policy rationales may be acceptable under the 
chapeau of the exception clause are diverse. Given that they are not the purported policy 
objectives of the disputed measures but some other policy rationales that may conflict with the 
purported policy objectives, cases like the two may reveal a trend of today’s domestic regulatory 
measures, which is that domestic regulatory measures are becoming more complex and flexible. 
The hypothetical case described at the end of Chapter 3 presents an even more complex scenario. 
When trying to achieve their principal policy objective, domestic regulations try to take care of 
various values and interests that are negatively impacted. Measures of this kind reflects that 
when domestic authorities try to take actions to address domestic non-economic issues, they try 
to devise and implement more tailored instruments. More surgical measures are an improvement 
over measures with a sweeping impact irrespective of values or interests that are different from 
those that the principal policy objective of the measures try to protect. It is able to avoid 
sacrificing some other values and interests while trying to shield certain values or interests from 
the fierce international economic competition.  
It has to be admitted that some of the miscellaneous policy rationales discussed in 
previous cases can be framed as some of the policy objectives listed in the subparagraphs of the 
exception clause, particularly when an expansive approach is taken towards the interpretation of 
the subparagraphs. The rationales offered by the United States in US – Clove Cigarettes to justify 
the internal inconsistencies of its measure can be seen as policy objectives recognized in GATT 
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Article XX (b) and (d). More specifically, to avoid negative impact on the health care system can 
be seen as necessary to protect human life and health, and to prevent the emergence of a black 
market and smuggling of menthol cigarettes can be seen as necessary to enforce relevant US 
laws and regulations. Similar arguments can be made regarding policy rationales proposed to 
justify the exemptions in the EU seal scheme in EC – Seal Products. Indeed, it is not easy to 
come up with policy rationales that are clearly not related with those listed in the subparagraphs 
of the exception clause. The hypothetical case in Chapter 3 is not at all typical.   
Nevertheless, the respondents in these two real cases did not argue that way. Also, it 
would be difficult to different extents for them to dress up some rationales as those provided in 
the subparagraphs of the exception clause. For example, the argument that protecting the health 
care system has a health objective may not be accepted by the WTO judiciary because previous 
cases were all involved with a specific and direct health risk while flooding the emergency room 
by smokers is, in a sense, a remote and indirect threat to human health. For another example, it 
might be tempting to argue that the IC subsistence rationale in EC – Seal Products involves 
moral issues, but it would be difficult to actually establish that people in European Union 
member countries know about Inuit people and their way of living.    
If domestic regulatory measures are going to keep becoming more complex and flexible, 
they would be able to accommodate values and interests as refined as possible. Again, the 
hypothetical case in Chapter 3 is an example. These refined values or interests tended to be 
neglected by crude measures in the past, but with more complex and flexible measures, they 
would be taken care of. I would not say that these values or interests are less important from any 
perspective, but I would say they would be quite different from high-profiled values and interests 
that seem to have established normative importance. From US – Clove Cigarettes and EC – Seal 
Products, I can see that these values and interests are more specific and more related to practical 
considerations of details. 
  The acceptability of both the miscellaneous policy rationales and some high-profile 
policy objectives would eventually depend on where the boundaries are drawn. If EC – Seal 
Products is followed to allow domestic regulatory measures to be justified with policy rationales 
that are not the purported policy objectives or policy objectives on the list as prescribed in the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause, the scope of acceptable policy rationales would have to 
be greatly expanded one way or another. Technically, the expansion is needed under the chapeau 
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of the exception clause. It seems clear that there is no clue in the chapeau to delineate the 
boundaries of the expanded scope. Nevertheless, both a general standard and expansive 
interpretation drawing on treaty texts and jurisprudence under sister clauses in and outside the 










CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS FOR RELEVANT WTO CLAUSES   
 
The reconstruction of the chapeau of the exception clause would greatly expand domestic 
regulatory autonomy, but it may need coordination with other relevant clauses in and outside the 
WTO Agreements containing the exception clause. The most relevant clauses are the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause and the non-discrimination clauses, particularly the 
subparagraphs of GATT Article XX and GATT Article III:4. Two other WTO Agreements, the 
TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement, also contain clauses, including TBT Article 2 and SPS 
Articles 2 and 5, serving basically the same purpose of GATT Articles III and XX combined, 
which is to maintain a balance between trade liberalization and domestic regulatory autonomy. 
The TBT Agreement and SPS Agreement overlap with GATT Articles III and XX, but  only 
focus on technical regulations and standards and measures taken for sanitary or phytosanitary 
purposes, which are two specific groups of domestic regulatory measures. 566  The new 
interpretation of the chapeau of the exception clause would certainly create repercussions in 
these Agreements as well. 
 
5.1 Subparagraphs of the Exception Clause 
 
Basically, in order for the reconstructed chapeau of the exception clause to work as 
intended, the subparagraph jurisprudence should avoid determining whether discrimination can 
be justified. The reason is simple. If discrimination is to be justified under the subparagraphs, 
only policy objectives on the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs can be invoked. The trick is 
to stick to the broad definition of a “measure”, which will be discussed first. However, GATT 
Article (g) contains an explicit “even-handedness” requirement. Specific attention should be paid 
to it in order to harmonize the relationship between the new chapeau interpretation and the 
subparagraphs, which will be discussed next. In some of the major subparagraphs, the key test 
for justifying disputed measures is the “necessity” test. It is argued that the greatest constraint on 
domestic regulatory autonomy is the “less restrictive” alternatives test as part of the necessity 
                                               
566 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International economic relations: 
Cases, Materials and Text (4th ed.). St Paul, Minn: West Group , 2002, pp. 575, 579. 
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test.567 Whether an alternative is “reasonably available” is an important factor of consideration in 
the less restrictive alternatives test, which resembles the rationale of administrative difficulties 
considered under the chapeau in US – Gasoline.568 A discussion of it is necessary to see whether 
analysis of reasonable availability and the analysis of administrative difficulties can be 
differentiated. Last, a general review of the necessity test will be conducted. It is possible to 
introduce the necessity test into the chapeau to assess whether discrimination can be explained 
by either the purported policy objectives, or most importantly, by other rationales. The 
subparagraphs are the right place for a look at a full-fledged necessity test, which can definitely 
shed light on the assessment under the chapeau. The following discussion is primarily based on 
the GATT jurisprudence and relevant comments, but it largely applies to the GATS exception 
clause, because GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV have almost identical function, 
structure, and wording.569  
 
5.1.1 The scope of the measure 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, the AB in US – Gasoline departed from the GATT 
jurisprudence that required the subparagraphs to examine the discrimination caused by the 
disputed measure. In US – Gasoline, the AB held that it was the entire measure (the baseline 
establishment rules) that needed to be examined to see whether it contributed to its purported 
policy objective instead of part of the measure (the refusal to provide individualized baselines to 
foreign refiners) that caused discrimination.570 The premise is that when the entire measure is 
examined, only the main scheme should be focused upon while “trivial detours” should be 
ignored. The AB had followed US – Gasoline regarding the scope of “measure” in later cases. 
But in Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the AB stated that “when less favourable treatment is 
found based on differences in the regulation of imports and of like domestic products, the 
analysis of an Article XX (d) defense should focus on whether those regulatory differences are 
                                               
567 Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’, 14 (3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 639-675 (2011), p. 665. 
568 Jeffrey Waincymer, ‘Reformulated Gasoline under Reformulated WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling 
Pandora out of a Chapeau?’, 18 (1) Michigan Journal of International Law 141-181 (1996), p.175. 
569 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2005, para. 291. 
570 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 19. 
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‘necessary’ to secure compliance with ‘laws and regulations’ that are not GATT-inconsistent.”571 
It seems that the AB reinstated the US – Section 337 precedent that examined, under the 
subparagraphs, part of the disputed measure that was the roots of discrimination. However, later 
in EC – Seal Products, the AB said the inconsistencies with GATT non-discrimination 
obligations were caused by “the combined operation” of both “the ‘ban’ that restrict market 
access” and “the IC exception” and the other exceptions.572 Therefore, the entire measure instead 
of the exceptions that were the cause of discrimination was examined and found necessary for 
the purported policy objective of the disputed measure. It seems that US – Gasoline was 
reinstated.  
In US – Gasoline, it is clear that the broad definition of the “measure” helped the US 
measure pass the examination under the subparagraph. The broad definition of the “measure” is 
particularly important to measures containing internal inconsistencies. In disputes involving 
measures containing internal inconsistencies, measures in their entirety were easily found to 
contribute to their purported policy objectives while it is much more difficult to establish a 
positive connection between the internal inconsistencies within disputed measures and their 
purported policy objectives.  
More importantly, the broad definition of the “measure” made it almost impossible for 
the subparagraph to examine discrimination. When the entire measure is examined in a dispute, 
what usually happens is that only the principal body of the measure is focused upon while 
internal inconsistencies and exemptions are neglected. For discriminatory measures, the 
subparagraphs simply becomes an easy portal for them to access the exception clause if the 
WTO judiciary keeps defining broadly the scope of the challenged “measure.” This actually 
works perfectly together with the chapeau as it was said that the primary function of the chapeau 
is to guard against discrimination.573 The subparagraphs are used to assess the disputed measure 
with respect to its trade restrictiveness while the discriminatory aspects of the disputed measure 
can be left for the chapeau to examine. This works even more perfectly together with the 
reconstructed chapeau as elaborated in Chapter 3. To be more specific, without the broad 
                                               
571 WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines 
(Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines)), WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, para. 177.  
572 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, paras. 5.188-
5.189. 
573 Arwel Davies, ‘Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the ‘New’ Approach in Brazil – Tyres’, 
43 (3) Journal of World Trade 507-539 (2009), p. 508 
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definition of the scope of the “measure”, the reconstructed chapeau may not have the chance to 
justify disputed measures with internal inconsistencies. As discrimination caused by the internal 
inconsistencies of disputed measures can only be explained by policy rationales behind the 
internal inconsistencies and these policy rationales are different from the purported policy 
objectives and usually not on the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs, measures with internal 
inconsistencies would inevitably fail the subparagraphs if discrimination is examined under the 
subparagraphs. Only when the subparagraphs refuse to examine the discriminatory aspects of a 
disputed measure, particularly the discrimination caused by its internal inconsistencies, the 
chapeau has an opportunity to assess whether policy rationales other than the purported policy 
objective of the disputed measure can justify discrimination caused by its internal 
inconsistencies. 
 
5.1.2 The “even-handedness” requirement in GATT Art XX (g) 
While most subparagraphs of the exception clause can avoid examining discrimination, 
GATT Article XX (g) is an exception. GATT Art XX (g) contains an “even-handedness” 
requirement that domestic regulating authorities shall “make effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption” when the measure at dispute is “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”574 The “even-handedness” requirement is 
basically a national treatment (NT) requirement regarding measures concerning natural 
resources. It may overlap with the NT obligation in GATT Article III if the disputed measure is 
imposed on like products produced by both domestic and foreign producers. It can also be 
independent if the disputed measure is a border measure or is not imposed on like products 
produced by both domestic and foreign producers. No matter whether it overlaps with the NT 
obligation under GATT Article III or not, a violation of the NT requirement in GATT Art XX (g) 
is not justifiable. If there is violation, the disputed measure will not be provisionally justified 
with the conservation objective. The regulating Member will not get a second chance to defend 
its measure with other policy rationales under the chapeau. Therefore, measures invoking GATT 
Art XX (g) have a more limited room for exemptions or flexibilities.  
                                               
574 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, p. 21. 
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However, the NT requirement under GATT Art XX (g) is not difficult to meet. At least it 
is less demanding than that under GATT Article III. It is probably only concerned with the most 
gross discrimination. Lesser discrimination, no matter whether falling into GATT Article III or 
under the chapeau, could be outside the reach of GATT Art XX (g), and therefore could have an 
opportunity to be justifiable under the chapeau. US – Gasoline is a perfect example. In US – 
Gasoline, the US measure imposed baseline rules for pollutants contained in gasoline products in 
order to “control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline.”575 However, 
while domestic refiners were allowed to reduce pollutants according to individualized baselines, 
imported gasoline was subject to a uniform statutory baseline.576 However, the discrimination 
thus created was not inconsistent with NT requirement under GATT Art XX (g) since 
“restrictions on the consumption or depletion of clean air by regulating the domestic production 
of ‘dirty’ gasoline are established jointly with corresponding restrictions with respect to imported 
gasoline.”577 The AB in US – Gasoline further stated explicitly that “[t]here is, of course, no 
textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and imported products.”578 Although 
there was discrimination, it was not inconsistent with the NT requirement under GATT Art XX 
(g). Therefore, the discrimination against foreign gasoline survived the NT requirement under 
GATT Art XX (g). Then, with the help of the broad definition of the “measure,” the 
discriminatory aspects of the measure were not focused on when examining its contribution to its 
conservation policy objective. Thus, the discrimination was finally examined under the chapeau. 
In US – Gasoline, the AB held that “if no restrictions on domestically-produced like 
products are imposed at all, and all limitations are placed upon imported products alone 
(emphasis original)” the disputed measure was inconsistent with the NT requirement under 
GATT Art XX (g).579  The impression is that the disputed measure would meet the NT 
requirement under GATT Art XX (g) as long as some measures are imposed on domestic 
production or consumption. Only the grossest discrimination, that is that restrictive measures are 
                                               
575 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, p. 1. 
576 WTO Panel Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), 
WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, para. 2.9, 2.11. 
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imposed only on foreign products, producers, or consumption, would fail the NT requirement 
under GATT Art XX (g).  
In the pre-WTO era, the NT requirement under GATT Art XX (g) had been interpreted 
more strictly. In the 1982 US – Canadian Tuna case, the panel found the United States only 
imposed restrictions on the domestic catches of selected species of tuna while imposing 
restrictions on all tuna and tuna products imported from Canada.580 It then concluded that the NT 
requirement under GATT Art XX (g) was not satisfied.581 Apparently, it is not only non-
restriction on domestic production or consumption but also restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption not meeting certain criteria that will fail the NT requirement under GATT Art 
XX (g). In the 1988 Canada – Herring and Salmon case, the panel set up a general standard that 
“[a] trade measure could…only be considered to be made effective ‘in conjunction with’ 
production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions.”582 This 
case seemed to have imposed an “aim” test, which could be a more complicated NT requirement. 
Since the very early WTO era, the WTO judiciary stopped complicating the NT 
requirement under GATT Art XX (g) any further. In US – Gasoline, as just discussed, only the 
minimum requirement was established.583 In US – Shrimp, the AB found that the restrictions 
imposed on imported shrimp or shrimp fishing vessels were also even-handedly imposed on 
domestic shrimp or shrimp fishing vessels.584 As mentioned in Chapter 2, US – Shrimp is a case 
where the same measure was imposed on like products originated from countries where different 
conditions prevail. However, the parties and the WTO judiciary did not try to make the NT 
requirement under GATT Art XX (g) complicated in that direction.  
Things got a little more complicated once again later. In China – Raw Materials, the AB 
seemed to have paid attention to the phrase “made effective”, suggesting restrictions on domestic 
production and consumption should not be merely nominal but rather had to be “brought into 
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operation, adopted, or applied.”585 The AB in China – Rare Earth further elaborated that the 
restrictions imposed on domestic production or consumption must be “operative”, “in force”, or 
have “come into effect.”586 The restrictions must be “real” instead of “a possible limitation at 
some undefined point in the future.”587 
Overall, although with some complications, the NT requirement under GATT Art XX (g) 
is not very demanding. It is possible to make it more complicated by paying more attention to 
requiring measures imposed on domestic production or consumption to aim at natural resources 
conservation. In that case, a connection between measures imposed on domestic production or 
consumption on the one hand and the purported policy objective of the disputed measure on the 
other hand needs to be established, which would a be higher standard for conservation 
regulations to meet. However, for the reconstructed chapeau to work as intended, it is better to 
keep the threshold of the NT requirement under GATT Art XX (g) as low as possible.  
 
5.1.3 Distinctions between “reasonable availability” in the less restrictive test and administrative 
difficulties under the chapeau 
In Chapter 2, when I try to demonstrate that the rationales able to justify discrimination 
under the chapeau of the exception clause are not limited to those listed in the subparagraphs of 
the exception clause, I discuss US – Gasoline where administrative rationales were offered as 
explanation of discrimination by the respondent and examined by the WTO judiciary. However, 
while US – Gasoline supports EC – Seal Products and helps to overturn Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres regarding the analysis of “arbitrariness and unjustifiability” under the chapeau of the 
exception clause, administrative rationales are not substantive policy rationales. They are more 
concerned with whether the same or similar treatment is reasonably available for imports given 
the resource constraints on the regulatory bodies in a specific situation. 
Waincymer commented that the analysis under the chapeau of the exception clause 
conducted by AB in US – Gasoline smuggled the necessity test into the chapeau.588  To 
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Waincymer, the analysis under the chapeau in the AB’s report was not about substantive policy 
rationales as explanation for discrimination, but the analysis of necessity under the 
subparagraphs. To be more specific, what he meant is that the analysis of the US omission of 
plausible alternatives under GATT Article XX chapeau resembled that in the “less restrictive” 
test as part of the “necessity” test under some subparagraphs of Article XX.589  
According to Sykes, there are two “less restrictive” tests (Sykes called them the “least 
restrictive” tests) in the “necessity” test. One is that domestic regulating authorities should ensure 
their measure is “not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of … 
protection” or enforcement. This “less restrictive” test focuses on the connection between the 
disputed measure and its purported policy objective, particularly whether the means just match 
the appropriate level of protection aimed at by the purported policy objective. The other is that a 
disputed measure “could be considered to be necessary only if there were no alternative measure 
consistent with GATT, or less inconsistent with it,” while able to achieve the purported policy 
objective at the same level.590  This “less restrictive” test focuses on the existence of an 
alternative. The analysis discussed by Waincymer is more like the second “less restrictive” test 
under the subparagraphs. 
On the one hand, in the second “less restrictive” test under the subparagraphs, whether 
the alternative is “reasonably available” is an important factor of consideration. When 
considering whether an alternative is “reasonably available”, “administrative difficulties” and 
“the difficulty of implementation” are important factors. The AB in earlier cases might have 
reservations about acknowledging that administrative difficulties would render an alternative to 
the disputed measure not “reasonably available.”591 In early cases, the AB only explicitly 
admitted that alternatives shown to be impossible to implement were not “reasonably 
available.”592 However, things began to change later. In EC – Asbestos, the AB for the first time 
acknowledged that “the difficulty of implementation” was a factor of consideration when 
determining an alternative to the disputed measure was “reasonably available.”593 Since then, it 
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has become easier for regulating Members to argue that there is no alternative “reasonably 
available” if they can base their arguments on the administrative difficulties of adopting the 
proposed alternative. 
On the other hand, a similar if not identical examination was established under the 
chapeau. In US – Gasoline, the respondent argued that the alternatives, which would eliminate 
the discrimination in the US measure, were not available because the “impracticability” of taking 
the alternatives.594 As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the AB finally rejected this argument, but 
on factual bases. The AB did not reject the rationale of “administrative difficulties” as 
explanations to the unavailability of alternatives and hence as justification of discrimination 
under the chapeau in principle. It looks like the rationale of “administrative difficulties” should 
be able to rebut the availability of alternatives under the chapeau. 
The consideration of “administrative difficulties” has been explicitly included in the 
determination of whether the alternative is “reasonably available” under the subparagraph while 
it is also able to provide justification for discrimination under the chapeau. Therefore, it looks 
like that one of the two exercises is redundant. To get rid of the redundancy, one way is to 
exclude the rationale of  “administrative difficulties” from explanations for discrimination under 
the chapeau. I would argue it is indeed the way that the WTO judiciary would probably take in 
order not to disturb existing case law concerning the reasonably availability analysis under the 
subparagraphs, but the reasons behind this decision are a little more complicated. 
The benefit of excluding the examination of “administrative difficulties” under the 
chapeau and retaining it under the subparagraphs is the “reasonably available” jurisprudence is 
left undisturbed. However, as discussed in a few places earlier, it is preferable for the 
subparagraphs not to examine the discriminatory aspects of a disputed measure. Therefore, it is 
desirable for the “less restrictive” test including the “reasonably available” analysis of the 
proposed alternative should also refuse to examine the discriminatory aspects of the disputed 
measure. That is, to be consistent with the subparagraph jurisprudence in a broader sense, the 
“reasonably available” analysis cannot examine an alternative targeting the discriminatory 
defects of the disputed measure. It can only assess whether an alternative that is less trade 
restrictive instead of being less discriminatory is reasonably available. Therefore, whether an 
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alternative that is less discriminatory is reasonably available is still left for the chapeau to 
examine.   
Thus, in theory, the redundancy issue is eliminated with the relevant analysis under both 
the subparagraphs and the chapeau jointly taking up the task of examining whether alternatives 
are reasonably available, but the analysis under the subparagraphs concentrates on alternatives 
that are less trade restrictive while the analysis under the chapeau concentrates on alternatives 
that are less discriminatory. 
But in reality, the analysis whether an alternative is “reasonably available” cannot really 
distinguish an alternative that is less discriminatory from one that is less trade restrictive. That is 
to say, even if the WTO judiciary tries to avoid examining the discriminatory aspects of the 
disputed measure under the subparagraphs when the disputed measure creates discrimination, it 
is inevitable for the complainant to propose an alternative that is less discriminatory. The WTO 
judiciary has been successful in avoiding considering the discriminatory aspects of the disputed 
measure when it directly examines the connection between the disputed measure and its 
purported policy objective. However, it has not insisted on refusing to consider whether there is 
an alternative which is less discriminatory. Indeed, for a discriminatory measure, even if the 
WTO judiciary wants to focus only on its trade restrictiveness in the analysis of alternatives, it is 
also impossible. A less trade restrictive alternative to a discriminatory measure often proposes to 
lower the trade restrictiveness of the disputed measure imposed on imports while it does not 
change what is imposed on domestic products. Such a less trade restrictive alternative is certainly 
a less discriminatory alternative as well. An examination of this kind of “hybrid” alternatives 
cannot make a distinction between their less trade restrictive aspects and their less discriminatory 
aspects. Therefore, the WTO judiciary would eventually choose to exclude the rationale of  
“administrative difficulties” from explanations for discrimination under the chapeau. 
 
5.1.4 A full-fledged “necessity” test   
In Chapter 1, I have provided a review of the jurisprudence of and comments on the 
“necessity” test, but the purpose was to reveal that the relevant jurisprudential developments are 
increasingly more friendly to domestic regulations. Here, the review is conducted to shed light 
on the assessment of whether policy rationales other than the purported policy objective of the 
disputed measure can explain discrimination under the chapeau of the exception clause. After all, 
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the “necessity” test is the most important one to assess the connection between a disputed 
measure (or certain aspects of it) and a policy rationale.   
 It is easily to equate the “necessity” test with the second “less restrictive” test under the 
relevant subparagraphs. In many cases, it is true that the disputed measure did not pass the 
examination under the subparagraphs because it did not pass the “less restrictive” test, 595 and the 
WTO judiciary tended to find that an less trade restrictive alternative was reasonably 
available.596 The importance of the “less restrictive” test was first established by the GATT panel 
in US – Section 337: 
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent 
with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an 
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is 
not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in 
cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably 
available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably 
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions.597  
The importance of the “less restrictive” test has since been honored by the judiciary of the world 
trading system in both the GATT era and the WTO era.598  
However, the “less restrictive” test is only part of the “necessity” test. If the WTO 
judiciary introduces the “necessity” test to determine whether policy rationales other than the 
purported policy objectives of the disputed measure could explain the discrimination often 
caused by the internal inconsistencies of the measure under the chapeau, we may need to have a 
full-fledged “necessity” test. Although a full-fledged “necessity” test is not always needed in 
actual cases, it is always necessary to know what key components it may have.  
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 As above discussed, the traditional “less restrictive” test was actually the second version 
of “less restrictive” test as identified by Sykes, which focuses on looking for less restrictive 
alternatives. It neglects the direct examination of the disputed measure itself. That did not change 
until Korea – Beef. In Korea – Beef, the AB stated:  
[The] determination of whether a measure, which is not “indispensable”, may 
nevertheless be “necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in 
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently 
include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the 
law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected 
by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on 
imports or exports.599  
The “weighing and balancing” test of the disputed measure in relationship to its purported policy 
objective was thus established. Basically, the “weighing and balancing” test consists of three 
factors to consider: (1) attainment of the purported policy objective of the disputed measure; (2) 
the importance of the values or interest furthered by the disputed measure; (3) trade 
restrictiveness of the disputed measure. As early as in US – Gasoline, the AB established that the 
basic requirements set out in the subparagraphs of the exception clause were different kinds or 
degrees of “connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and the state interest 
or policy sought to be promoted or realized.”600 Therefore, the first factor of the “weighing and 
balancing” test is central. Bown and Trachtman even gave it an independent name – the 
“suitability” test or the “simple means-ends rationality” test.601   
In later cases, it turned out the “weighing and balancing” test was not only concerned 
with the direct analysis of the disputed measure itself. The WTO judiciary has continued its 
focus on alternatives in the “weighing and balancing” test by assessing possible alternatives with 
reference to the disputed measure in a “less restrictive” examination.602 Du therefore commented 
that the “necessity” test became a “weighing and balancing” test with two steps: (1) the direct 
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analysis of the disputed measure as illustrated in Korea – Beef; (2) the “less restrictive” test that 
focuses on whether there is an alternative that is able to achieve the purported policy objective of 
the disputed measure and is reasonably available.603 These two steps also correspond with the 
two versions of the “less restrictive” test proposed by Sykes.  
The second step is certainly different from the first step. However, it turns out that they 
have similar analytical frameworks. The AB said succinctly in EC – Asbestos that, after the first 
step was performed, “[t]he remaining question, then, is whether there is an alternative measure 
that would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade.”604 That is, the examination 
of alternatives also needs to see how they contribute to the achievement of the purported policy 
objective of the disputed measure and how trade restrictive they are. Since alternatives are 
proposed on the premise that they also further the same values or interests as the disputed 
measure, the importance of the values and interests are not evaluated again, but conceptually, 
this factor of consideration is also included regarding the examination of alternatives. It is clear 
the “less restrictive” test largely overlaps with the first step except it focuses on the alternative 
while the first step focuses on the disputed measure respectively. In a sense, the only important 
difference is that the “less restrictive” test would need an additional analysis of whether the 
alternative is “reasonably available.” 
Given the framework similarity between the two steps of analysis, I further argued in 
Chapter 1 that the application of the “necessity” test should include a juxtaposed “weighing and 
balancing” of both the disputed measure and the possible alternative. That is, the two steps are to 
be applied side by side and step by step as long as they are focusing on the same factors of 
analysis. Of course, whether the alternative is “reasonably available” is an exercise exclusive to 
the second step. 
A full-fledged “necessity” test would also include some other factors of consideration not 
stressed in the case law. Three factors can be clearly identified. The first one is whether there 
exists the problem the disputed measure is supposed to address. This is logically the preliminary 
issue before the WTO judiciary engages in the examination of the connection between the 
disputed measure and its purported policy objective. The second one is what is the nature of the 
                                               
603 Michael Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or 
Reality?’ 13 (4) Journal of International Economic Law 1077-1103 (2010), p. 1093. 
604 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (EC - Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 172. 
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issue found to exist and hence how to phrase the policy objective of the measure. One good 
example can be found in EC – Seal products, where parties disagreed on whether the concern 
was about morals or seal welfare and whether the disputed measure had a public morals policy 
objective or an animal welfare policy objective.605 The third additional factor is to determine the 
ALOP of the disputed measure. It is also a preliminary issue. The WTO judiciary needs to know 
the intended level of attainment before it sets out to examine whether and how much the disputed 
measure (and possible alternatives) can achieve the purported policy objective of the disputed 
measure.  
A final note has to be taken, which is that the examination of the connection between 
policy rationales other than the purported policy objective and the discriminatory aspects of the 
disputed measure does not necessarily only rely on the “necessity” test, at least not in every case. 
Thus, the jurisprudence concerning “relating to” as developed in cases involving GATT Article 
XX (g) would also be useful for the reconstructed chapeau.  
Overall, as the subparagraphs of the exception clause are most closely related to the 
chapeau, it is most important for them to make accommodations for the reconstructed chapeau. 
The key is to avoid examining the discriminatory aspects of a disputed measure. GATT Article 
XX (g) and the “reasonably available” analysis under the subparagraphs may create some 
problems, but they can be dealt with to avoid overlap with the analysis under the reconstructed 
chapeau as much as possible. The subparagraphs can also support the reconstructed chapeau in a 
more positive way, which is that the tests to examine the connection between the disputed 
measure and its purported policy objectives can cross-fertilize the similar assessment of the 
connection between the discriminatory aspects of the disputed measure and policy rationales 
other than its purported policy objective under the chapeau.   
 
5.2 GATT Article III:4 
 
The balance between trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy, as Hudec 
suggested, is primarily embodied by the relationship between GATT Articles III and XX.606 The 
                                               
605 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para. 5.134. 
606 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p.620. 
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two versions of the “aim and effects” test proposals try to readjust the balance within GATT 
Article III by incorporating a policy analysis. However, they were turned down by the WTO 
judiciary. Now, as I propose to build on the developments in EC – Seal Products regarding the 
chapeau to readjust the balance, it is desirable to leave the Article III jurisprudence undisturbed. 
However, as people have repeatedly claimed that there are clues in certain cases to indicate the 
WTO judiciary is open to the “aim and effects” test,607 it is necessary to further clarify some of 
the discussions to put the “aim and effects” test to rest.  
Detrimental impacts on products from certain origins resulting from “private choices” 
have been held not to constitute discrimination.608 The economic premise upon which the world 
trading system has been built is to exclude as much artificial influence, especially from 
governments, as possible, leaving trade to private choices.609 In other words, trade shall be 
conducted through private choices influenced by market factors to the extent possible. Only 
detrimental impacts on trade caused by government measures are of concern under the trade 
regime.610 However, cases ruled on this premise may look like that discrimination has been 
justified with policy considerations under GATT Article III. As a policy analysis is deferred to 
GATT Article XX, it is necessary to understand the cases accurately.   
In Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, Dominican Republic required, among other things, 
that both importers and domestic producers post a bond to guarantee compliance with tax 
liabilities.611 According to Honduras, one of the problems with the bond requirement was that the 
bond was set at a fixed amount, not proportionate to the actual amount of tax that needed to be 
guaranteed.612 Honduras further claimed importers who have a lower market share than domestic 
                                               
607 Weihuan Zhou, ‘US – Clove Cigarettes and US – Tuna II (Mexico): Implications for the Role of Regulatory 
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Trade 783-799 (2003); Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’, 
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West Group, 2002, pp. 15-37. 
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611 WTO Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes 
(Dominican Republic – Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, paras. 7.234, 7.235. 
612 WTO Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes 
(Dominican Republic – Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, para 7.269. 
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producers would be burdened with a higher per unit cost of the bond, which was unfair.613 The 
panel ruled that Honduras did not present convincing evidence to support its claim in this regard. 
During appeal, Honduras claimed that the panel failed to compare the per-unit costs incurred or 
wrongly calculated the per-unit costs of imported cigarettes while determining whether imported 
cigarettes had been accorded with less favorable treatment.614 The AB said that the element of 
“treatment no less favourable” under GATT Article III:4 focused on whether the bond 
requirement “modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of 
imported products.”615 Honduras argued that the bond requirement imposed a heavier economic 
burden upon imported cigarettes on a per-unit basis, which means that the bond requirement had 
modified the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported cigarettes. The AB, 
however, said that this was not necessarily true “if the detrimental effect is explained by factors 
or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the market share of the 
importer in this case.”616 Therefore, it was not the bond requirement that altered the conditions of 
competition to the detriment of imports or constituted discrimination. 
In this case, the AB put the premise down clearly in the form of an operative rule. 
Transforming the unstated premise into a stated rule helps clear the ambiguity associated with 
the unstated premise, but it also risks being rigid and is susceptible to misinterpretation. What the 
AB said in this case might be used to suggest discrimination can be justified by more factors than 
market factors within the analytical framework of GATT Article III:4. If it is read literarily, the 
consideration of “factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin” may be read to include 
policy consideration. Under GATT Article III:4, It has long been established that discrimination 
analysis is an analysis of competitive effects. By adding a new analysis of whether “the 
detrimental effect is explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the 
product,” the AB, however, seemed to have transformed ArticleIII:4 into an analysis in the 
perspective of policy rationales as well as the perspective of competition in Dominican Republic 
– Cigarettes.  
                                               
613 WTO Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes 
(Dominican Republic – Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, para 7.295. 
614 WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
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615 WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
Cigarettes (Dominican Republic – Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, para 93. 
616 WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
Cigarettes (Dominican Republic – Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, para 96. 
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However, a literal reading of the AB’s statement in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes will 
render GATT Article XX, including the reconstructed chapeau, redundant. GATT Article XX 
has undoubtedly served the function of assessing measures at issue in the perspective of policy 
objectives. If GATT Article III:4 allows for a consideration of policy objectives, there will be an 
obvious overlap between GATT Articles III:4 and XX, especially rendering the reconstructed 
chapeau partially redundant. When one commentator suggested that the AB had created the 
flexibility in GATT ArticleIII:4 jurisprudence for “purpose inquiries under the ‘treatment no less 
favourable’ test” in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes,617 he certainly overlooked the confusion 
his suggestion would create with regard to the relationship between GATT Articles III:4 and XX. 
Fortunately, such confusion is avoidable if one reads Dominican Republic – Cigarettes 
more carefully and is mindful of later cases that are relevant. The most important reason for the 
AB in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes to dismiss Honduras’ claim is that the AB held that 
Dominican Republic’s fixed bond requirement did not cause the detrimental effect. According to 
the AB, that effect occurred because “the importer of Honduran cigarettes has a smaller market 
share than two domestic producers.”618 The AB also said that the bond requirement might not 
cause a detrimental effect on imports in violation of GATT Article III “if the detrimental effect is 
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the 
market share of the importer in this case.”619 Taking these statements into consideration, it is 
logical to conclude that the AB’s decision was based on whether the causal relationship between 
disputed measures (bond requirement) and detrimental impacts on products from certain origins 
was interfered with by market factors. As found by the AB in this case, market factors were more 
proximate to the result of a higher per unit financial burden on imports from Honduras. Market 
factors not associated with governmental measures disconnected that causal relationship. It is fair 
to argue that the AB did not have policy considerations in mind in Dominican Republic – 
Cigarettes when it referred to “factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin.”  
In Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) which is a recent case concerning GATT Article 
III:4, the AB clarified the analysis of GATT Article III:4 in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes. 
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619 WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
Cigarettes (Dominican Republic – Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, para 96. 
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The AB explained that the determination of “treatment no less favourable” must include a 
determination of the existence of “genuine relationship between the measure at issue and its 
adverse impact on competitive opportunities for imported products versus like domestic 
products.”620 Thus, the AB re-affirmed that the added analytical step under GATT Article III:4 in 
Dominican Republic – Cigarettes is an examination of causation between measure(s) at issue and 
detrimental impact. The AB confirmed that policy rationales would not be considered in this 
added analytical step. This step of examination is to see whether there are other factors such as 
market factors interfering with the causal relationship between government measures and 
detrimental effects. In other words, the added analytical step introduced into GATT Article III:4 
in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes is to make sure modifications of competition conditions are 
not caused by market factors before they find the disputed measure to be discriminatory. If 
market factors are found to have got in the way, the fact that imports are in a disadvantaged 
competitive position cannot be attributed to domestic regulatory measures, and government 
actions cannot be found to have modified conditions of competition or caused discrimination. As 
to the consideration of policy rationales of the disputed measure, it is not a relevant question 
under GATT Article III:4. It is deferred to the analysis under GATT Article XX. 
In US – Clove Cigarettes which is a recent TBT case, the panel borrowed this added 
analytical step of GATT Article III:4 in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes.621 The language of 
TBT Article 2.1 does not contain any requirement of consideration of policy rationales, but the 
panel borrowed the analytical step of “factors or circumstance unrelated to the foreign origin” 
from Dominican Republic – Cigarettes to that effect. The AB did not agree with the borrowing 
though it agreed a policy analysis under TBT Article 2.1 was needed. The AB discarded the 
borrowed analytical step from GATT Article III:4 and added a new one which is an assessment 
of “whether the detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory 
distinction.”622 That is, the AB created a new analytical step for policy analysis instead of 
borrowing from Dominican Republic – Cigarettes. This indicates the AB in US – Clove 
Cigarettes did not believe the added analytical step in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes 
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(US – Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, para. 182. 
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contained an analysis of policy rationales although it needed a policy analysis under TBT Article 
2.1. In a lengthy footnote, the AB also explicitly explained why it substituted the analytical step 
borrowed from Dominican Republic – Cigarettes with a new one. The reason is that the 
borrowed analytical step should be understood only as an inquiry into whether the detrimental 
impact was “attributable to” the measures at issue while not a “function of” some other factor(s) 
such as sales volume.623 
In EC – Seal Products, the AB said more clearly that they “do not consider, as argued by 
the European Union, that for the purposes of an analysis under Article III:4, a panel is required to 
examine whether the detrimental impact of a measure on competitive opportunities for like 
imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.”624 Levy and 
Regan therefore suggested that the discrimination created by the IC procedures against Canadian 
seal products could be explained with “the difference in scale of the Greenland and Canadian 
hunts,”625 which is definitely a consideration of market factors. Although Levy and Regan’s 
suggestion was not adopted by the AB, the AB made it clear that “there must be a ‘genuine 
relationship’ between the measure at issue and the adverse impact on competitive opportunities 
for imported products.”626 If that relationship is interrupted by market factors, government 
measures should not be held responsible for the detrimental impacts on trade. 
Thus, the WTO judiciary has avoided mixing detrimental effects on imports caused by 
market factors and detrimental effects on imports caused by government policies together. The 
division of work between GATT Article III and GATT Article XX is therefore not disturbed. 
The reconstructed chapeau does not have to worry about overlapping with a policy analysis 
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5.3 Implications for Relevant TBT Clauses 
 
As mentioned earlier, the issue that this study focuses on exists not only in GATT and 
GATS cases, but also has been found in SPS and TBT cases. To examine this issue 
comprehensively under the WTO, one must study it under the SPS and TBT contexts as well. 
The treaty structures of the SPS and TBT Agreements, however, are different from the treaty 
structures of the GATT and GATS Agreements. In terms of jurisprudential technicality, we may 
see the same issue poses itself differently in different treaty contexts, with an understanding that 
this issue will be somewhat redefined in terms of jurisprudential details. Therefore, I will pay 
attention to the different treaty contexts whenever necessary in the discussions in this and next 
sections. 
In the TBT context, it looks more difficult to find treaty language to incorporate policy 
analysis to see whether discrimination, particularly discrimination caused by internal 
inconsistencies within technical regulatory measures, can be explained. But we can see that the 
creative interpretation of TBT Article 2.1 by the AB has provided a friendly test for internal 
inconsistencies, allowing discrimination caused by them to be justified with policy rationales, 
especially when we re-read the relevant TBT jurisprudence in light of EC – Seal products. 
However, there may be an overlap between TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2, which should be taken care 
of in order for TBT Article 2.1 to perform a similar task that the reconstructed chapeau of the 
exception clause performs.  
 
5.3.1 Treaty language of relevant clauses and key analytical frameworks 
TBT Article 2.1, which is analogous to GATT Article III, reads: “Members shall ensure 
that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall 
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
and to like products originating in any other country.” Different from the GATT Agreement, the 
TBT Agreement crams both the NT obligation and the MFN obligation into one clause. To 
establish a violation of the NT obligation, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the measure at 
issue must be a technical regulation; (2) the imported and domestic products at issue must be like 
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products; and (3) the treatment accorded to imported products must be less favourable than that 
accorded to like domestic products.627 
Since there is no exception clause in the TBT Agreement, the AB creatively interpreted 
TBT Article 2.1 to incorporate an inquiry into “whether the detrimental impact on imports stems 
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction” to carve out a safe zone for domestic 
regulatory autonomy against a totally pro-trade reading.628 Thus, although there is no treaty 
language as basis for an examination of discrimination through the lens of policy rationales, 
through judicial creation, TBT Article 2.1 has become a provision that assesses discrimination in 
both the competition perspective and the perspective of policy rationales. 
In the policy analysis of discrimination under TBT Article 2.1, the AB has set up a 
general standard for policy rationales that are able to justify seemingly discriminatory technical 
regulations, which is that the policy rationale proposed should be “legitimate.” Naturally, 
“legitimate” distinctions would come from “legitimate” policy rationales. As long as policy 
rationales are deemed legitimate, they are able to justify TBT regulatory discrimination. But 
what groups of policy rationales would qualify, in the newly added inquiry, to create “legitimate” 
distinction? Purported policy objectives of disputed measures or rationales other than the 
purported policy objectives? Or both? As revealed in Chapter 4, the AB did not directly answer 
this question in relevant TBT cases.  
Also as discussed in Chapter 4, TBT Article 2.2 seems to have a legitimate objective 
requirement regarding disputed domestic standards measures. As TBT Article 2.2 is the most 
important context for the analysis of TBT Article 2.1, it may help to shed some light on the scope 
of acceptable policy rationales under TBT Article 2.1. I reproduce it here again:  
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment 
would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security 
requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or 
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safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, 
relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical 
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products. 
TBT Article 2.2 requires a determination of “legitimacy” of objectives of technical regulations. 
Compared with the closed-end list of acceptable policy objectives as prescribed in the 
subparagraphs of the exception clause, an open-ended list of legitimate policy objectives is 
provided here. Although the AB has not established an interpretation, the scope of acceptable 
policy objectives is definitely wider than that under the subparagraphs of the exception clause. 
As TBT Article 2.2 informs TBT Article 2.1, legitimate objectives recognized in TBT Article 2.1 
will not be limited to a closed-end list either. That is to say, while the explicitly recognized 
policy objectives in the GATT and GATS contexts are limited, they are not as limited in the TBT 
Agreement in general and in TBT Article 2.1 in particular even though their scope is not certain 
as for now. As a result, if rationales other than the purported policy objectives of measures at 
issue are to be examined, their “legitimacy” will not be undermined by a closed-end list. 
TBT Article 2.2 is more than a context for Article 2.1. It provides an examination of the 
disputed measure that is analogous to the necessity test in some the subparagraphs of the 
exception clause. In US – Clove Cigarettes, the panel came up with a two-step analytical 
framework under TBT Article 2.2: (1) whether the disputed technical regulation pursues a 
legitimate policy objective; (2) whether the disputed technical regulation is more trade restrictive 
than necessary to fulfill that legitimate objective (taking into account of the risks non-fulfillment 
would create).629 This was not disturbed by the AB during the appeal and has since been 
followed with some refinements.630  
 
5.3.2 Key tests for examination of policy rationales 
Now, let us take a look at the operative tests in the TBT cases to see how the WTO 
judiciary could use policy rationales not limited by a closed-end list to justify discrimination, 
particularly discrimination created by internal inconsistencies of the disputed technical 
regulations. The new interpretive creation under TBT Article 2.1 seems able to take over the task 
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assigned to the reconstructed chapeau of the exception clause. But, it has to be pointed out first 
that the newly added element in the analytical framework of TBT Article 2.1 remains somewhat 
unclear when we start to probe what operative tests the AB employed. 
If the reconstructed chapeau of the exception clause is followed, the analytical element of 
TBT Article 2.1 created by the AB through interpretation would most likely consist of two tiers 
of analysis. In the first tier, the WTO judiciary would examine discrimination in the perspective 
of the purported policy objective of the disputed measure. If the purported policy objective could 
explain the discrimination, the analysis is over and the second tier of analysis is not necessary. If 
the purported policy objective could not explain the discrimination, then in the second tier of 
analysis, the WTO judiciary would examine the discrimination in the perspective of policy 
rationales other than the purported policy objective of the disputed measure. 
What specific tests the WTO judiciary would use as it conducts these steps of analysis? 
When discussing the newly added inquiry, the AB used interchangeable phrases like “whether 
any detrimental impact reflects discrimination against imports,” “whether the technical 
regulation is even-handed,” “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and whether the 
detrimental impact “stems exclusively from a legitimate distinction.” In application, “even-
handedness” was mentioned most frequently and seemed to be used as the operative test in US – 
Clove Cigarettes and US – Tuna II (Mexico), although it was less frequently mentioned and 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” was more frequently mentioned in US – COOL. In US 
– COOL, instead of “even-handedness,” the AB applied the “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” test which is essentially a test to assess alternatives under the chapeau as 
represented by US – Gasoline.631 Basically, the tests identified under TBT Article 2.1 regarding 
the new interpretive creation are very similar to the ones used under the chapeau when analyzing 
the element of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” in EC – Seal Products.  
However, the tests mentioned above have not really been applied to examine whether 
policy rationales other than the purported policy objective of the disputed measure can explain 
discrimination. In the few TBT cases that involve TBT Article 2.1 so far,632 the AB only 
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assessed whether the purported policy objectives of the disputed measures could justify 
discrimination. That is to say, we can only observe what tests the WTO judiciary has used in the 
first tier of analysis. Although in US – Clove Cigarettes, the United States proposed to justify 
discrimination in its regulatory measure with two policy rationales other than the purported 
policy objective of the measure at issue, the two policy rationales were quickly dismissed by the 
AB without a serious examination. Therefore there was no chance to see how the AB would 
apply a test to those two rationales.  
Nevertheless, the assessment of whether policy rationales other than the purported policy 
objective of the disputed measure can explain discrimination under TBT Article 2.1 should not 
be very different from that under the reconstructed chapeau. Indeed, as can be seen in Chapters 2 
and 3, the panel, in EC – Seal Products, spelled out a three-step analytical framework to address 
the issue of whether the disputed measure stemmed exclusively from “legitimate regulatory 
distinctions” under TBT Article 2.1, which was almost identical to the three-step analysis of 
“arbitrariness or unjustifiability” proposed by the AB under the chapeau in the same case. 
Although the AB held EC – Seal Products did not fall under the TBT Agreement,633 the AB 
implied that the panel’s rulings under the TBT Agreement, including its three-step analytical 
framework of the interpretive creation, followed the AB in US – Clove Cigarettes and 
subsequent TBT cases.634 
 
5.3.3 Overlap between TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2 
Basically, TBT Article 2.2 contains a “less restrictive” test, which focuses on whether the 
disputed technical regulation is more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill its purported 
policy objective. In application, this test is analogous to a mixture of the two versions of “less 
restrictive” tests identified by Sykes under the subparagraphs of the exception clause.635 Article 
2.1 that provides non-discrimination obligations is apparently different from Article 2.2. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
WT/DS406; United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 
(US – Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381; United States – Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements 
(US - COOL), WT/DS384&386. 
633 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, para 5.59. 
634 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted June 18 2014, paras. 5.188-
5.130. 
635 Alan O. Sykes, ‘The Least Restrictive Means’, 70 (4) University of Chicago Law Review 403-420 (2003), p. 407 
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relationship between Articles 2.1 and 2.2 is analogous to some extent to that between GATT 
Articles III and XX.   
However, since the AB included a policy analysis through judicial creation under TBT 
Article 2.1, Article 2.1 is likely to overlap with Article 2.2. As discussed earlier, the tests 
identified under TBT Article 2.1 regarding the new interpretive creation are very similar to the 
ones used under the chapeau when analyzing the element of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” in 
EC – Seal products. They are likely to be the “necessity” test or tests used in the subparagraphs 
of the exception clause to examine the connection between the disputed measure and its 
purported policy objective. While the “less restrictive” test under TBT Article 2.2 established 
since US – Clove Cigarettes is clearly part of the “necessity” test, the overlap between TBT 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 seems inevitable. 
In the context of the exception clause, both the reconstructed chapeau and the 
subparagraphs host the “necessity” test for both examine the connection between the disputed 
measure and its policy objectives. The way to avoid overlap is to confine the analysis under the 
subparagraphs to the entire measure while the focus of the analysis under the chapeau is on the 
discriminatory aspects of the measure. TBT Article 2.1 is apparently a non-discrimination clause. 
When a policy analysis is incorporated, it should be an analysis of policy objectives offered to 
explain the discriminatory aspects of the disputed measure. Thus, if TBT Article 2.2 can be 
dedicated to the examination of non-discriminatory aspects of the disputed measure, the overlap 
between TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2 seems also avoidable. 
The TBT jurisprudence supports devoting Article 2.2 to the examination of non-
discriminatory aspects of the disputed measure. For example, when examining whether the 
disputed technical regulation pursues a legitimate policy objective, the panel in US – Clove 
Cigarettes stated that “we are mindful of the Appellate Body's guidance on the need to examine 
a technical regulation as a whole, taking into account, as appropriate, both any prohibitions and 
any exceptions to those prohibitions.”636 The panel actually ignored the exemption in the US ban 
on flavored cigarettes and concluded that the policy objective of the US ban “is to reduce 
smoking by youth.”637 It is more obvious when the panel assessed whether the disputed technical 
                                               
636 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove 
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012,  para. 7.342. 
637 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove 
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, para. 7.343 
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regulation is more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill that legitimate objective (taking into 
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create). Refusing to delve into the exemption of the 
US ban,638 the panel found that the US measure as a whole was not more than necessary to fulfill 
its legitimate policy objective. To be more specific, the panel found that Indonesia was not 
successful in proving that the US ban “exceeded the level of protection intended by the United 
States,”639 or that the ban “did not materially contribute to its policy objective,”640 or that there 
was “a reasonable alternative which was less trade restrictive.” 641  Obviously, the panel 
conducted its analysis by modeling the “necessity” jurisprudence concerning the subparagraphs 
of the exception clause. Indeed, it said it should not depart from “some aspects of the Article XX 
(b) jurisprudence” where they were applicable to TBT Article 2.2.642 These issues were not 
appealed. The AB did not have an opportunity to express its view in US – Clove Cigarettes. 
Nevertheless, the relevant rulings by the panel in US – Clove Cigarettes was endorsed by the AB 
in later cases. 
 In US – Tuna II (Mexico), in the panel’s examination of the US technical regulations 
under TBT Art 2.2, the panel based its analysis on the discriminatory aspects of the US labeling 
regulations and found that they could only partially fulfill its objectives, and therefore a less 
trade restrictive alternative was easily found.643 However, during appeal, the AB disagreed with 
the approach taken by the panel and ignored the discriminatory aspects of the US labeling 
regulations and the panel’s findings concerning TBT Article 2.2 were reversed.644  
In US – COOL, when the United States once again disagreed with borrowing from the 
GATT Art XX (b) analysis concerning whether the disputed technical regulation is more trade 
restrictive than necessary to fulfill that legitimate objective (taking into account of the risks non-
fulfillment would create), the AB explicitly held that the “necessity” test in TBT Art 2.2 was 
                                               
638 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove 
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integrated with the “necessity” jurisprudence under the exception clause of the GATT and GATS 
Agreements.645 The panel, based on its findings under TBT Article 2.1, concluded the US 
labeling requirements also failed the examination under Article 2.2.646 Since the findings under 
Article 2.1 focused on discrimination and possible policy justification for discrimination. 
Therefore, the panel’s conclusions under Article 2.2 in US – COOL were necessarily based on its 
analysis of the discriminatory aspects of the US labeling requirements. However, the AB 
disagreed with the panel regarding the approach it took and the conclusion it made, and reversed 
the panel. 647 
Overall, thanks to the creative interpretation by the AB in US – Clove Cigarettes, TBT 
Article 2.1 can give TBT measures with internal inconsistencies a chance to be justified with 
rationales different from their purported policy objectives. The tests examining those policy 
rationales would resemble the tests used in the analysis of “arbitrariness or unjustifiability” under 
the chapeau. However, TBT Article 2.2 needs to more clearly avoid examining the 
discriminatory aspects of disputed measures in its “less restrictive” analysis in order to avoid 
overlapping with TBT Article 2.1.   
 
5.4 Implications for Relevant SPS Clauses 
 
Compared with the TBT measures, it is easier to find a textual basis to build a policy 
analysis to justify discriminatory SPS measures. Particularly, SPS Articles 2.3 and 5.5 seem able 
to allow discrimination created by internal inconsistencies within SPS measures to be justified 
with policy rationales. However, the SPS Agreement is all about a special type of domestic 
regulatory measures that have the purported policy objective of protecting life and health.648 Are 
there any other policy rationales that are able to override the health objective to deserve a carve-
out, or justify different appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) within one SPS measure? For 
these types of measures, it is difficult to find excuses for internal inconsistencies. It seems that 
                                               
645 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
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COOL), WT/DS384&386/R, adopted 23 July 2012, para. 491. 
648 Hal S. Shapiro, ‘The Rules That Swallowed the Exceptions: the WTO SPS Agreement and Its Relationship to 
GATT Articles XX and XXI’, 24 (1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative law 199-233 (2007), p. 201. 
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the only flexibilities allowed within a SPS measure is based on calibration to different levels of 
risks posed to health or life, which are not really flexibilities of the sort this study is interested in. 
Nevertheless, I will try to discuss what the suggestions can be put forward regarding the relevant 
SPS jurisprudence if the reconstructed chapeau of the exception clause needs to be honored in 
the context of the SPS Agreement, assuming worthy policy rationales that deserve carve-outs or 
flexibilities in SPS measures can be found.  
 
5.4.1 Treaty language of relevant clauses and key analytical frameworks 
SPS Articles 2.3 and 5.5 both contain language guarding against “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” and “a disguised restriction on international trade”, which seem to 
be able to examine internal inconsistencies within SPS measures and allow justification based on 
policy rationales. Article 2.3 contains a nondiscrimination/consistency requirement, which reads:   
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily 
or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions 
prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade. 
Article 5.5 may be seen to be “marking out and elaborating a particular route leading to the same 
destination set out in Article 2.3,”649 WTO judiciary usually only examine discrimination under 
Article 5.5 instead of under both Article 2.3 and Article 5.5. So Article 5.5 is the operative 
provision, which reads: 
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or 
health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different 
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade… 
The analysis under SPS Article 5.5 can be broken into three elements in case law: 
The first element is that the Member imposing the measure complained of has 
adopted its own appropriate levels of sanitary protection against risks to human [, 
                                               
649  WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 212.  
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animal, and plant] life or health in several different situations. The second element to 
be shown is that those levels of protection exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable 
differences (“distinctions” in the language of Article 5.5) in their treatment of 
different situations. The last element requires that the arbitrary or unjustifiable 
differences result in discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade.650 
Overall, SPS measures that have different ALOPs can be justified if the different ALOPs 
correspond with different risks that exist, or if the ALOPs do not result in discrimination or 
restriction on trade even if they are arbitrary or unjustifiable. The first element provides an 
examination of whether the disputed SPS measure has promulgated different ALOPs in 
comparable situations.651 The second element assesses whether the difference between different 
ALOPs can be explained by different risk levels.652 The third element provides an assessment of 
whether different ALOPs result in discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade.  
How a measure would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade has not 
been really discussed in WTO law, particularly under the chapeau of the exception clause. It has 
not been discussed under SPS Article 5.5 either. Without taking it into account, it seems difficult 
to differentiate the second and third elements. Logically, a finding of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
difference in ALOPs should already mean that discrimination exists. The third element looks 
redundant. It seems the second element provides the key test under Article 5.5. The AB stressed 
that the third element focused on the “application” of SPS measures.653 It is also possible to 
include an examination of the impact on competitive opportunities in the third element to 
distinguish itself form the second element. However, in previous cases, the factors of analysis 
included in the third element are largely those discussed in the analysis of the first two 
elements.654 It is difficult to see how the analysis of the third element is fundamentally different 
from that of the second element. 
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The analysis of the second element may utilize the necessity test. In explaining the setting 
of ALOPs to calibrate to different risk levels, an inevitable question may be whether the ALOPs 
set are necessary regarding different risk levels. Or if the setting of different ALOPs is allowed 
to be explained by invoking policy rationales other than calibration to different risk levels, the 
question whether the ALOPs set are necessary regarding the policy rationales invoked is also 
important. Since the analysis of third element may not be very different from the analysis of the 
second element, it is likely the third element may include a necessity test in its policy analysis. 
SPS Article 5.6 provides a necessity requirement although it does not use the word 
“necessary” in the text. If Article 5.6 examines the discriminatory aspects of a disputed SPS 
measure, it is possible for it to overlap with Article 5.5. Article 5.6 reads:  
Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or maintaining 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more 
trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility. 
It basically asks whether the disputed SPS measure is necessary for the ALOPs it sets while the 
ALOPs are based on policy considerations like calibrating to risk levels or even other objectives. 
The footnote to SPS Article 5.6 clarifies that it asks the necessity question by providing an 
examination of alternatives. An examination of alternatives is only concerned with the second 
version of “less restrictive” test identified by Sykes. According to the footnote, an alternative 
exists if it (1) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; (2) 
is able to achieve the intended ALOP set by the regulating WTO Member; and (3) is less 
restrictive on trade than the disputed SPS measure.  
 
5.4.2 “Calibration” to different risk levels  
The SPS cases concerning discrimination have focused on the issue whether ALOPs shall 
be set differently in different but comparable circumstances regarding the severity of the same 
risks.655 In other words, if the issue of discrimination is involved, almost all SPS cases have been 
concerned with calibration to different levels of the same risks. It has to be noted that flexibilities 
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allowed to accommodate different levels of the same health risks are still based on the 
consideration of the health objective. That is to say, SPS measures at issue should be allowed to 
be calibrated to conditions that are different in the perspective of the health objective as the only 
purported policy objective of SPS measures. Calibration to different risk levels in SPS measures 
are not concerned with the need for flexibilities driven by policy rationales other than the health 
objective. It is inherent justification for different treatment of like products based on health 
concerns, independent of other substantive policy considerations.656 Discrimination caused by 
internal inconsistencies are often not justifiable with the reason of calibrating to different risk 
levels.  
In EC – Hormones, the European Union prohibited imported meat products treated with 
hormones for growth purposes. 657  This prohibition was based on health concerns.658  The 
European Union was charged to have set too high an ALOP concerning the use of hormones for 
growth purposes while have not set the same ALOP concerning the use of certain other 
hormones. Imported meat products were detrimentally impacted most by the prohibition and 
hence the European Union was charged of violating nondiscrimination/consistency obligation 
under SPS Article 2.3 and Article 5.5. 
It was argued that SPS Article 5.5 (particularly, the second element of analysis) was 
designed to allow calibration to different risk levels and require SPS measures to achieve 
“consistency” in accordance with different risk levels in application.659 If like products are 
treated differently according to their difference regarding risk levels, the WTO judiciary should 
not hold that the different treatment is arbitrary or unjustifiable, or constitutes discrimination. In 
EC – Hormones, the AB compared the risks related to growth hormones which were banned with 
the risks related to certain other hormones which were not banned and found the latter 
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represented as high a risk as, if not a higher risk than, the former.660 The AB then found “the 
difference in the EC levels of protection in respect of the hormones in dispute when used for 
growth promotion, on the one hand, and certain other hormones, on the other hand, is 
unjustifiable in the sense of Article 5.5.”661  
When analyzing the third element, the AB seemed to avoid focusing on calibration to 
different risk levels. It said, when applying the third element of analysis, that “the degree of 
difference, or the extent of the discrepancy, in the levels of protection, is only one kind of factor 
to be considered. [...] [T]he difference in levels of protection that is characterizable as arbitrary 
or unjustifiable is only an element of (indirect) proof […] [of] discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.”662 However, it is clear that the AB cannot exclude the analysis 
of the second element from the third element. The third element still examines the same factors 
already examined in the analysis of the second element. Nevertheless, It may be argued that the 
AB wanted affirmative proof of protectionism in the third element of analysis.663 The AB 
seemed to have included a search for discriminatory intent. When it did not find any, it did not 
find the unjustifiably different ALOPs result in discrimination in analysis of the third element.664  
Overall, it is clear that, in EC – Hormones, the second element of analysis under SPS 
Article 5.5 hosts an examination of calibration of ALOPs to risk levels. There was no other 
policy rationales offered to explain the difference between ALOPs related to different hormones. 
Even the third element does not appear to be very different from an examination of calibration to 
different risk levels. 
In Australia – Salmon, “to prevent the introduction of any infectious or contagious 
disease, or disease or pest affecting persons, animals or plants,” Australia prohibited the 
importation of uncooked salmon for commercial purposes.665 The panel held that Australia, by 
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adopting arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the ALOPs, had violated SPS Article 5.5 and, 
on that ground, had also acted inconsistently with the requirements contained in SPS Article 
2.3.666 This conclusion was based on scientific studies that the risks associated with banned 
imported salmon were no greater than that associated with other salmon.667 Therefore, the same 
level of risks only warrants the same ALOPs.668 It was not reasonable to be over-cautious with 
regard to the banned salmon while other salmon were allowed access to Australian market.669 
The panel’s findings on this issue were upheld during appeal.670 The AB agreed with the panel 
that the latter category of salmon represented “as high as, if not a higher risk than, the former 
category.”671 The AB also upheld the panel’s ruling that the Australian measure is discriminatory 
in the end, which was largely based on its findings in the analysis of the first two elements.672 
Interestingly, regarding the third element, the AB did not take as many efforts as it did in EC – 
Hormones to distinguish it from the second element and commented that “All ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions’ in levels of protection will lead logically to discrimination between 
products.”673 This case is very similar to EC – Hormones and it also only recognized calibration 
to different risk levels as a legitimate justification for different ALOPs. 
In 2000, “Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 5.5 (Guidelines)” 
were adopted to clarify the practical implications of the requirement contained in SPS Article 
5.5. What matters to this study is that the Guidelines affirms that “[w]hat a Member is comparing 
are the levels of protection against the risks posed by potential hazards to human, animal or plant 
life or health” when considering the ALOPs in different situations.674 
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In recent cases, calibration of SPS measures to different risk levels under SPS Article 5.5 
has been reaffirmed. In Australia – Apple, apples imported from New Zealand were subject to 
certain SPS measures for the purpose of controlling the possible risks of disease spread while 
domestic apples were not.675 As to whether there were arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
the measures applied by Australia in different situations, the panel assessed it by comparing the 
risks involved in the comparable situations and the measures applied by Australia against such 
risks.676 
In US – Poultry (China), the United States applied a higher ALOP to poultry products 
from China and lower ALOPs to poultry products from other WTO Members.677 This resulted in 
that poultry products from China were subject to a more stringent sanitary measure while poultry 
products from other WTO Members enjoyed more lenient sanitary treatments. The Panel turned 
to Brazil – Retreaded Tyres for help to determine whether the distinction between the ALOPs 
was arbitrary or unjustifiable.678 The Panel declared that, like in GATT Article XX cases, 
distinctions made under SPS Articles 2.3 and 5.5 could be justified if there was a legitimate 
cause or rationale in the light of the legitimate objectives of the measure at issue to explain 
them.679 However, this declaration did not mean a new approach was adopted to apply SPS 
Article 5.5. In assessing the distinction at issue, the panel concluded that there was no scientific 
evidence to support that different risk levels were associated respectively with poultry products 
from China and other WTO Members. Therefore, the panel held the distinction of ALOPs 
between poultry products from China and other WTO Members could not be properly explained 
and was hence arbitrary or unjustifiable. In essence, the Poultry panel followed the relevant case 
law starting from EC – Hormone, assessing the distinctions in ALOPs against the risk levels 
associated with relevant products.680 No other policy rationales were offered to explain the 
distinction of ALOPs. 
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5.4.3 Extension of the SPS Article 5.5 jurisprudence to the examination of policy rationales other 
than health objectives as justification for discrimination 
 Hypothetically, the analysis under Article 5.5 can be extended beyond calibrating to 
different risk levels. Without considering judicial interpretation, the text alone does not really 
limit the analysis to calibration to different risk levels. Moreover, after reading the SPS 
Agreement, there is not another SPS provision in which discrimination caused by real internal 
inconsistencies within SPS measures can be examined. The analytical framework under SPS 
Article 5.5 has to provide for the analysis of internal inconsistencies if the reconstructed chapeau 
needs to be respected and transplanted into the SPS context. However, locating the specific 
analytical step and ascertaining the relevant test for policy rationales as justification for 
discrimination would prove to be quite difficult within SPS Article 5.5. The reason is that, 
compared with case law concerning other WTO Agreements, SPS case law offers little help. The 
analytical framework under SPS Article 5.5 has long been applied for the examination of 
distinctions calibrating to different risk levels. Or it has evolved only with calibration to different 
risk levels in mind. Therefore, Article 5.5 may be a blunt tool for the extension.  
When examining discrimination caused by policy rationales other than the purported 
policy objectives of measures at issue, it is sensible to think that the second element shall provide 
a test, since there is a determination of whether the distinction in protection levels is arbitrary or 
unjustifiable in the assessment of the second element. If policy rationales other than the 
purported policy objectives can explain the distinction, the difference in ALOPs and related 
treatment would not be arbitrary or unjustifiable. In the case law, however, the AB only assessed 
the distinction in ALOPs calibrated to different risk levels in the analysis of the second element. 
It has never even hinted that the second element of analysis was able to examine discrimination 
based upon policy rationales other than the purported policy objectives.  
The third element is also a candidate for receiving the proposed developments under the 
chapeau of the exception clause. Although the analysis of it overlaps with that of the second 
element, the case law concerning it is not exclusively about calibration to different risk levels. 
The panel in EC – Hormones held that “the absence of any plausible justification” on the part of 
                                                                                                                                                       
United State – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China (US – Poultry (China)), WT/DS392/R, 
adopted 29 September 2010, para 7.262. 
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EU for the significant difference in protection levels in compatible situations was one important 
step of analysis in the assessment of the third element.681 This definitely can be seen as an 
examination in the policy objective perspective, and an opening to justification for 
discrimination based on rationales other than the purported policy objectives of the SPS 
measures at issue. As mentioned earlier, the AB in EC – Hormones also stressed that the third 
element should be different from the second element.682  
The test under the third element is not as clear as expected. What is a “plausible” 
justification needs further clarification. However, looking for plausible justification could not 
possibly be truly different from the determination of “arbitrariness or unjustifiableness” of 
discrimination in the policy objective perspective. Thus, if the WTO judiciary conducts a 
detailed examination of discrimination in the policy objective perspective in general or in the 
perspective of rationales other than the purported policy objectives of measures at issue in 
particular, the same tests as those used under the second element of analysis of SPS Article 5.5, 
TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article XX Chapeau would probably be applied again.  
The opening in the third element to the examination of policy rationales other than the 
purported policy objective of SPS measures seems to have been narrowed in some cases. For 
example, it is true that the third element may examine additional factors, but the additional 
consideration is at best relevant to the manner of the application of the SPS measures.683 For 
another example, in Australia – Salmon, the Panel considered six factors in the analysis of the 
third element. Most of them seem to be factors demonstrating a nature of arbitrariness or 
unjustifiability also to be considered in the second element.684 Also the AB appeared to suggest 
more than implicitly that the third element was not really independent from the second one.685  
Nevertheless, compared with a body of case law overwhelmingly dominated by the issue 
of calibrating to risk levels, the jurisprudence of the third element would be more friendly to a 
                                               
681 WTO Panel Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998 para. 8.244. 
682  WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 240. 
683 The AB said in EC – Hormones, “[w]e understand the last element to be referring to the measure embodying or 
implementing a particular level of protection as resulting, in its application, indiscrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.” See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 214.  
684  WTO Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia – Salmon), 
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 20 October 1998, paras. 8.149–8.155. 
685 WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia – Salmon), 
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 20 October 1998, para. 169. 
 207 
transplant from the chapeau of the exception clause. A transplant from the chapeau of the 
exception clause would mean borrowing indirectly from the typical necessity test when 
examining whether other policy rationales could justify discrimination contained in SPS 
measures. That may cause SPS Article 5.5 to overlap with Article 5.6. 
 
5.4.4 Overlap between SPS Articles 5.5 and 5.6 
Before discussing the possible overlap between SPS Articles 5.5 and 5.6, I would like to 
briefly discuss Article 5.4 that may also overlap with Article 5.5. SPS Article 5.4 requires WTO 
Member to “take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects.” It seems that 
Article 5.4 provides a “least trade restrictive” test. If the SPS Agreement is compared with the 
TBT Agreement, SPS Article 5.4 is more like TBT Article 2.2. It would overlap with Article 5.5, 
just as TBT Article 2.2 may overlap with Article 2.1. However, Article 5.4 has not been applied 
yet. The reason is that it is regarded as not operative. In EC – Hormones, the panel commented 
that “guided by the wording of Article 5.4…we consider that…[it] does not impose an 
obligation.”686 Therefore, SPS Article 5.4 would not really create any problem for SPS Article 
5.5 when it extends to accommodate SPS measures with internal inconsistencies if there are 
policy rationales other than SPS objectives that explain the internal inconsistencies.  
But Article 5.6 is different. It provides an operative obligation.687 Like Article 5.5, SPS 
Article 5.6 has its counterpart in Article 2 as well, which is Article 2.2. Besides other basic 
obligations, Article 2.2 contains a necessity requirement. That requirement is further developed 
in Article 5.6. 688  Since SPS Articles 5.5 (and its roots in Article 2) contains a non-
discrimination/consistency obligation. The relationship between Articles 5.5 and 5.6 is also 
analogous to that between TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2, or as that between GATT Articles III and 
XX (actually only XX (b)) if there is a policy analysis under Article III. 
As said earlier, when SPS Article 5.5 is open to examination of policy rationales other 
than the purported policy objective of SPS measures as they are offered to justify discrimination, 
it may need to import tests from the reconstructed chapeau of the exception clause. The possible 
                                               
686 WTO Panel Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para. 8.166. 
687 WTO Panel Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products (India – 
Agricultural Products), WT/DS430/R, adopted 19 June 2015, para. 7.614. 
688 WTO Panel Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products (India – 
Agricultural Products), WT/DS430/R, adopted 19 June 2015, para. 7.613. 
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overlap between TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2 would replicate itself in the relationship between SPS 
Articles 5.5 and 5.6. Again, the way to avoid overlap is to confine the analysis under SPS Article 
5.6 to the entire measure while focus the analysis under Article 5.5 on the discriminatory aspects 
of the measure.  
In SPS cases, the scope of the measure has not been an explicit issue. One reason is the 
WTO judiciary avoided deciding it under SPS Article 5.6. For example, in one of the most 
classical SPS disputes – EC – Hormones, the panel exercised judicial economy and refused to 
decide it under both SPS articles 2.2 and 5.6, which was upheld by the AB.689 Another more 
important reason is that the WTO judiciary does not want to scrutinize ALOPs set by Members 
under SPS Article 5.6. In Australia – Salmon, the AB said that setting ALOPs is “a prerogative 
of the Member concerned and not of a panel or the Appellate Body” when it tried to find the 
ALOP set by respondent in that case.690 Under SPS Article 5.6, there usually is only one ALOP 
claimed by the respondents in SPS disputes, which is usually taken for granted by the WTO 
judiciary. If there is discrimination in terms of ALOPs set and measures imposed accordingly, it 
is ignored. Thus, it looks like the overlap between SPS Articles 5.5 and 5.6 can be avoided 
without much disturbance to the case law.  
Overall, when compared with the relevant jurisprudence in the TBT context, there are 
more questions that need to be answered and more difficulties that need to be overcome, if the 
SPS jurisprudence is to receive the reconstructed chapeau of GATT Article XX into the SPS 
context. Of course, some work also needs to be done and some ambiguities need to be clarified 
regarding the relevant TBT jurisprudence and the jurisprudence concerning the subparagraphs of 
the exception clause in the GATT and GATS Agreements. It is probably only GATT Article III 
that does not need any change to pave the way for the reconstructed chapeau of the exception 
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WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para. 253 (n). 
690 Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia – Salmon), WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 20 






The GATT Agreement, a cornerstone of the world trading system, was drafted more than 
70 years ago. Over the years, more and more side agreements, a great of number of which were 
built on specific clauses of the GATT Agreement, have been added to the treaty system under the 
world trade regime. However, the GATT Agreement remains unchanged. Its inadequacy to deal 
with contemporary issues including the balance between trade disciplines and domestic 
regulatory autonomy has been apparent.  
  The greatest constraints on domestic regulatory autonomy imposed by the GATT 
Agreement are the rule-exception structure in the Agreement and certain cumbersome conditions 
domestic regulatory measures have to meet under the exception clause. Among the conditions set 
under the exception clause, the most restrictive one is that domestic regulatory measures must 
have policy objectives that are on a short list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of the exception 
clause. In Hudec’s view, these constraints originally targeted explicit discrimination and were 
too strict for de facto discrimination that had become more common in domestic regulations.691 
Hudec’s opinion has been widely shared.692 But Hudec did not foresee the restriction the relevant 
GATT jurisprudence imposed on domestic regulations would be taken to another level when 
domestic regulatory measures became more and more complex and refined.  
As can be seen from WTO cases, Members have tended to take consideration of multiple 
legitimate values and interests and to design and implement measures in a more flexible way to 
accommodate these values and interests. This trend is probably inevitable due to the rise of the 
                                               
691 Robert E. Hudec, ‘Scope for GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’, 32 (3) International Lawyer 619-649 (1998), p. 622. 
692 A survey of the concept national regulatory autonomy in the perspective of a few theories revealed that many 
scholars had not been happy with the constraints imposed by the GATT jurisprudence on domestic regulatory 
autonomy. See Michael Ming Du, ‘The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime’, 14 (3) 




regulatory state.693 However, these measures often contain internal inconsistencies in order to 
accommodate multiple policy objectives. Discrimination caused by the internal inconsistencies 
in such measures cannot be explained by the purported policy objectives that are often on the 
closed-end list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of the exception clause. What can really 
explain discrimination thus created are policy rationales that are different from the purported 
policy objectives of the measures and often not on the list as prescribed in the subparagraphs of 
the exception clause. However, under traditional WTO jurisprudence, discrimination is not 
justifiable by these policy rationales. It seems that Members have to design and implement their 
domestic regulatory measures without internal inconsistencies. Sometimes, they have very good 
rationales to have carve-outs in their measures or treat some products less favorably than other 
products even in the perspective of the purported policy objectives.694 While guarding against 
excuses for trade protectionism, the WTO should not interfere with Members’ autonomy to 
regulate in a more flexible way. 
As the anti-globalization movement is becoming more powerful, it seems the WTO 
judiciary cannot wait any longer for a paralyzed political organ to re-adjust the balance between 
trade disciplines and domestic regulatory autonomy. Fortunately, in EC – Seal Products, for the 
first time, the panel identified and explicitly discussed a long-avoided question: How shall 
discrimination created by internal inconsistencies of a disputed domestic regulatory measures be 
justified? Also in EC – Seal Products, for the first time, the panel and the AB provided an 
answer that discrimination, particularly discrimination created by the internal inconsistencies of 
disputed domestic regulatory measures could be justified by policy rationales different form the 
purported policy objectives of the regulatory measures at issue. It seems the short list was 
circumvented.  
                                               
693 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’, 41 (2) Journal of Economic Literature 
401-425 (2003), pp. 401-405.  
694 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, ‘Regulatory autonomy and multilateral disciplines: the dilemma and a 




EC – Seal Products was somewhat ambiguous. Therefore, the importance of EC – Seal 
Products has been under-valued. But I think the AB had pointed a very clear direction and 
following it has benefits in both the technical sense and the political sense. Technically, EC – 
Seal Products expanded domestic regulatory autonomy under the chapeau of the exception 
clause. This approach works better than the “aim and effects” approach, the major alternative 
favored by Hudec and others,695 by preserving the original division of work between GATT 
Article III and XX. Politically, since EC – Seal Products was the only case where the AB tried 
most earnestly to re-adjust the balance between trade disciplines and domestic regulatory 
autonomy, it should be followed if the WTO has to appease the anti-globalization powers.    
After an examination of the relevant case law, it is clear that EC – Seal Products is 
reconcilable with most precedents except Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. It would not be difficult to 
overrule Brazil – Retreaded Tyres and further clarify and develop EC – Seal Products. On this 
assumption, this study further reconstructs the chapeau of the exception clause, which is turned 
into a tool to justify disputed domestic regulatory measures with policy rationales within a wider 
scope. Of course, this tool does not provide an unconditional endorsement for domestic 
regulatory measures conflicting with trade disciplines. Certain tests, possibly including a 
necessity test, have to be established to examine policy rationales not limited by the short list to 
guard against abuses. This study also tentatively probes the boundary of the expanded scope of 
policy rationales that would be acceptable under the chapeau to justify disputed domestic 
regulatory measures. To go down the road pointed out by EC – Seal Products, it is not enough to 
only reconstruct the chapeau of the exception clause. Relevant clauses in and outside the GATT 
Agreement are also discussed to harmonize WTO law with the reconstructed chapeau. 
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In recent years, the world trading system has experienced a very difficult time. Compared 
with many urgent and grave issues, the delicate balance between trade disciplines and domestic 
regulatory autonomy appears less important. Do we really need to go through all the troubles to 
reconstruct and tweak some of the most complicated WTO jurisprudence to draw a new line for 
that balance? One probable answer is no. No, we probably do not. There are so many more 
urgent and seemingly more fundamental issues need attention. However, the value of this study 
is that, if the WTO survives the current crises and things return to their normal state, the 
balancing issue this study focuses upon would become pivotal again to the world trading system. 
Also, the strict constraints imposed by WTO law, as interpreted and applied by the WTO 
judiciary, on domestic regulatory measures may have helped to fuel the anti-globalization 
movement. In that case, it is a self-redemption the WTO judiciary has to make on behalf of itself 
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